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Abstract 
 
This thesis examines the experiences of WX Australian and American women who have 
been tested for BRCAZ- and BRCA[-associated hereditary breast and ovarian cancer 
syndrome. Existing anthropological approaches to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer 
syndrome assert a stern analytic division between biomedical and genetic, and familial 
relatedness. By asserting the primacy of the individual, these approaches attempt to 
rescue the socially connected at-risk woman who chooses her relations with others 
affectively, from the genetic sequence that dictates her relations with others medically. 
This figure of the ‘individual’ is anthropologically considered to organise socially 
significant others according to either selfish or selfless motives:  she may selfishly have 
children despite the risk of cancer she confers, or selflessly hold back her reproductive 
desires. These difficult emotional decisions, it is anthropologically asserted, are 
obscured by a medical world that dictates genetic relatedness. But, as I show in this 
thesis, analyses that sharply contrast genetic and social forms of relatedness prevent us 
from seeing their shared basis in, simultaneously, partiality and collectivity.   
 
Rather than taking up the familiar combative anthropological stance in which the 
biomedical and the social are sharply contrasted, I take my cue from a basic principle of 
genetic inheritance. Genes challenge the discrete boundedness of the body: each person 
makes partial genetic contributions which, in concert with the partial contributions of 
others, yield the genetic collective that is ‘me.’ Just as persons are the collective product 
of partial contributions of others, so too is the social institution of the family. The family 
is a sociality made and maintained in fleshy relations between parts of bodies that 
together create a familial collective. Taking the notions of partiality and collectivity that 
are found in both genetic and social worlds of cancer as key motifs, I offer up a new 
analysis of precancerous lives. Instead of seeing at-risk women who act as bounded 
individuals – either selfishly or selflessly – I focus on the precancerous parts of women’s 
bodies that threaten to disrupt familial collectivities. Such an analysis tells us much 
about the importance of particular body parts to the intercorporeal sociality of the 
family, how critical it is that those parts remain reliably there, however unreflexively 
 v 
considered they might usually be, and how wrenching it is to have to remove parts 
critical to the making and maintenance of the family to remain in it as a living presence. 
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Introduction 
 
How do anthropologists understand and analyse experiences of hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer? The paradigmatic approach in the discipline to date is overwhelmingly 
biosocial. In these analyses, emphasis is placed on the presence of a genetic mutation 
as organising the at-risk woman’s experience of (pre) cancer and her social relationships 
that are threatened by cancer risk. The figure of the individual is foundational to 
dominant anthropological accounts of the woman bearing hereditary illness and its 
associated risks. It is the individual who harbors, passes on and suffers disease or its 
spectre.  This emphasis on the individual, located at the heart of a biosocial network 
generated by the conditions of her genes, obscures the propensity of the body to exist 
as an intercorporeal sociality. These approaches precede and make abstract a clearly 
identifiable individual who arrays a genetically given social world. This predominant 
figuring of precancerous women certainly sees individual bodies as linked to one 
another, in a network of cancerous connectivity. In doing so, these accounts that focus 
on the biosocial world presuppose the body’s integrity, but do not attend to the ways in 
which the body is always, already, indistinguishable as a discrete entity. Not only is the 
body thought of as bounded in such approaches, it is also considered in terms of its 
wholeness. In the dominant anthropological literature on hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer, the body is a whole fleshy entity called ‘the individual.’ This discrete body 
produces, resists, expands and constrains the social relations available to her, resultant 
of the genetic mutation that forms part of her medico-social identity.   
 
In this thesis, I take a different approach to ethnographic material on hereditary breast 
and ovarian cancer that looks very similar to that found in existing anthropological 
studies, in the sense that I interviewed women making choices about how to handle 
their risk of developing hereditary breast or ovarian cancer. These women had a strong 
family history of cancer and had tested positive or were awaiting testing for a gene 
mutation linked to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer syndrome. As outlined below, 
women carrying a Breast Cancer Z (BRCAZ) mutation have between a W`-fX% lifetime 
chance of developing breast cancer and a eg-`e% lifetime chance of developing ovarian 
 [ 
cancer while a woman carrying a Breast Cancer [ (BRCA[) mutation has between a ef-
fW% chance of developing breast cancer and a Z`.h-[X% chance of ovarian cancer. 
Although the presence of a mutation in either of these genes does not necessarily result 
in cancer, the prevalence of cancer amongst women with mutated BRCA genes is up to 
five times higher than those women who do not carry these mutations.  
 
In my analysis, I move beyond the paradigmatic parameters of hereditary cancer 
research in anthropology to date. I do so by taking a view of a bodily being that does 
not presuppose a discrete wholeness of the body congruous with the classifier 
‘individual.’ I begin rather with the notion of fleshy relationality. Instead of taking 
precancerous or at-risk bodies as discrete individual entities that circulate and relate in 
networks with other discrete individual bodies, I offer up a partial and porous body that 
is always relational. If we closely attend to fleshy life, the fleshy life of at-risk women 
and families, we see that it is hardly ever the whole body that acts, expresses and relates. 
It is, rather, elements or parts writ more or less significant to the occasion that come to 
act accordingly. An attendance to partial deployments, and not the wholeness or 
boundedness of flesh, reveals that it is partial relations between bodies that are 
responsible for creating and maintaining the institution we know as the ‘family.’  
 
Attending to partial relations is crucial to a thesis that examines the lives of people 
dealing with the prospect of having parts of their bodies removed. For women at-risk of 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, particular body parts – namely breasts and ovaries 
– are drawn into the foreground by precancerous means. The cancerous potential of 
these body parts brings to attention their more usual backgroundness in the habitual 
actions and rhythms of everyday life. Significantly, the cancerous potential of these body 
parts also serves to emphasise their role in creating institutions such as the family. As I 
will detail in Chapters One and Two, the recognition that body parts act together to 
collectively create institutions such as the factory floor or the army has been reflected 
upon by scholars such as Foucault (ZgXX). Likewise, Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW), in 
considering the role of emotion in sociality, demonstrate how parts of bodies act 
together to create the institution of the family. Not only is the family constructed from 
these interconnecting parts, it is, as Merleau-Ponty (Zg`f) suggests, the work of others 
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that together form the very thing that we call the person. It is in these partial relations 
between bodies that the body of the person and the body of the family is created. My 
refusal to recognise the bounds of the conceptual individual as corresponding with the 
boundaries of the flesh is particularly significant to my understanding of the experience 
of women who removed what they considered to be crucial body parts.  
 
For at-risk women, parts of precancerous bodies are removed in the service of continued 
participation in the body familial, a practice that I think underscores the importance of 
partial relations. In the experience of my informants, some parts were more critical to 
maintaining familial and other social relations than were others. Relating to others with 
and through the presence of these parts generated something I have termed ‘breasted 
sociality,’ and ‘ovarian sociality.’ When those parts had to be removed, people replaced 
them, or found new ways to participate in the body familial and social life. In this sense, 
my analysis of fleshy relationality is congruous with the experience of my participants, 
as practitioners of partial relations. It is these partial relations that are overlooked in 
anthropological analyses that insist upon the individual as the key analytic unit for 
understanding the at-risk woman.  
 
Another fundamental part of the approach anthropologists have tended to take towards 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer has been to emphasise the capacity of the gene, or 
gene mutation, to relate whole individual bodies to one another. Medical 
anthropologists have claimed that the individual who arranges her own kinship 
relations, based on affectivity and choice against the backdrop of a mutated cancer gene, 
comes to be subsumed by the biomedical domain and must be rescued. We can see such 
thinking in the work of Kaja Finkler ([jjj), a dominant figure in the field of 
anthropological analyses of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. Finkler ([jjj, p. e) 
characterises the current age as one marked by the ‘hegemony of the gene’ that has 
ushered in the ‘medicalization of kinship.’ She argues that: 
  
family and kin relationships are being drawn into the biomedical domain through 
current comprehension that diseases are genetically transmitted from generation 
to generation. The medicalization of any human condition dramatically affects 
people’s deepest level of experience, understanding, and actions, transforming the 
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person from an active being [read ‘individual’] into a passive patient… the 
medicalization of kinship is relatively recent because it is being especially 
promoted by the new genetics… In fact, the sharing of DNA is becoming the 
hallmark of people’s relationships with those designated as family and kin… The 
ideology of genetic inheritance unites, often unwillingly, the individual with his or 
her family and kin, over and above the nuclear family. Whereas individuals may 
choose kin on the basis of affective ties, as is the case in modern society, the new 
genetics prescribes one’s kin relations on the basis of birth rather than on choice 
(Finkler, [jjj, p. Z`)  
  
In Finkler’s ([jjj) analysis of genetic medicine, we see the emergence of a struggle to 
deliver the individual agent from the powerful force of gene hegemony as her familial 
relations come to be arrayed according to gene relatedness and hereditary. In Finkler’s 
work, the individual is the key analytic unit used to distinguish the decision-taking, 
world-arraying woman from the genetic network of relationality which she belongs, 
according to medicine. It is this agential, autonomous individual, Finkler ([jjj) 
purports, who risks being subsumed by the burdens and obligations of her genetic kin, 
with whom she may not share affective ties. Such concern over the individual’s rights 
and autonomy in the face of other’s demands, Nedelsky (Zggj) argues, is well 
established in Western society and scholarship. The bounded individual and 
individuated body, she writes, is ensconced in Western ideals of personal freedom and 
autonomy, such concern for spatial boundaries derived from early property laws. 
Consequently, Nedelsky (Zggj) posits, the bounded individual is, often unconsciously, 
seen as in need of defence against others in order to ensure one’s own autonomy.  
 
Concurrent with the view of the individual struggling under the weight of genetic 
knowledge and responsibility we see in Finkler’s ([jjj) work is the notion that medical 
views of the person are wholly incongruent with anthropological ones. In this thesis, I 
argue that they are not necessarily incongruous. I take this stance on the basis of the 
partial relationality that bodies-in-action and genes-in-process each share. They each 
make problematic the notion of the discrete and bounded whole individual body.  
 
I have indicated my analytic interest in the partiality of the familial body and how it is 
foundational to the collectivity of familial relationality above, and in what follows I 
briefly sketch out the same with respect to genetic relations. The body, in genetic 
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medicine, is fundamentally partial. The ‘individual’ body is, by necessity, the yield of the 
genetic contributions of others. ‘It is an anthropological axiom,’ Strathern (Zgg[a, p. Z[) 
reminds us, ‘that however discrete they appear to be, entities are the product of 
relations.’ From an Anglo-American viewpoint, children, she argues, are ‘genetic 
hybrids by nature… regarded as constellations of elements [genes] derived from each 
parent but mixed in such a way as to make them into unique entities’ (Strathern, Zggh, 
p. W[g). In this regard, the concept of the discrete ‘individual’ body is inherently 
problematic. In a genetic sense, bodies are always produced in and through other bodies 
and are always relational. Indeed, genetics is all about the relatedness of bodies. Persons 
are ‘natural hybrids’ of other persons (Strathern, Zgg[a, p. ZZZ).  
 
I am not suggesting that the way in which genetics and genetic medicine view the body 
and the experiences of the body discussed by my informants are entirely congruous or 
synonymous. To insist upon such direct comparison or correlation would overlook 
some of the problematic ways in which particular genetic knowledge and genetic 
understandings of the body, for example, genetic essentialism, have strengthened 
essentialist thinking about identity and social connections, rendering ‘personal esteem 
and self-worth, group cohesion [and] access to resources’ at stake (Brodwin, [jj[, p. 
e[h). Considering the hybrid composition of bodies however, as Strathern (Zgg[a) 
suggests, provides fertile grounds for reimagining the body in this space and for 
thinking anew about bodily experience. Throughout this thesis, I am drawing on this 
imagining of the body as a hybrid of partial contributions of genes, as does Strathern 
(Zggh) to think about other ways in which the body is partially constructed.   
 
This fundamental relatedness of genes, for Finkler ([jjZ, p. [Wf), is the key issue of 
genetic medicine as the ‘individual [who carries a cancer gene mutation] is united… by 
asocial and amoral DNA’ with others to whom she may have no social or affective 
relation. Finkler ([jjj) is concerned about this genetic relationality, and its capacity to 
dictate who is related to whom. She worries that this form of relationality may diminish 
how people affectively conduct kinship relations with their nearest and dearest. 
Consequently, Finkler ([jjj) and other medical anthropologists of hereditary breast 
and ovarian cancer (see Hallowell, Zggg; d'Agincourt-Canning, [jj`), seek to disrupt 
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this genetically ‘given’ relationality by vigorously reinserting the figure of the individual, 
one that is capable of choosing her relations on the basis of their affective qualities. 
Finkler’s ([jjj) concern for the autonomous, bounded individual who becomes linked 
to unchosen genetic kin stands in contrast to the version of person described above by 
Strathern (Zgg[a). In her examination of genetic relatedness, Strathern (Zgg[a) 
identities persons as always, already entwined with others. Persons are the ‘natural 
hybrids of other persons,’ that is, entities that produced in and through relations.  
 
These different modes of categorising the at-risk woman, as individual or person, are 
consequential for understandings of the illness experience. As Harris (Zgfg, p. hhg) and 
La Fontaine (Zgfh, p. Z[W) have argued, concepts of the person and the individual are 
often conflated or utilised interchangeably in anthropology. Such conflation, however, 
can have consequences for resulting analyses. As I will detail in the first chapter of this 
thesis, the ‘individual’ has been adopted by and large by medical anthropologists as the 
core analytic unit to describe the autonomous and agential at-risk woman. This 
individuated at-risk woman must be rescued from the pull of genetic relatedness so as 
to protect her ability to be a ‘free agent, striving to actualize [herself] in terms of self-
achievement, in a field of extrinsic social institutions, such as the family, and other 
associations’ (Hollos & Leis, [jjZ, p. eXZ). The assertion of the individual within 
paradigmatic anthropological approaches to genetic medicine also has important 
implications for how social relations, such as affective and genetic relatedness, can be 
understood.  
 
According to Conklin and Morgan (Zgg`, p. ``W), the model of the individual and its 
attendant ideologies of ‘self-containment, self-reliance, and social autonomy’ produce a 
mode of sociality analogous to ‘bumper cars.’ Individuals and their bodies in this sense, 
are  
 
bounded units [that] seek rapid acceleration, watch out for one another cautiously 
or hit each other mercilessly, attempt to protect their space, yet inevitably bump 
into and rebound off one another (Conklin & Morgan, Zgg`, p. ``W). 
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This framing of the individual and her relationality reflects the biosocial approach 
favoured by medical anthropologists of hereditary cancer. These approaches, as 
mentioned above, envisage relatedness as individuals linked together in a network with 
other discrete and bounded entities. Such views of networked and yet fundamentally 
detached and inviolable ‘individuals,’ however, obscures alternative understandings of 
the illness experience that preface ‘openness, connectedness, and permeability to 
others’ (Kirmayer, [jjX, p. [We). 
 
It is certainly the case that, as Finkler ([jjj, [jjZ) asserts, genetic and affective 
relations with kin can be substantively different. This situation was reiterated by a 
number of my informants. Genetic relations organise people in and on different 
foundational terms than affectively made choices. Different people are included and 
excluded in each register of acknowledging kin. Indeed, many of my informants came 
to know of people to whom they were genetically related, and recognised that it was 
important to know them in the context of a shared genetic mutation and a family history 
of disease. Again, these relations were often of a different affective quality than the 
relations they had with the kin they chose. However, there appears to be a significant 
limitation in the approach taken by Finkler ([jjj) and others in regards to the veracity 
with which they contrast genetic and affective kin relations. The assertion that the 
individual agent is the necessary corrective to genetic views of relatedness is somewhat 
problematic. Finkler ([jjj) notes that a relationality is insisted on and asserted by 
genetic views on kinship. This relationality, she submits, subsumes and obscures the 
individual and her ability to choose her own kin (Finkler, [jjj). In her view, we must 
resurrect this individual from such demands forced upon her by biomedicine and its 
inherent ‘hegemony of the gene’ (Finkler, [jjj, p.e).  
 
As I have stated above, I recognise (as did my informants) that affectively and 
genetically arrayed kinship is qualitatively different in experience. However, the 
insistence on the individual as the figure who experiences illness, the figure who relates, 
and is related to the significant others in her familial world, obscures the ways in which 
the ‘individual’ body may not be the basis upon which the risk of hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer is experienced. In focusing so directly and ferociously on the ways in 
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which the individual is engulfed by genetics and genetic medicine, anthropologists 
generally proceeded twofold; they have insisted on the dominance of the individual 
body as the corrective to an old enemy (the primarily biological body) and they have 
taken it to be the theoretical basis for analysing the body as it experiences the risk of 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. This view precludes more phenomenological and 
experiential insights into the partial and embodied ways in which the at-risk person is 
always and already enfolded into and by others. These others are, likewise, only 
ostensibly whole, individual, bodies. By insisting upon a critique of genetics such 
approaches also elide insight into the possible congruencies between medical and 
experiential knowledges of hereditary illness. It may be the case that the experiencing 
at-risk body and the genetically configured body share more in common that the 
current paradigmatic anthropological split permits. They are both, in essence, partial 
and relational bodies rather than wholly individual ones. 
 
These new insights that I intend to make about partiality, collectivity, the relationality 
of the family and the at-risk body, are necessary to push past current anthropological 
knowledge of hereditary cancer syndromes and what I will call its ‘moral impasse.’ Seen 
as discrete individuals by the bulk of anthropologists working in this field, women 
(especially) are prone to being characterised as either selfish or selfless. They are selfish 
if they choose to pass on their genes by having children or resist undergoing the regimes 
of risk reduction currently recommended by medical professionals. They are selfless if 
they sacrifice their body parts and reproductive desires to halt the ticking time-bomb 
of a gene mutation in its tracks.1 This selfish/selfless dyad and the notion of genetic 
responsibility as necessarily a part of positive testing for a genetic mutation has been 
examined by many such as Mozersky ([jZ[). As Mozersky notes in an article entitled, 
                                                
 
1 Although both women and men can carry and pass on a mutated BRCA gene, the majority of 
anthropological research into hereditary breast and ovarian cancer focuses on the illness experiences of 
women. This may be a result of the differing risk calculations for women and men carrying a mutated 
BRCA gene. As outlined later in the introduction, men carrying a BRCA mutation have a considerably 
lower risk of developing hereditary cancer of the breast (or prostate) and thus are more likely to be offered 
a less intensive or invasive program of surveillance or screening as risk-management rather than surgical 
or chemo-preventative intervention (Liede, et al., [jjW).  
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‘Who's to blame? Accounts of genetic responsibility and blame among Ashkenazi Jewish 
women at risk of BRCA breast cancer:’  
 
genetic knowledge of disease risk may induce a sense of genetic responsibility 
whereby those who are at risk feel an obligation to take certain actions not only in 
relation to their own personal health but also to their family, their children and 
many other aspects of their life… blame help[s] to mitigate or allocate genetic 
responsibility… Women locate responsibility or blame for genetic disease in the 
collective reproductive history of Ashkenazi Jews…, and this knowledge can have 
potential future reproductive consequences. A contradiction may arise between a 
pre-existing sense of responsibility to produce future generations of Jews with that 
of producing future breast cancer free children ([jZ[, pp. XX`-XXX). 
 
We can see in Mozersky’s ([jZ[) analysis that ways in which blame, obligation and 
genetic responsibility to others, often genetic kin, are seen to result from a positive 
BRCA mutation status. Likewise, in her work on hereditary cancer in Britain, Brazil and 
Cuba, Gibbon ([jj`) notes that the genetic arraying of information also impacts the 
individual and whether or not she will be selfish or selfless, that is, a figure who either 
enacts her right to bear children and sufficiently care for them or who foregoes her 
desire to ultimately ‘ensure the health of others:’ 
 
women are being recruited and enrolled into this arena of health care practice and 
in the requirements of knowledge and for care, in the clinic, there is at least some 
degree of enabling slippage between the morality of health awareness for oneself 
and desire or perceived need to take care of and ensure the well-being of related 
others. That is the articulation of rights, and obligations become linked to and 
gain much of their force from the way that an ideology of female gender is 
represented and reproduced in terms of both socially configured gendered rights, 
and an often naturally perceived female desire and/or need to ensure the health 
of related others (Gibbon, [jj`, p. Z`e).  
 
For Gibbon ([jj`) at the heart of genetic medicine there is a slippage of genetic 
relatedness and female nurturance, in which women come to feel obligated to both 
genetic and affective kin. In their study of BRCAZ and BRCA[ mutation carriers in 
Austria, Felt and Muller remark similarly:  
 
How individuals come to terms with these responsibilities seems highly gendered, 
prominently featuring the image of the nurturing woman taking care of and 
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protecting her family’s physical and emotional health… sacrificing individual 
preferences for the well-being of others (for example, the option not to know her 
own risk) ([jZZ, p. eW`). 
  
In Felt and Muller’s ([jZZ) account, the at-risk woman is a self-sacrificing, selfless 
individual who puts the needs of others before her own by dint of her gender. In these 
examples, the individual (woman) is a rational actor, making decisions about the fates 
of others that will be secured by her careful calculations and selfless decisions. Or she 
may be figured as the irrational actor, who, like her Ashkenazi predecessors, indulges 
her own selfish desires for children despite the illness burden they may have to 
bear. This is a very narrow, albeit very common, analytic frame, in which individuals are 
either/or, selfish or selfless. 
 
In this thesis, I take issue with the thinking that underpins the use of the prefix ‘self’ to 
analyse at-risk women’s decision making. I argue that this convention only makes sense 
if the analyst takes the bounded individual as the primary experiential basis upon which 
illness or the threat of illness is based. Drawing on Mauss ([Zgeh] Zgfh), Kirmayer ([jjX, 
p. [eg) identifies the self as the ‘locus of attribution of conscious experience... voluntary 
action… introspection, and imagination,’ what Harris (Zgfg, p. `jZ) has elsewhere 
described as a ‘human’s own someoneness.’ My attendance in this thesis to relational 
and social forms of embodiment is not intended to deny or erase the self, or to suggest 
that it has no role in understanding hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. After all, it is 
distinct and discernible women whose names and stories appear throughout this thesis. 
It is her body that will lie on the operating table to have her breasts removed. It is her 
body that will be cremated or buried should that procedure prove insufficient.  
 
A problem arises however when the self is aligned with an inherently individualistic 
ethos. The categorization of at-risk women’s behaviour as either selfish or selfless is 
symptomatic of such individualistic understandings of the self and her attending social 
relations (see Harris, Zgfg; Hollos & Leis, [jjZ; Mageo, Zggh). As Kirmayer ([jjX, p. 
[hg) explains: ‘in a social world made up exclusively of willful individuals, someone is 
always to blame for whatever happens. There is no room for impersonal accident since 
this would challenge the hegemony of the individual.’ When the at-risk woman is 
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figured by anthropologists of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer as inherently 
autonomous, bounded and individualistic, so too is her behavior and decision making. 
She bounces back and forth between concern for herself and concern for her family, 
analogous to Conklin and Morgan’s (Zgg`) bumper cars. This view of the at-risk woman 
and her decision making also presupposes a bodily and social integrity in her relating 
with others. Consequently, we risk overlooking complex and messy modes of world-
making experienced by women at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer that 
refuse confinement to the neat analytic parameters of concepts such as the bounded 
‘individual.’ 
 
It is the case that some theoreticians have critically responded to the dominance of the 
individual as the core analytic basis upon which experience, particularly the experience 
of genetic medicine, should be examined. Indeed, as early as [jjj, Novas and Rose 
argued that the new medical genetics offered an opportunity for scholars to explore 
networks and relationality. They noted how, in regards to the practice of genetic 
counselling, ‘the genetic identity of the counselled individual is established by locating 
him or her within a network of relations – mapping a set of remembered relations of 
lineage onto a remembered web of illnesses – at the same time as those social and 
familial relations were reworked in genetic terms (Armstrong, et al., Zggf; Novas & Rose, 
[jjj, p. Wgj).  
 
Despite recognising the inherent sociality of genetic illness and the genetic counselling 
encounter, Novas and Rose ([jjj) yet retain the individual as the key analytic basis 
upon which such relations should be understood. They note, for example, that while 
‘the “cause” of the patient’s problem might be a family member in a previous generation; 
the diagnosis in one person now has all kinds of implications not only for themselves 
but also for the relatives’ (Novas & Rose, [jjj, p. Wgj). New linkages come to be traced 
through genetic connections, in this case, mutations, that bind one person with 
another. Genetic identity as a mutation ‘carrier,’ is thereby revealed and creates ‘a web 
of genetic connectedness, which is overlaid upon a web of family bonds and family 
members, with their burden of mutual obligations and caring commitments, and with 
all the ethical dilemmas they entail’ [my emphasis] (Novas & Rose, [jjj, p. Wgj). Once 
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inculcated into this genetic ‘network,’ individuals at-risk may come to reconsider or re-
evaluate their relationships through the lens of risk and inheritance. Such re-evaluation 
may concern their genetic and perhaps more significantly their affective kin; ‘lovers, 
potential and actual spouses, children, grandchildren and so forth’ as Novas and Rose 
([jjj, p. Wgj) suggest. They may choose or feel compelled to amend aspects of their 
life according to medical recommendations; ‘lifestyle, diet, leisure activities, alcohol, 
smoking,’ in these terms, which also reshapes their relations with those with whom they 
interact (Novas & Rose, [jjj, p. Wgj). Novas and Rose also recognised the ability of 
and modes through which these genetic relations bring forth other ‘novel networks of 
interaction,’ a biosociality if you will, which they describe as:  
 
those not of ‘society,’ but of ‘community’ – groups, associations, communities of 
those similarly at-risk; groups of patients at particular hospitals or clinics; 
participants in trials of new therapies; subjects of documentaries and dramas on 
radio, television and movies (Novas & Rose, [jjj, p. Wgj). 
 
These biosocial communities are made up of what Rose ([jjX) has elsewhere described 
as the ‘somatic individual.’ Somatic individuals are, according to Rose ([jjX, p. W), those 
‘whose individuality is, in part at least, grounded within our fleshly, corporeal existence, 
and who experience, articulate, judge and act upon ourselves in part in the language of 
biomedicine.’ Although it may be ‘somatic’ and relational, this body is still whole. This 
body is still seen to enclose a bounded individual, one who operates in a discrete 
network to the family from this position:  
 
the somatic individual, incorporating their genetic status, is also a subject of self-
actualization, responsibility, choice and prudence – ethics that can only be 
operative in the light of a knowledge of one’s bodily truth. Individuals themselves 
are faced with questions as to whether to take genetic tests in order to predict 
their own future and act prudently within it, in relation, say, to their obligation to 
their family, the need to make provisions by way of insurance in the event of their 
death or incapacity, their wish to conduct their affairs in the world in the light of 
a knowledge of their genetic status. Genetic identity, that is to say, induces ‘genetic 
responsibility’ (Rose, [jjX, p. W). 
 
While Novas and Rose ([jjj) recognise the relationality necessary to the procedures 
of genetic disease and medical knowledge, they retain the whole, bounded individual as 
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the key unit for analysing illness experience. I am not suggesting that the ‘individual’ be 
replaced with the corrective of ‘dividual,’ egocentrisim with sociocentrism, in 
anthropological examinations of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. To do so would 
reaffirm the unhelpful binary between individualism and collectivism that, as Mageo 
(Zggh, p. [f[) purports, is better conceptualised as a matter of ‘degree,’ a continuum 
that is dynamic and hybrid. Everyday life, Conklin and Morgan (Zgg`, p. `hg) remind 
us, resists being reduced to essentialist categories of ‘individualism’ and ‘sociocentrism.’ 
What I am taking issue with is anthropologists proclivity to preface the individual and 
her ‘internal’ processes to the degree that other, more partial, socio-relational 
explanations and dimensions are overlooked to the detriment of our understanding of 
illness experience. 
 
In attempting to rescue the individual from the weight of her genetic burden to other 
non-affective kin, existing approaches to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer have 
presupposed the body’s integrity. The body of Novas and Rose’s ‘somatic individual,’ for 
example, still reflects the social values inherent in individualism. While it may be related 
in a network, the body is remains ‘separate from other bodies and bounded by the skin… 
it is disciplined, controlled, restrained, and autonomous – a private property’ (Conklin 
& Morgan, Zgg`, pp. ``W-``h). Returning to the broader but more useful concept of the 
person, allows me in this thesis to offer new insights into the body of the at-risk woman 
and the family. Consequently, the body of the at-risk woman emerges as partial, 
permeable and outbound. Likewise, the body familial is not so much a network of 
discrete interacting individual bodies but a collective made in and through partial 
relations of flesh. The approach I am taking assembles as its core data that which has 
remained largely unexamined by the paradigmatic approaches to hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer thus far and something that my informants spoke about at great length. 
Time and again, what came to the fore during the time I spent with these women in 
their homes, accompanying them on their daily routines, in local cafes and playgrounds 
was the ways in which time, care and their bodies were always, already enfolded into 
particular kinds of collectivities in the most mundane and everyday, yet vital, of ways. 
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Paradigmatic approaches prevent us from seeing congruencies between possible 
anthropological understandings of the person and genetic, medical knowledge of how 
such person is formed. I take as a leitmotif throughout this thesis the notion of the social 
body proposed by Lyon and Barbalet in ZggW. Differing from the idea of the social body 
proposed by Lock and Scheper-Hughes (ZgfX), Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW, p. h`) conceive 
of a social body that is fundamentally partial; it as an ‘intercommunicative and active’ 
form of embodiment, an ‘ordered aggregation of particular and specific types of 
relations between... the relevant aspects of bodies.’ In this reading the body and the 
familial body are not discrete units that correspond with the boundaries of the flesh but 
rather are created in and through the fleshy relations of body parts.  
 
Building on this idea, I use the notion of ‘partiality’ in two senses throughout this thesis. 
Firstly, I recognise that the body is inherently partial; an insight I take from genetic ways 
of knowing the body. The body, in genetic terms, is necessarily made up from the parts 
of other bodies (called genes) that recombine to make up the person. This recognition 
in genetic medicine of the partial construction of the body in and through others, is, as 
I will demonstrate, congruent with anthropological understandings of the person. 
Tenets of genetics that recognise body parts as creating other bodies align with the 
insights made by Merleau-Ponty (Zg`f) into the ways in which the person comes to be 
completed by their significant others; a theme that arose a number of times amongst 
my informants.  
 
Secondly, I use the notion of partiality to address the ways in which the family as an 
institution is created in and through fleshy relationality. The family emerges as a result 
of syncopated and habitual deployments of body parts in close proximity. These 
habitual and partial deployments, acting in concert, bring together a collectivity of 
people that is recognised as the family. It this twofold notion of partiality – of both body 
and family – that is overlooked when we insisted upon the bounded individual as the 
unit of analysis. In this thesis, I deploy the notion of collectivity to describe the product 
of the partial, fleshy relations between bodies that I described above. This notion of 
collectivity (used here to describe both body and family) stands in contrast to the 
metaphor of bounded individuals relating in a network that is offered by 
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anthropologists such as Novas and Rose ([jjj). ‘No embodied form,’ Turner ([jZZ, p. 
Zje) argues, ‘can be understood solely as the product of its own activity, but always owes 
its formation in part to its relations with other bodies.’  In focusing so squarely on the 
individual, Turner (ZggW, p. [f) observes, anthropologists often unconsciously ‘ignore 
or misrecognize the social nature of the body, and the multifold ways it is constituted 
by relations with other bodies.’ Significantly, my attention to the collectivities – of 
person and family –  produced by the multiplicity of partial relations, is important to 
understanding at-risk women’s decision to remove risky body parts. Assuming the 
body’s integrity and discreteness, as a whole that relates to other whole bodies, has 
consequences for how we can understand the at-risk woman’s decision to remove 
significant body parts and reduce cancer risk. Rather than starting with the notion that 
these body parts belong to an individual who makes decisions about them that will 
come to bear on her familial relations, I begin with the idea that these parts are 
constitutive of family as a collective and thus, are collective decisions.  
 
In my thesis, I pose the question, how can we understand experiences of living with the 
risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer anthropologically? In it I respond with quite 
a different answer to those delivered in the space dominated by biosocial 
interpretations. I argue that a fundamental reimagining of the individual body is needed 
in order to come to fresh grips with hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, and to 
incorporate the relational and partial experiences of the body of which my informants 
spoke. I take a critical approach to the notion that we must rescue the individual from 
the grip of a relationality that is imposed by genetic kinship – what I take to be a well-
rehearsed response to the medicalising of the body and its relations. As Novas and Rose 
pointed out in [jjj, the genetic arraying of kinship did not necessarily ‘lead to a focus 
on the individual as isolate’ instead, the reverse occurred (Novas & Rose, [jjj, p. Wgj). 
Genetic notions of kinship came to underscore the ‘network of relations’ in which an 
individual was entailed (Novas & Rose, [jjj, p. Wgj). Somewhat ironically, this 
individual is taken to be under threat of being subsumed by genetic configurations of 
kinship and thus has emerged as ‘isolate’ in current anthropological understandings of 
the at-risk person. I conclude that refiguring the sanctity of the individual body, and 
relinquishing the old fight with medicine produces new insights into hereditary breast 
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and ovarian cancer not currently available to us within the existing paradigm. This has 
consequences for both understanding the ethnographic circumstances with which this 
thesis is concerned, and for the discipline at large. By protecting the bounds of affective 
sociality enacted by the discrete individual, current anthropological approaches to 
illness may forego knowledge issuing from other ways of envisaging relatedness.  
 
Chapter Outlines 
 
I advance my argument in this thesis through four substantive chapters. In Chapter 
One, I present a detailed examination of the alleged ‘geneticization’ of the family and 
the individual that dominates anthropological approaches to hereditary ovarian and 
breast cancer. I track the ways in which fears about the hegemony of genetic medicine 
and the power of the gene initially threatened to isolate the individual, and then 
proceeded to diminish it, in the view of anthropologists specialising in hereditary cancer 
syndromes. Cutting through the polarising elements of affective versus genetic 
relatedness promulgated by Finkler ([jjj) and others, I closely examine what, exactly, 
is being rescued from the ‘power of the gene,’ and at what cost to our knowledge of 
experience of hereditary cancer. Implied here is the idea that anthropology’s 
oppositionary relationship with medicine has fundamentally crafted the space in which 
such knowledge can be produced. In this first chapter, I seek to unsettle the primacy 
and solidity of the discrete and bounded individual which is at the heart of such views.  
As I have suggested in this introduction, this view has been highly consequential in that 
it has narrowed our understanding of at-risk women’s decision making to a 
selfish/selfless binary.  
 
I then detail my alternative re-envisaging of the body, and propose one that expands 
beyond the conventions of physical individuality. Drawing on concepts of a co-
constructed and partial body such as those advanced by Ribbens McCarthy and 
Prokhovnik  ([jZW, p. [[), I offer a reading of the body that is characterised by the ‘felt 
persistence of an enfleshed and material relational connection with a loved one.’ Unlike 
Novas and Rose’s ([jjj) somatic body that is fleshily connected with the bodies of 
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significant others as an individual body, my concept of the body is one comprised in, of 
and through the co-presence of others. Just as the genetically figured body is one that 
is composed of the contributions of others, my analytic body is not a whole, bounded, 
entity in, of, to or for itself. Extending this further, I draw on Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW) 
to similarly cast the family as an institution crafted of and maintained in the fleshy 
relations between parts of bodies. Some parts of bodies are more significant than others 
in the creation and maintenance of the family; something very pertinent to the 
experience of, say, considering the ongoing existence of one’s breasts and ovaries in the 
face of cancer risk. Here, I put forth the notion of breasted and ovarian sociality to posit 
the ways in which these significant parts, or their approximations, work to create and 
maintain familial relations. I also consider how these forms of socialities are altered and 
transformed as such parts come to be excised from the body in the process of risk 
reduction. Taking this concept of the partial body and family as the analytic centrepiece 
of my thesis, I turn to examine how particular temporal politics and regimes of time 
come to bear on women at-risk of hereditary cancer.  
 
Temporal matters are the subject of the second chapter.  I explain how the disruption I 
have made to presuppositions of discrete intersubjective relations permit a 
reconsideration of illness time. I draw on my informants’ reports to explore bodily co-
presence, that is, their experiences of significant and socially valued parts of the bodies 
of their mothers, sisters and children coming to inhabit their own. I use these accounts 
to challenge both linear conceptions of temporality and the notion of ‘patients-in-
waiting’ (Timmermans & Buchbinder, [jZj). By challenging this notion of patients-in-
waiting as those who merely wait their turn in genetic line, I reveal how illness time, 
like bodies, gene and caregiving refuses neat containment (Timmermans & Buchbinder, 
[jZj). In focusing on the minutia of everyday life, I consider how the rhythms of one’s 
life; patterns of eating, sleeping, waking, are considered by women at-risk as patterns 
that require syncopation. These patterns are a family matter and necessitate continued 
familial participation. From fast-tracking menopause to ensuring regularity in the 
rhythms of the family; from routines around sleeping, eating, schooling, to milestone 
planning; around graduations, weddings, grandchildren, the temporal experience of 
illness is a syncopated one, inextricably intertwined with the flesh of others. Likewise, 
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looking backwards, the expectation of how an illness will unfurl is inseparably 
enmeshed with others. It is conjointly involved with the experience of others, mothers, 
aunts, sisters, who are only ostensibly ‘individuals’ in our analytic imaginaries of them 
as discrete bodily entities.  
 
Having proposed alternative ways of thinking about the body (as a constructed in fleshy 
relationality rather than a bounded individual entity) and time (as a community 
property) I turn in Chapter Three to consider how acts of caregiving operate. I dispute 
the notion, prominent in existing work, that caregiving pivots on notions of selfish and 
selfless acts on the part of the at-risk woman. Repudiating the claims made for and of 
the individual in paradigmatic anthropological works regarding illness experience, I 
take issue with prefix ‘self’ in the terms ‘selfish’ and ‘selfless’ in favour of a view of 
caregiving conducted in collectivity, in flows. Extending on Mauss’ ([Zghj] [jZj) 
classical theory of the gift, I consider how the reciprocity of care challenges the 
individualising forces ascribed to the ill body by most anthropologists. Taking this 
notion of reciprocity into the meshwork of the familial body, I argue that ‘care’ flows as 
a resource that is not sited in any particular body. I offer a version of care attentive to 
its participatory qualities, its inherent messiness, rather than understanding it as being 
directed from one individual to the other and reciprocated back, to ensure any debts 
are repaid.  
 
Chapter Four synthesises the claims I have made for the collectivities of body, time and 
caregiving around a consideration of risk management. Drawing on these claims, I argue 
that risk management is not so much of an individual concern as it is one arrayed 
around ensuring a particular type of presence within the family. Drawing on Leder’s 
(Zggj) work on ‘dys-appearing’ bodies, I put forth the notion of an ‘absent presence’ as 
one that is yearned for by at-risk women. This ‘absent presence’ is one that is free from 
the spectre of cancer; that dwells in and with the fleshy relations of familial others and 
enables care to flow across time. I will argue that it is this recognition of the importance 
of achieving an absent presence within the familialy constructed body, that allows at-
risk women to ultimately remove significant parts from the body. In this sense, body 
parts or the replacements of body parts come into the service of the body whole. This 
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whole is not the buffered, autonomous bodily whole of an individual but the relational 
body of the familial unit.  
 
In the conclusion, I provide a sense of what it is that my informants wanted to stave off 
at all costs; death and its antecedent, suffering. This conclusion aims to show not only 
the thanatophobic quality of action taken on the part of my informants, but also 
reiterate the theoretical approach of this thesis. In it, I demonstrate my issues with 
analyses that preface the bounded individual who alone staves off death, who acts 
within her remaining means to make selfless decisions in relation to those to whom she 
is affectively related. I use the conclusion to illustrate the concepts that I have advanced 
in the previous chapters; shared flesh, family, time, care, pain, and the partial relations 
of body parts that sustain those same collectivities of mutually constructed flesh. These 
concepts are the bases from which only ostensibly individual women act to stave off the 
potential of death handed to them by their genes.     
 
Orienting notes: what is hereditary breast and ovarian cancer? 
 
With the development of biotechnologies to isolate and detect potentially damaging 
genetic mutations, people can now be tested for an ever-growing range of biomarkers 
linked to hereditary cancer syndromes such as hereditary breast and ovarian cancer 
(Bell, [jZe). In ZggW the Breast Cancer Z (BRCAZ) gene was discovered by a team of 
researchers led by Doctor Mary Claire King, followed quickly by the detection of the 
BRCA[ (Breast Cancer [) gene in Zggh. The BRCAZ and BRCA[ genes are tumour 
suppressors, meaning that they are responsible for regulating cell growth and death. 
When mutated, these genes can malfunction, causing the proliferation of cancer cells. 
Mutations in the BRCAZ and BRCA[ genes are autosomal dominant and, as such, can be 
passed down the maternal or paternal side of the family, for example; mother to son, 
father to daughter, mother to daughter, father to son. Although the presence of a 
mutation in either of these genes does not necessarily result in cancer, it is estimated 
that a woman carrying a BRCAZ mutation has between a W`-fX% lifetime chance of 
developing breast cancer and a eg-`e% lifetime chance of developing ovarian cancer. A 
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woman carrying a BRCA[ mutation has between a ef-fW% chance of developing breast 
cancer and Z`.h-[X% chance of ovarian cancer, however the risks associated with either 
mutation may be lesser or greater depending on particular modifiers such as the 
location of the mutation on the chromosome (Couch, et al., [jZW, p. ZW`h, see also King, 
et al., [jje). Both mutations also confer an increased risk of other cancers. BRCAZ 
mutations are associated with a risk of fallopian tube and peritoneal cancer and both 
BRCA mutations may increase the risk of pancreatic cancer (Finch, et al., [jj`). Men 
can also be affected by hereditary breast and ovarian cancer syndrome if they carry a 
mutated BRCAZ or BRCA[ gene. Men carrying BRCA mutations may be at an increased 
risk of breast cancer, prostate cancer and pancreatic cancer (Levy-Lahad & Friedman, 
[jjX). While BRCA mutations can be carried by both women and men, the risk for a 
man carrying a mutated gene to develop cancer is considerably less than women 
carrying a BRCA mutation (Weitzel, et al., [jZZ; Liede, et al., [jjW). 
 
Table 1: Risk of Malignancy in Individuals with a Germline BRCA1 or BRCA2-Pathogenic 
Variant. 
Cancer Type General Population 
Risk 
Risk for Malignancy 
BRCA1 BRCA2 
Breast 12% 46%-87% 38%-84% 
Second primary breast 2% within 5 years 21.1% within 10 yrs 
83% by age 70 
10.8% within 10 yrs 
62% by age 70 
Ovarian 1%-2% 39%-63% 16.5%-27% 
Male breast 0.1% 1.2% Up to 8.9% 
Prostate 6% through age 69 8.6% by age 65 15% by age 65 
20% lifetime 
Pancreatic 0.50% 1%-3% 2%-7% 
Melanoma (cutaneous & 
ocular) 
1.6%  Elevated Risk 
Source: Petrucelli et al, 2016.  
 
An estimated h to Zj% of all breast cancers are caused by germline mutations in these 
BRCA genes, with more than one million people estimated to have been tested for 
BRCAZ and BRCA[ mutations since they were discovered (Couch, et al., [jZW, p. ZWh). 
The prevalence of cancer amongst women with mutated BRCA genes is up to five times 
higher than those women who do not carry these mutations, with an even high 
prevalence of mutations and hereditary cancer syndromes within particular populations 
such as women and men of Ashkenazi Jewish descent (Weitzel, et al., [jZZ). In America 
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about Z[% of women in the general population will develop breast cancer within their 
lifetime, compared to `j% of women who have inherited a mutation in the BRCAZ or 
BRCA[ genes (National Cancer Institution, [jZe). This being said, women may also be 
identified as at-risk of hereditary or familial cancer syndromes given a sufficiently strong 
family history or a positive test for one of the many more recently discovered cancer-
linked gene mutations such as PALB[, ATM, CHEK[, PTEN, although the degree of risk 
conferred by these mutations remains uncertain.2  
 
There are a number of different guidelines that exist for determining whether a person 
qualifies for genetic counselling and testing, depending on the country of testing and 
the company that is used. These criteria however, are generally similar and may be 
adapted during clinical encounters, as I witnessed during my observations of genetic 
counselling sessions in Boston, Massachusetts. The United States National 
Comprehensive Cancer Center Network (Daly, et al., [jZ`) for example, outlines the 
following criteria for identifying appropriate candidates for genetic testing for 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer: 
 
Z. A family member positive for a known deleterious BRCA mutation 
[. A personal history of breast cancer who was: diagnosed Wh years or younger, 
diagnosed hj years or younger with either an additional primary, a positive 
family history, or an unknown or limited family structure, diagnosed `j years or 
younger with a triple-negative breast cancer, OR diagnosed at any age with a 
relative family history (e.g. two close blood relatives, male breast cancer, or an 
ethnicity associated with a founder mutation) 
e. A personal history of epithelial ovarian cancer (including fallopian tube or 
peritoneal cancer) 
W. A personal history of male breast cancer 
                                                
 
2 Recent research conducted at the University of Melbourne has confirmed that mutations in the PALB[ 
and ATM genes increase the risk of breast cancer. They also concluded that mutations in the CHEK[ gene 
can cause a moderate risk of breast cancer (Southey, et al., [jZ`).  
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h. A personal history of pancreatic, or aggressive prostate if a similar history of 
either, breast, or ovarian cancer is also present in the family 
`. A family history of any of the above mentioned criterion in a first or second-
degree family member  
 
The United States and Australia, where my fieldwork was carried out, like many 
countries around the world, offer clinical recommendations or guidelines on risk 
reduction.  
 
In the tradition of non-directive genetic counselling, these aim to give the patient the 
information required to make choices regarding regimes of risk reduction.3 In the 
United States, the current recommendations released by the NCCN for managing the 
risks conferred by a BRCAZ/[ gene mutation involves; breast awareness starting at Zf 
years of age, clinical breast exams every six to Z[ months starting at [h years, annual 
breast MRI screening from ages [h to [g (or based on earliest age of onset in family) 
and annual mammograms and breast MRI screenings for women over ej. There is also 
the option of a risk-reducing mastectomy, with or without reconstruction, alongside 
counselling to outline effectiveness, potential risks and options for reconstruction 
                                                
 
3 There exist a number of surgical options for the removal of breast tissue. Performed under general 
anaesthetic, a total mastectomy involves the removal of the breast tissue, areola, nipple and skin, while 
skin sparing or subcutaneous (skin and nipple sparring) surgeries remove breast tissue whilst leaving as 
much skin and nipple intact. The success of the surgery in reducing the risk of developing cancer varies 
depending on the amount of breast tissue remaining (with more risk associated with nipple and skin 
sparing surgeries). Due to the nature of breast tissue blending with and extending beyond the primary 
site, there still remains a small chance that cancer could develop despite risk-reducing surgery (Friedman, 
et al., [jZ[). This being said, studies by Hartmann et al (Hartmann, et al., Zggg, Hartmann, et al., [jjZ) 
show that risk-reducing mastectomies reduce a patient’s risk of developing cancer by fh% to gj%, 
making it lower than that of the general public. In the case of reducing the risk of ovarian cancer, surgical 
options range from the removal of the ovaries and fallopian tubes (known as salpingo-oophorectomy), to 
the removal of these parts as well as the uterus and cervix (a complete hysterectomy). The removal of the 
ovaries can also reduce the risk of breast cancer. Recovery after breast surgery takes weeks to months and 
involves the prolonged use of surgical drains to prevent fluid build-up and infection during healing. 
Following a mastectomy, women may choose to undergo breast reconstruction. There currently exists a 
wide range of procedures for breast reconstruction including implants filled with saline or silicone gel, 
the reshaping of breast from tissue taken from the stomach or back often in combination with implants, 
tissue matrices, fat grafts and nipple tattooing or reconstruction through tucking. While such procedures 
aim to restore the cosmetic appearance of the breast, they do not re-establish sensation to the area and 
can require replacement and further surgery in the future to maintain shape and appearance (Friedman, 
et al., [jZ[). 
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(Daly, et al., [jZ`). A recent meta-analysis study suggested that between Zf-Wj% of 
BRCA gene mutation carriers undergo risk-reducing mastectomies, with this number 
varying between countries (Euhus, [jZh, p. [fjf).4 A bilateral risk-reducing 
mastectomy is a major surgery that involves a considerable amount of time spent under 
general anaesthetic. According to Euhus’ ([jZh, p. [fjf) meta-analysis study, in f-`W% 
of cases, women experienced one or more complications after their risk-reducing 
surgery with h[-XZ% having to undergo reoperations, a rate that was attested to by a 
number of my interlocutors. A risk-reducing salpingo-oophorectomy (the removal of 
the ovaries and fallopian tubes) is recommended for women with a BRCAZ/[ mutation, 
ideally between the age eh and Wj or on the completion of childbearing. For women not 
electing to undergo this procedure, concurrent transvaginal ultrasounds and a CA-Z[h 
test are recommended every six months although the effectiveness of these technologies 
remains subject to debate (Daly, et al., [jZ`). By removing the ovaries, women enter 
into surgically induced menopause. Women may choose to have these menopausal 
symptoms mitigated by hormone replacement therapy depending on their family 
history and the possible risks of these drugs.5  
 
Current research suggests that a risk-reducing mastectomy decreases a woman’s risk of 
developing breast cancer to less than that of the general population (Tong, et al., [jZh, 
p. ee). A risk-reducing oophorectomy has been shown to reduce the risk of ovarian 
cancer by fj% and when completed before menopause, also reduces the risk of breast 
cancer by hj% (Tong, et al., [jZh, p. ee).6 Additionally risk-reducing oophorectomies 
are associated with the reduction of all-cause mortality in BRCAZ/[ mutation carriers 
(Tong, et al., [jZh, p. ee). It is recommended that these surgical procedures are 
                                                
 
4 Daly and Forman ([jZh, p. Zhe) outline four broad categories of risk-reducing recommendations; 
‘increased screening, pharmacologic interventions (chemoprevention), surgical prophylaxis and lifestyle 
changes.’ 
5 Although the symptoms of surgically induced menopause can be mitigated with hormone replacement 
therapy, side-effects of the procedure can include ‘vasomotor symptoms, damage to the skeletal system 
and sexual dysfunction as well as the more obvious loss of any reproduction capability’ (Weitzel, et al., 
[jZZ).  
6 As mentioned above, breast cancer risk cannot be completely reduced with a mastectomy because ‘short 
of removing all the skin of the breast envelope, it is not possible to remove all the breast epithelium in 
every woman’ (Euhus, [jZh, p. [fjX). 
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discussed as risk-reducing options alongside chemoprevention drugs and 
investigational imaging and screening studies. Cancer Australia, by and large, follow 
similar recommendations as those set out by the National Comprehensive Cancer 
Network. Nevertheless, Collins et al ([jZe) study of risk reduction in Australia showed 
that the uptake of management strategies remained lower than anticipated across the 
country, suggesting the need to improve follow-up, multidisciplinary care and support 
for those facing hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. Importantly, this study noted that 
the lack of specialised, multidisciplinary reviews for at-risk women left few 
opportunities for women to discuss the options available to them after testing and how 
these may change over their lifetime (Collins, et al., [jZe, p. `fe). 
 
Significantly, the number of people identified as being at-risk of hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer is likely to grow over the coming years. This increase may be linked to 
higher incidences of cancer associated with an ageing and expanding global population 
and the advancement of early surveillance medicine and genetic testing for hereditary 
cancers. These technologies enable the pre-diagnosis of women and men at an early age, 
some as young as Zf years old (Daly, et al., [jZ`). The ‘Angelina Jolie’ effect has also 
been shown to have increased the demand for genetic testing for hereditary cancer 
syndromes (James, et al., [jZe). In the week following the announcement of Jolie’s 
bilateral risk-reducing mastectomy in [jZe, familial cancer clinics in Australia reported 
a doubling in the number of referrals for genetic counselling (James, et al., [jZe).  
Additionally, the decision by the US Supreme Court to dissolve the Myriad Genetic 
Company’s patent over the BRCAZ and BRCA[ gene mutations in [jZ[ paved the way 
for more competitive and cheaper testing methods for hereditary cancer genes across 
the globe. As a result of this Supreme Court decision, competing companies such as 
AMBRY and Colour have been able to, for the first time, offer tests, some costing as little 
as $[jj. In October [jZh, the High Court of Australia also ruled that BRCA genes were 
not patentable subject matter in Australia, thus overturning Myriad Genetics patents in 
the country. Consequently, genetic testing companies are now expanding their product 
lines, offering tests not only for single site mutations on the BRCA gene, but also panel 
tests that screen for the BRCA mutations and an additional [h mutations that may 
increase the risk of cancer and other diseases.  
 [h 
 
The practice of identifying and reducing the risks of hereditary cancer in the clinical 
setting has become common in most advanced capitalist societies. More recently, 
research and testing has focused on gathering information on the different variations 
that can occur within the breast cancer genes. This has resulted in the creation of 
extensive databases of genetic results, family histories and phenotypes of affected 
families to compare and ascertain which mutations are pathogenic and those which are 
of uncertain significance. As more family disease information has been catalogued and 
examined, these databases have helped to improve the accuracy of risk statistics and 
narrow the parameters of risk-reducing recommendations.7 This process of cataloguing 
known mutations is still in its early stages especially in regards to the other associated 
genes for hereditary cancer syndromes included those on next-generation sequencing 
multi-gene panel tests.  
 
Despite these developments in technology, accessing genetic testing services and 
undertaking risk-reducing strategies remains laborious and financially demanding, 
often precluding the uninsured, underinsured and those from socioeconomically 
disadvantaged backgrounds (Burke & Korngiebel, [jZh). Extensive research has 
                                                
 
7 Over the past year, the practice of testing genes for variations that may increase the risk of cancer has 
been transformed both scientifically and economically with the development of Next-Generation 
Sequencing (NGS) in the form of multi-gene panels for testing hereditary cancer syndromes. NGS, write 
Fecteau and Pal ([jZh, p. f[), has revolutionised the genetic testing paradigm and is predicted ‘to become 
a central piece of routine healthcare management which can be practiced regularly by physicians from 
their offices.’ Prior to NGS, suspect genes were examined by single tests for a mutation followed by further 
single gene tests if a variance was not identified. NGS, in contrast, allows for multiple genes to be tested 
simultaneously using massive parallel sequencing (Mauer, et al., [jZe). This technique reduces both the 
time and the cost of the test itself. Costs for NGS multi-gene or multiplex tests, in contrast to the $Zjjj-
$[jjj for a single gene Sanger sequencing, are expected to drop below $Zjjj with an increasingly 
competitive market of laboratories releasing commercial NGS panels for hereditary cancer syndromes. 
NGS multi-gene panels for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer analyse not just BRCAZ and BRCA[ genes 
for clinically significant or ‘known’ mutations, but other gene variants that may be used to make clinical 
recommendations for preventative action. The major issue with these techniques is that, while multiple 
genes are tested for variants, there remains a lack of working knowledge about what these genes and 
variants do, producing a large number of variants of uncertain significance. As Phimister ([jZh, p. [[[X) 
surmises ‘a major challenge of interpreting genetic sequence is… how to determine which variants are 
pathogenic and which are benign’ especially in the clinical setting.  
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identified possible barriers to genetic testing and counselling including; lack of 
knowledge of genetics amongst primary physicians, lack of clinical genetics support, 
varying genetic resources in different locations, different assignment of responsibility 
in different health care systems, concern for costs of testing and follow-up amongst 
patients and difficulty in understanding complicated testing procedures (Burke & 
Korngiebel, [jZh). Antill ([jZe) identified public hospital waiting times and the expense 
associated with private health insurance as potential barriers to the uptake of genetic 
testing, counselling, and risk reduction in Australia. Similarly, Collins et al ([jZe, p. ` fe) 
have identified the lack of ‘regular ongoing multidisciplinary specialist’ support for 
decision making after genetic testing as contributing to the low uptake of risk-reducing 
strategies in Australia. These studies illustrate just some of the many ways in which 
BRCA research and clinical practices remain unevenly distributed and taken up across 
the globe (Antill, [jZe; Collins, et al., [jZe; Gibbon, et al., [jZW, p. W). Subsequently, the 
population of those recognised clinically as at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer is predominately Caucasian, urban women and men from middle to higher socio-
economic backgrounds. This demographic is more likely to have access to the required 
resources and finances for undertaking risk reduction. I have found this to be true 
within my own ethnographic fieldwork in Australia and America.  
 
A note on terminology  
 
‘Previvors’ or ‘previvorship’ as a label used to identify those living with the risk of 
hereditary cancer was coined by the support group Facing Our Risk of Cancer 
Empowered, or FORCE, in the early [jjjs. Previvors are ‘the portion of our community 
which has its own unique needs and concerns separate from the general population, but 
different from those already diagnosed with cancer’ (Friedman, [jZZ). This term was 
specifically chosen to contrast the medical terminology of ‘unaffected carrier’ used to 
identify those at-risk of hereditary cancer syndromes. This medical nomenclature, 
FORCE suggested, did not adequately capture the ‘experience of those who face an 
increased risk for cancer and need to make medical management decisions’ (Friedman, 
[jZZ). Throughout the thesis, the terms at-risk women and previvor will be used 
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synonymously to reflect the most common terms my informants used to describe 
themselves. Notably, the preference for a particular label tends to fall along geographic 
lines. Previvor was the more common term used by informants to described their 
experience of being at-risk of hereditary cancer in the United States whilst my 
Australian informants generally referred to themselves as ‘at-risk’ or ‘high-risk.’   
 
Throughout this thesis, I use feminine pronouns as the majority of my informants 
(excluding five male informants) were femme-presenting and identified with the use of 
feminine pronouns. I also use she as the generic or gender-neutral singular pronoun 
throughout this thesis to reflect the trend in the anthropological literature on hereditary 
breast and ovarian cancer to focus on the experiences of women.  
 
The study 
 
Over a period of two and a half years spanning from [jZe to [jZ`, I conducted multi-
sited ethnographic fieldwork amongst women and men at-risk of hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer and their families in Australia and the United States. The nature of the 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer community is disparate. Those clinically 
recognised as being at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer are located across 
the world in predominantly advanced Western societies. As such, rather than focusing 
on a single, fixed location, my fieldwork took the form of multi-sited ethnography and 
followed ‘people, connections, associations, and relationships across space’ (Falzon, 
[jZ`, p. [). This focus on what Falzon ([jZ`, p. [) describes as the ‘substantially 
continuous but spatially non-contiguous’ fieldwork site mirrors the formation of the at-
risk community within and across countries. As a result, much of the interaction taking 
place within the at-risk community relied on popular media platforms such as Facebook 
and Twitter and local outreach events (Falzon, [jZ`, p. [; see also Coleman & Collins, 
[jj`).  
 
The United States and Australia proved fruitful locations for fieldwork as they are home 
to world-class facilities dedicated to the study of hereditary cancer and, as such, 
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communities dedicated to supporting and advocating for those at-risk. These locales 
enabled me to gauge the developments in genetic and genomic medicine and interact 
with the people involved in these spheres. In Australia, I volunteered with a national 
support group for at-risk women and men to conduct participant observation and to 
recruit participants into the study from across the country. During this time, I 
interviewed eh Australian women and two Australian men who carried a BRCA 
mutation or were identified as at-risk about their experiences of living with hereditary 
cancer. These semi-structured interviews, conducted in local cafés and public spaces, as 
well as over the phone, generally lasted between one to three hours. Participants were 
also recruited outside of the national support group through the method of snowballing 
as, being a hereditary condition, informants would often recommend their extended 
family members for the project. In this sense, my fieldwork could at times be considered 
informal ethnography. I was invited to participate in familial discussions and family 
gatherings such as birthday parties. Recruitment was further facilitated by two surveys 
distributed throughout the national support group’s online forum. Over [jj responses 
were gathered, identifying key thematic concerns for analysis as well as further possible 
informants for interviewing. During this fieldwork period, I also undertook participant 
observation within the wider hereditary breast and ovarian cancer community, 
attending fundraisers, public outreach events and ambassador weekends organised by 
the national group, as well as medical research conferences and information days held 
across the country. I also conducted two focus groups with at-risk women and men in 
Canberra.  
 
The primary fieldwork undertaken during my time in America was participant 
observation within a cancer prevention and genetics clinic in Boston. Over a period of 
six months, I observed over hj genetic counselling appointments, spanning between ej 
minutes to an hour. These observations gave me the opportunity to engage with at-risk 
women and men in the community who presented at the clinic for counselling, testing 
and surveillance as well as the workings of the clinicians, genetic counsellors, nurses 
and genetic testing company representatives. This time spent in the clinic allowed me 
to observe the procedures and protocols through which a person becomes recognised, 
clinically, as ‘at-risk’ and those who fall outside of such criteria. While in Boston, I also 
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immersed myself in the HBOC community and genetic scientific and research network. 
Home to more than [j hospitals, including the top five recipients of National Institute 
of Health research dollars, Boston was an ideal location in which to witness the cutting-
edge of genetic medicine coming out of these centres. I attended conferences, 
symposiums and seminar days, engaging with health-care professionals to make sense 
of these and future developments in ‘precision’ medicine around hereditary cancer 
syndromes.  I also attended conferences and fundraisers organised by the leading US 
support group for previvors, FORCE. During these events I engaged in more informal 
and unstructured conversations with women and men at-risk of hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer.  While based in the US I conducted a further Z` one-on-one interviews 
(Z[ women, four men) with previvors. These interviews often arose from interactions 
with attendees at the cancer genetics and prevention clinic where I was based and from 
my interactions with the FORCE community.  
 
Informants opted in for an interview based on their interest in the project and 
willingness to be involved. In terms of the selection process, I purposely kept the 
selection criteria broad; potential informants only needed to have reason to believe they 
were at high-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. This included people who had 
a family history of breast and ovarian cancer but had not yet undergone genetic testing, 
those who had been tested, including those who received inclusive results and those 
who had not undergone genetic testing but had, under the advice of their doctor, 
undergone risk reducing surgery. It also included people who had been diagnosed with 
cancer and, as a result, been tested for a hereditary cancer mutation.  
 
My informants in Australian and America ranged in age, BRCA mutation status and the 
stage of risk reduction they had or were considering undertaking. Interviewees ranged 
in age from Zf to `g years. While the majority of my informants were women (WX), I also 
interviewed six men. While both women and men can carry BRCA mutations, the 
chance of men developing the associated cancers is considerably less. Although I 
conducted interviews with at-risk women and men, my study focuses on women’s 
experiences of being at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. This focus arose 
from my interest in how female participants discussed the ways in which particular body 
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parts, namely their breasts and ovaries, related to others within the family. This sociality 
based on these significant body parts – breasts and ovaries – was not as applicable to 
men’s experience of hereditary cancer risk. Further anthropological research is required 
to investigate men’s particular experiences of hereditary cancer risk and how it may, 
too, impact on their modes of sociality and means of relating with familial others.   
 
The majority of my informants had tested positive for a mutation in either the BRCAZ 
or BRCA[ gene. A small portion of informants (two in total) had a VUS result, that is, a 
variance of uncertain significance, however, on the basis of their family history, were 
considered at-risk of a hereditary cancer syndrome. As mentioned above, the 
population of previvors in Australia and America are predominately educated 
Caucasian, urban women from middle to higher socio-economic backgrounds. This 
being said, I endeavoured to broaden my sample to include a range of ages, genders, 
education levels and ethnicities. Information about each informants’ circumstances, for 
example, age, BRCA mutation status, gender, ethnicity and regime of risk-reduction is 
located in Appendix A.  
 
I have located the information concerning my informant’s social context in an appendix 
rather than in text to emphasis the voices of my informants and their descriptions of 
their experiences. Rather than converting these women’s voices and experiences into 
the perhaps more conventional, narrative form, I have purposely chosen to rely on 
excerpts from my interview data, as supported by some instances of participant 
observation, to support my investigation. This aligns with my theoretical interests 
across this thesis, namely, women’s own descriptions and reflections of their 
experiences of cancer risk, family life, temporality and care-giving. My reliance on 
interview data likewise reflects my interest in countering existing anthropological 
approaches to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer that focus primarily on the biosocial 
as a unit of analysis, for example, the collective experiences of at-risk women within a 
support group and as a social corrective to the individualising forces of genetic 
medicine. My rationale for this approach is discussed in further detail in Chapter One.  
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I conducted interviews until a clear pattern of responses had emerged, as described 
throughout this thesis. I reach a point of data saturation in late [jZ`. This interview 
data was then transcribed and, with the notes collected from participant observation, 
coded thematically. My research was provided human ethics clearance by the Australian 
National University Research Ethics office, protocol number [jZe/heX and Harvard 
University Committee on the Use of Human Subjects Institutional Review Board. 
 
Cast of characters  
 
Although the voices and experiences of a number of women appear in this thesis, they 
are not represented equally. This uneven representation is not because these women 
did not talk about, speculate on or agree with the issues discussed in this thesis. Rather, 
over the course of my research, certain informants emerged whose expressions and 
insights helped me to talk about these experiences in the clearest of terms. One of these 
informants was Lily.  
 
It seems like some kind of fate that I was to meet Lily, one of my key informants, on my 
very first day of fieldwork. Nervous and running late as usual I stumbled into the 
crowded seminar room of a Sydney hotel for the [jZe Annual Information Day for those 
living with BRCAZ/[ gene faults, held by the Association of Genetic Support of 
Australasia (now known as Genetic Alliance Australia). Making my way to the back of 
the room, I noticed a spare seat next to a young woman holding a small squirming child. 
After sitting through the first presentation, an overview of the different methods of 
screening; mammogram, eD ultrasound and MRI, I had a chance to speak with the other 
people at my table. Lily introduced herself and her mother, Beth. Like me, they had 
travelled up from our home city that morning to attend the information day. Beth 
explained why they had come along. After a diagnosis of aggressive ovarian cancer in 
her early `js, Beth had tested positive for a BRCA[ mutation. Her daughter Lily was 
tested for a BRCA mutation earlier in the year, at the age of eW and also tested positive. 
Like the other Zhj or so women and men in the room, Lily and Beth were looking to 
gather information about living with a BRCA mutation. They wanted to know how to 
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make sense of and minimise their risk of developing hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer, or in Beth’s case, a reoccurrence.  
 
Over the course of the day we sat through seemingly endless PowerPoint presentations 
given by genetic counsellors, geneticists, clinical oncologists, clinical psychologists, 
breast surgeons and other at-risk woman. The presentations covered the different forms 
of surveillance and surgical risk reduction regimens available; how these may impact on 
one’s family planning and physical wellbeing and the ways in which such health 
information could be communicated among relatives.  There were numerous slides 
bearing the statistical calculations of lifetime risks of cancer, of surgical complications, 
of false positive CA-Z[h tests, of IVF success and failure. There were many tears and 
consoling hugs as one woman recounted her experience of losing her mother to 
aggressive breast cancer while she was pregnant. She spoke of how she decided to 
undergo a risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy not long after. By the end of the day, I 
overheard many of the attendees talking of ‘information overload’ and emotional 
fatigue, including Beth and Lily.  
 
During one of the afternoon tea breaks, I began talking to Lily. At the time, Lily was on 
maternity leave from her job as a public servant in the Australian government. It so 
happened that she was organising an upcoming fundraiser for the main HBOC support 
group, Pink Hope, in Australia and it would be held in our neighbourhood in a few 
months, November of [jZe.  Sensing a good opportunity to familiarise myself with the 
HBOC community, I offered to help Lily by volunteering to deliver pamphlets around 
the city. In the weeks leading up to the fun run, I met with Lily to deliver flyers and to 
help set up the information tent at her event. After the fun run and Christmas break, 
Lily and Beth, now familiar with my research project, kindly offered to meet with me 
for an interview. In February of [jZW, we started what would be the first and most formal 
of our many discussions concerning their family history of cancer and our many 
interactions over the coming years.  Cups of tea in hand, we began by talking through 
the Brooks family’s various cancer diagnoses. Beth’s mother (Lily’s grandmother) had 
been diagnosed with breast cancer at the age of hZ and in the following year, she 
underwent a radical mastectomy, radiation and chemotherapy. She passed away not 
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long after these treatments. Beth’s father was diagnosed with cancer and passed away a 
few years after her mother. Beth’s maternal grandfather died from bone cancer. Beth 
was shocked when she herself was diagnosed with stage W ovarian cancer at the age of 
hg. She had always been very careful to have regular check-ups after Wj, every second 
year, and then every year at hj. Given her family history of multiple cancers, her doctor 
suggested that her cancer could be hereditary and advised that she and her family be 
tested for the BRCAZ/[ gene mutations, a recommendation that was supported by her 
oncologist.  
 
After undergoing surgery and chemotherapy to treat her ovarian cancer, Beth began the 
process of genetic testing. ‘I felt like I was undergoing an interrogation,’ Beth declared. 
Beth was asked to recount her family history of cancer to the genetic counsellor, 
including the types of cancers present and the ages of diagnosis and death. ‘I came out 
drained,’ she noted. Beth waited six weeks for her blood test results, after which she was 
contacted by the genetic counsellor and told that she carried a mutation in her BRCA[ 
gene (located in the eighth exon between nucleotides `hf & `hg). Finding out this 
information close to Christmas, Beth took the opportunity to inform her close family. 
Beth called her brother Eric (who lived in England at the time, working as an executive 
in a media company) and spoke with Lily and her oldest child Dylan in person. At the 
time, Lily was due to give birth to her second daughter. Beth’s sister Charlotte, at first, 
did not want to know about the gene mutation nor be tested for it. However, given time 
to consider the news and its implications, Charlotte decided to undergo a hysterectomy 
and a risk-reducing mastectomy not long after she was told of the familial risk. 
Charlotte’s three sons each tested negative for the mutation. Beth’s brother Eric also 
tested positive for the gene mutation in his mid-sixties, as did his daughter Chloe, now 
in her early thirties. While both Lily and Dylan were eligible to undergo genetic testing, 
given their mother’s diagnosis and family history, only Lily chose to be tested. Lily tested 
positive for a BRCA[ mutation not long after giving birth to her second daughter. ‘Mum 
did good!’ Beth exclaimed, as she listed the number of family members carrying a 
mutation. Of the eight family members who had been genetically tested, five tested 
positive for a BRCA[ mutation (Beth, Lily, Charlotte, Eric and Chloe). 
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During this initial interview, Lily recounted her own experience of testing positive for a 
BRCA[ mutation: 
 
I was eW and in the sauces aisle of my local shops when I received a call from my 
genetic counsellor advising me that I had a ``% lifetime chance of developing 
breast cancer. After nearly dropping the phone and looking at my two young 
daughters, I thought that it was probably time for me to take this hereditary cancer 
stuff seriously. 
 
Lily spoke to me about the difficulty she experienced in making decisions about a course 
of action when it seemed like there were so many different recommendations and 
studies constantly changing and emerging. One of her main frustrations with her 
situation, and one that we often spoke about, was the difficulty she experienced in 
making sense of her risk against the broader predictions, statistics and population-based 
risk calculations:  
 
I was talking to my friendly genetic counsellor last week and was asking about all 
the 'lifestyle' factors that the BOADECIA risk calculator takes into account when 
it gives a percentage risk for developing breast and ovarian cancer. It turns out 
that it only takes into consideration family history. So I asked if there was another 
risk calculator that would give a more accurate percentage risk calculation based 
on lifestyle factors as well as family history and Tanya said the 'Tyrer Cusick' 
calculator takes into account: age of having babies, height, weight, age of first 
period. So I gave her my details for that and now my risk has gone up from ``% 
to XW% lifetime risk for breast cancer! She then went on to say that she and Dr 
Hamilton felt in their 'gut' that this percentage was a bit too high for me so they 
said it should be slightly lower… So essentially I've been given two risk calculation 
figures, one based on four factors plus a gut feeling, and the other on family 
history, neither of which take into consideration my breast feeding history which 
is supposed to cut your cancer risk by hj%, my pill taking history which is 
supposed to drop your ovarian cancer risk, my smoking status, my alcohol 
consumption or my level of physical activity. Honestly, why isn't there another 
tool that takes everything into consideration.  
 
Lily also felt this frustration and confusion in regards to risk-reducing options such as 
screening and surgery. She recalled being given a few general information brochures 
about how she could proceed with risk reduction, but she wished that there existed 
something more akin to a ‘decision tree,’ as she called it.  Lily desperately wanted a 
resource that showed a ‘path’ or ‘checklist’ you could follow. For example, she could 
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select the criteria that best describes her situation; ‘I am a young mum, breastfeeding 
my bab[ies] and juggling a part time job,’ and follow it along ‘branches’ to find what the 
most suitable risk reducing strategy or option would be. Yet even then, she told me, she 
could still get cancer:  
 
It's frustrating that you can do nothing about your genes. It's frustrating that you 
can do everything right like, have kids early, breastfeed, exercise, not drink 
alcohol, be a healthy weight and not smoke but STILL get ovarian cancer because 
you've got some ridiculous gene mutation. 
 
Over the coming years, Lily and I would often talk about the difficulty she faced in 
deciding what to do about her BRCA[ mutation. When we first met, Lily had only 
recently found out about her mutation and was thoroughly preoccupied with nursing a 
newborn baby and toddler. Towards the end of my fieldwork and having completed her 
family with a baby boy, Lily was beginning preparations for undergoing risk-reducing 
surgeries. She had begun a savings fund for her operations and was hoping to take a 
voluntary redundancy at her job to give her the additional time and money to undergo 
the procedures. On one of our drives to a conference in [jZW, Lily told me how she had 
been surprised by what she felt was the emphatic support for surgery she received from 
her doctors: 
 
Within one minute of meeting you [they say], ‘oh you’ve got the gene, so we’ll take 
your breasts and then you should consider a hysterectomy when you’ve done with 
your family.’ It’s like they don’t even consider the myriad of other emotional issues 
there are to deal with. Obviously I appreciate that doctors are gurus and to reduce 
your risk you should have the surgery, but sometimes doctors forget that it’s a 
massive deal and that there are a lot of things to consider. 
 
This uncertainty often played on Lily’s mind, especially as she approached the age in 
which risk-reducing oophorectomy is recommended for BRCA mutation carriers. ‘I will 
never know if I have made the right decision,’ whether the cancer would develop or not, 
‘it is such a gamble.’ And yet, as she astutely observed, ‘if you choose not to have the 
surgeries and you develop cancer, you have to live with knowing you could have done 
something, that you were wrong, you got it wrong…You’d never want to lose the bet 
when cancer is the result… But on the other hand, there’s a Wj% chance I may be 
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removing perfectly healthy body parts.’ But it was not just this state of ambiguity that 
impacted on Lily’s everyday life. There were and still are practical matters that arise 
from living in the spectre of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer; issues of time, money 
and careers. ‘I waste a lot of time going to doctors to get little things checked out, little 
lumps or little abdominal pain, things I wouldn’t normally worry about.’ Lily often felt 
that she did not ‘have the time for this bullshit.’ Dealing with risk-reducing surveillance 
often ate away time from Lily’s busy everyday routine as she tried to coordinate school 
drop-offs, swimming lessons, work obligations and social events. While the whole 
process was less of a worry in terms of discovering a tumour or pre-cancerous growth, 
she noted how it often presented a challenge in trying to find someone to watch her 
children; ‘I am using up all the babysitting quota on getting ultrasounds.’ Lily’s concerns 
are indicative of a number of issues and worries that I heard from my informants over 
the course of my fieldwork. 
 
Lily’s life and that of her family members changed in a number of ways over the period 
of my fieldwork. When Lily and I first met in late [jZe, she was on maternity leave 
having recently given birth to her second daughter. Towards the end of my fieldwork 
period in late [jZh, Lily gave birth to her third child, a son. Over this period and up to 
the present, Lily continued to collect information to aid her in the process of deciding 
if and when she will undergo risk reducing surgery in the form of a bilateral risk-
reducing mastectomy and oophorectomy. Beth’s ovarian cancer also returned during 
this period. In early [jZh, her cancer markers increased and it was confirmed that her 
ovarian cancer had spread throughout her lower intestines and bowels (despite having 
undergone a complete hysterectomy). She went on hormone therapy in the hope of 
avoiding another round of chemotherapy. Beth spent much of [jZh in and out of 
hospital and in treatment as the hormone therapy proved unsuccessful and she 
underwent another round of chemotherapy and surgery to try to remove the diseased 
tissue. In [jZh she also enrolled in a clinical trial of a PARP inhibitor designed 
specifically for women with recurrent BRCA ovarian cancer during which her health 
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stabilised and her tumours dramatically decreased in size for a short period of time.8 
Mid-way through [jZ`, Beth’s cancer markers began to increase again.  
 
Over the period of my fieldwork and in the months I worked on writing my dissertation, 
I spent an increasing amount of time with Lily and the extended Brooks family. Living 
in the same city at the beginning of my fieldwork, Lily and I would often carpool to 
hereditary cancer conferences and Pink Hope events which lead to a friendship that 
extended beyond the fieldwork setting. In [jZh, as my fieldwork was coming to an end 
in the United States, Lily and her mother Beth travelled to America to attend the FORCE 
annual conference in Philadelphia. Beth’s niece and Lily’s cousin Chloe had moved to 
New York the year before to take up a legal internship. After some family consultation, 
Chloe decided to attend the FORCE conference along with her father Eric, who would 
travel over from England. For the week prior to the conference, I stayed with Lily, Beth, 
Eric and Chloe in New York City. This time spent with the extended Brooks family, this 
family of ‘muntantees’ as Chloe would call them in a mock David Attenborough accent, 
helped to crystallise my understandings of ‘what really matters’ to the Brooks family – 
what they value, cherish and strive to protect from the threat of hereditary cancer. ‘Ah 
the elderly mutantae seems confused by the amuse-bouche,’ Chloe chortled one day, 
playfully mocking me as I quickly scrawled down observations from the day in my 
fieldwork notebook over dinner. As Eric helped Beth choose the best low-fibre option 
for dinner, part of her post-surgery diet, Lily and Chloe chatted about risk reduction. 
The two laughed as Lily recounted how she was told that she left it ‘too late’ to have 
children at eZ, joshing that Chloe better ‘get cracking.’ ‘I should text Adam and let him 
know it’s time to start popping out some kids,’ Chloe responded, pretending to pull her 
phone out of her bag to text her boyfriend. While Lily and Chloe were able to use 
humour to talk about their situation both, on different occasions, felt intensely the 
                                                
 
8 PARP or poly(ADP-ribose) polymerases are ‘enzymes involved in DNA-damage repair’ (Livraghi & 
Garber, [jZh, p. Z). PARP inhibitors offer a ‘promising strategy for targeting cancers with defective DNA-
damage repair, including BRCAZ and BRCA[’ (Livraghi & Garber, [jZh, p. Z). 
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uncertainty of making decisions about their health, their families, and their careers in 
light of a BRCA[ mutation.   
 
Everyday life with the Brooks  
 
During my two years of fieldwork and extended writing periods thereafter, Lily, Beth 
and I would attend BRCA-related events, fundraisers and community outreach groups 
together. We travelled to Sydney, Melbourne, Philadelphia and New York to learn about 
the developments in the field of hereditary cancer and meet with other at-risk women 
and men. During these times, we got to know the ins and outs of hereditary cancer risk 
management and, more importantly, each other. The aim of an anthropologist, writes 
Foster et al (ZgXg, p. Zfj), ‘is to be able to relate to people, not simply as informants, but 
as friends who share much more than an immediate concern with data.’ Over these 
years, Lily and I developed a strong relationship of care and friendship. This relationship 
remained strong during our times together and apart, as I travelled away to conduct 
fieldwork in the United States and moved to a different city upon my return to Australia. 
Lily’s and her family’s experiences of being at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer are ones with which I feel incredibly privileged to have been able to engage. Over 
the course of my fieldwork, Lily not only tirelessly discussed with me the issues that 
pertained to her experiences of being at-risk but welcomed me into her life and family 
as a friend. She encouraged me to speak to her different family members and updated 
me on any developments in their lives. In welcoming me into her life as lived, I was able 
to spend time with her husband James and children, her cousins and uncles, parents-
in-law, work colleagues and friends. Lily’s generosity, enthusiasm and dedication 
encouraged me to see her beyond an understanding of what she was in relation to my 
project – a carrier of a genetic mutation for HBOC. I came to see, and to appreciate who 
she is and ‘who she is struggling to be, both now and in the future’ (Willen, [jZW, p. gX).  
 
Things were said and left unsaid in our relationship. Some weeks we would spend time 
together and not speak of hereditary cancer, some weeks we spoke about it a great deal. 
For periods of time I saw Lily and her family daily, we shared meals, perused the local 
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markets, went running and cycling around the streets, travelled together within 
Australia and abroad. I have held her children, comforted them when they cried, feed 
them and played with them for hours on end. Her daughters introduced me to strangers 
and friends as their ‘sister.’ At other times, we went for weeks, even months without 
seeing one another, maintaining regular contact through texting and emails. The many 
hours we spent engaging with the HBOC community were informative as we shared 
research articles, discussed the latest developments in treatments and risk-management 
and bemoaned the challenges of the healthcare system. Of equal if not greater value, 
however, were those intimate moments when Lily invited me to engage with her and 
her local world. Those mundane, everyday but no less important life activities; of 
grocery shopping, making cupcakes and eating icing, watching bad reality TV, griping 
about our partners and jobs, stuffing our faces with ice-cream, were critical to 
developing my ideas about the shared, familial body.  I sat with Lily as she breastfed her 
baby boy, and witnessed pure adoration as she gazed down at his tiny features and coy 
little smile. I held and bounced her little baby, watching as he took his first steps, played 
hide and seek with Suzie and did some rather enthusiastic Irish dancing with Lizzy. It 
was this intimacy that focused my gaze on what Mattingly ([jZW, p. xvii) describes as 
the ‘humbler moments of everyday life’ as we try ‘to make do with the… lot that has 
been handed’ to us. It was these lasting relationships of care that also attuned my 
ethnographic sensibilities to the role of the body in creating and maintaining the family, 
as a locus of collective experiences of temporality and as a means through which to give 
and receive the care of familial others. 
 
My position as ethnographer  
 
My age and gender undoubtedly assisted me in fostering and maintaining relationships 
with my informants as a young woman embarking on her first extended stint of 
fieldwork. My positionality as a woman that bore the same parts and biological capacity 
as the majority of my informants certainly enabled me to interact with my informants 
in ways that may not have been available to a male ethnographer. Indeed, on a number 
of occasions, I was invited by my interlocutors to see and feel their reconstructed breasts 
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and to accompany them to consultations with plastic surgeons as they showed them 
their breasts. Similarly, my age was an asset in the field. Being in my mid-twenties, I was 
often the same age or close in age with my informants or the age of their adult children. 
On other occasions, it was not so much our shared gender or age but rather mutual 
interests and similar personalities that creating connections. For Andy and I, for 
example, our mutual interest in academia, online communities and new technologies 
fuelled long debates and discussions. Lily and I, as mentioned above, bonded over our 
shared love of running, making desserts and watching trashy TV shows. 
 
My time spent with the Brookes family enabled me to move beyond formal data 
gathering to talk with and witness moments that were ‘significant yet often random and 
unexpected – moments that one is only privy to as a result of intimate contact’ (Taylor, 
[jZZ, p. ZZ).  In attempting to respond to Benson and Lewis O’Neill’s ([jjX, p. eZ) call for 
anthropologists to engage in critical ‘self-reflection about the fundamental face-to-face 
dimension of fieldwork,’ in this introduction, I have suggested some of the ways in 
which my caring relationship with the Brooks family and others like them influenced 
my thinking on the social body of the family, on shared temporality and care-giving. It 
is shocking, write Benson and Lewis O’Neill ([jjX, p. eZ) that for a discipline that is 
centred on people, anthropology often lacks ‘critical self-reflection on our relationships 
with informants.’ Wilkinson ([jZW, p. gW) details how, upon returning from his 
fieldwork on poverty and homelessness, Pierre Bourdieu was compelled to question the 
approach of social science to experiences of suffering. He voiced concerns over the 
propensity of researchers to distance themselves from their subjects and silence their 
voices in the process of writing up. This distancing prompted Bourdieu to challenge 
what he saw as the morally suspect relationship between researcher and informant. 
Such iterations, he suggested, promoted ‘cool rationality and abstract languages’ but 
also that the researcher adopt a ‘dispassionate manner’ when interacting with those 
experiencing suffering (Wilkinson, [jZW, p. gW). Following on from such critical 
reflections, Bourdieu called for an approach to research that requires researchers to 
engage on a ‘more personal level in the pains and difficulties of their responders.’ He 
envisaged social research, as Wilkinson ([jZW, p. gW) explained, as a form of caregiving.  
This is a stance that Wilkinson ([jZW, p. gW) himself takes, recognising Bourdieu’s 
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insights as a critical challenge for the discipline of anthropology as it concerns itself 
with suffering. Wilkinson ([jZW, p. gW) calls for a revision of ‘pursuit of social 
understanding’ that holds, at its core, a ‘caring practice.’  
 
This form of ethnography as a caring practice, is necessarily enmeshed in the 
‘contingency’ and ‘risk’ inherent in any human relationship, as Benson and O’Neill 
([jjX, p. eZ) suggest. The benefits of developing caring relationships with the Brooks 
family, for me, far outweighed the risks that such intimacy might pose to myself and, I 
hope, to them. As Jackson (Zgfe, p. eWj) has argued, we must move beyond the 
ethnographic use of a ‘linear communicational model for understanding… bodily praxis.’ 
Given this thesis’ interest in bodily praxis as integral to the formation of the family, my 
ethnography likewise demanded an embodied research practice. It is by using one’s own 
body, in concert with the bodies of others, Jackson (Zgfe) assets, that we can come to 
catch a glimpse into its significance:   
 
By using one’s own body in the same environment, one finds oneself informed by 
an understanding which may then be interpreted… yet which remains grounded 
in a field of practical activity and thereby remains constant with the experience of 
those among whom one has lived (Jackson, Zgfe, p. eWj). 
 
It was through this relationship of care and intimacy with Lily that I came to appreciate 
what was at stake for her and her family. It was through being a physical presence in 
her family life, of caring deeply for her and her family’s wellbeing as I felt she cared for 
my own, that I came to appreciate what really mattered for Lily and her family; her 
mother Beth, her husband James, her daughters and son, her uncle Eric, her cousin 
Chloe. It is to them that I owe this thesis. 
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Chapter One  
Genes, individuals and kin 
 
In this chapter, I expand upon the brief genealogy of anthropological approaches to 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer I provided in the introduction. In doing so, I 
illuminate what has become the paradigmatic approach to hereditary disease within 
anthropology and how this approach curtails other understandings of the illness 
experience. The rise of genetic medicine and genomic biotechnologies has led to much 
consternation among social scientists regarding how the patient and her relations may 
come to be understood in light of these developments. An initial fear was that those 
enfolded into genetic medicine would emerge in the form of the ‘individual as isolate’ 
(Novas & Rose, [jjj, p. Wgj). This is a long-standing concern of medical 
anthropologists who worried about the ways in which biomedicine isolated the sick 
body from the social and cultural contexts to which it belongs and is best understood. 
Helman ([jjf, p. xvi) notes that the voicing of this concern has been a strong trend in 
medical anthropology since the Zgfjs.  
 
This concern remains in the context of predictive genetic medicine and is perhaps even 
sharpened within its critiques. The ‘individual isolate’ imagined in such accounts is a 
profoundly decontextualised entity who is defined solely by her or his genetic matter. 
One more sinister manifestation of this, as Konrad (Zggf, p. ` We) suggests, could be that 
genes may be fetishized. She worries that genes may come to have ‘a claim to 
personhood and ought, as such, to enter the legal domain as nature-endowed, rights-
bearing entities,’ over and above the social, ‘choosing’ individual who is constituted by 
them (Konrad, Zggf, p. `We). Raspberry and Skinner ([jjX, p. eXj) put this fear in even 
franker terms. Being diagnosed with a genetic condition, they assert, ‘involves the 
process of remaking one’s self-image to accord with the sense of a “genetic identity”’ 
(Raspberry & Skinner, [jjX, p. eXj; see also Armstrong, et al., Zggf). In these arguments 
we see a theoretical concern for the ability of a gene or gene mutation to define the at-
risk woman over and above other, more affective, characteristics.   
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Novas and Rose ([jjj, p. Wgj) declare these fears largely unfounded on the grounds 
that ‘individuals are subjectified [in these medical technologies] through their location 
in a matrix of networks’ including those familiar to anthropologists such as genealogy. 
It is those networks of familial connectivity and affective kinship that by and large 
overlay genetic relatedness. They assert that individuals will remain social and will 
incorporate genetic ‘facts’ into social selves and relations. This sociality of those 
subjected to genetic medicine, Lindee ([jjh, p. Zghj) submits, is actually reflective of 
the communal project that is genetic medicine, a field that has been ‘brought into being 
by many social actors.’ Using the example of genetic counselling, Novas and Rose ([jjj, 
p. Wgj) situate the genetically identified ‘patient’ as one who nevertheless remains at 
the heart of mapping a set of remembered relations onto a lineage, and in this way takes 
some agency in arraying illness experience and genetic inheritance around existing 
modes of sociality.  
 
Konrad ([jje, p. eW[) argues similarly, noting that, ‘the promise of future curative 
genetic therapies makes scientific genetics the basis for cultivating another tissue of 
social connectivity: kin are having to negotiate, as part of a moral and social anatomy of 
interdependence, the degree to which they want to know about others and, by 
implication, their own, genetic inheritance.’ Despite the pull of nascent genetic 
information on relatedness and heredity, Konrad ([jje) asserts, the individual remains 
agential in how she uses this information to recognise or refute forms of relationality. 
Thus, she concludes, the rise of genetic medicine and its attended forms of biogenic 
relatedness preclude the ‘individual as isolate’ as these ‘moral and affective anatomies’ 
emerge as ‘new relational “webs” of kinship and relatedness’ (Konrad, [jje, p. eW[). 
These relational webs, she posits, fundamentally ‘rework older anthropologically 
inflected meanings of “genealogy,” and structural-functional concepts of genealogical 
“proximity” and “distance,” in quite different ways’ (Konrad, [jje, p. eW[). Indeed, 
Konrad ([jje) goes as far as to say that, in contemporary society, genetic knowledge of 
health and potential illness has become a key material through which ethicised and 
moral relationships between individuals come to bear. Genetic knowledge in this view 
is thus thoroughly affective, it is ‘the contemporary “material”’ that transforms people 
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as ethicized social relations’ (Konrad, [jje, p. eWg). At the heart of these reassurances 
offered by Novas and Rose ([jjj) and Konrad ([jje) is the notion that the genetically 
imagined and defined individual will not and cannot take agentic precedence over the 
social, affective already-networked individual so familiar to anthropologists. 
 
Genetics and kinship – at odds?  
 
Despite the reassurances offered by Novas and Rose ([jjj) and Konrad ([jje), it is 
possible to see how the notion that genetics might define individuals, as Finkler ([jjj, 
[jjZ) and others worry, extends the concerns anthropologists already held about 
biological modes of kinship. In particular, these worries centred on the shortcomings of 
forms of biological relatedness that have already and inherently organised ‘other’ people 
into patterns of relatedness generated by the ‘facts’ of biological inheritance.  For 
Strathern (Zgg[a), however, it is this very biological and genetic mode of producing 
bodies that underscores the inherent relationality of Euro-American kinship models. 
The uniqueness of persons, Strathern (Zgg[a) asserts in her influential work After 
Nature, is one of the key facts of English kinship. This proposition does not mean, 
however, that one’s genetic composition comes to circumscribe the person. Rather, as 
Strathern explains:  
 
The child’s physical origins lie in the bodies of others, a link as indissoluble as its 
own genetic formation is normally deemed irreversible. Yet parents only 
reproduce parts of themselves. Like the fortune one may or may not be born in to, 
the conjunction of genetic traits is assumed to be fortuitous. While the child 
claims its origin in its parents’ make-up, it itself evinces a unique combination of 
characteristics, and the combination is regarded as a matter of chance. This lays 
the basis of its individuality. Individuality is thus a significant outcome of 
relationships – indeed parents are expected to assist the child to develop that 
independence which is one manifestation of it (hence the lesser expectation of 
duty). At the same time, ‘individuals’ must also be seen as making themselves. 
Although the basis for the link between parent and child lies in the child’s past, 
what that link will mean in the future is contingent on how the individual person 
acts. The nature of interaction, the degree of obligation felt, and in respect of 
lateral connections through the parent even whether a tie is acted on at … all 
depends on what the child will make of its past. Such Euro-American kinship 
constructs thus evoke ideas about change and continuity… (Strathern, Zgg[b, p. 
Z`h). 
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In this excerpt, Strathern (Zgg[b) draws into conversation both the seemingly 
immutable laws of genetic inheritance and the production of the person. Significantly, 
Strathern’s (Zgg[b) figuring of the ‘individual’ is different from that offered by Finkler 
([jjj) and the like. The individual, for Strathern (Zgg[b) is not bounded or discrete 
but is necessarily partial and hybrid. It emerges from the partial inputs of others and yet 
remains agential in arraying its relations, both genetic and affective. Drawing on 
Strathern (Zgg[b), we see the ways in which genetics and social relationality produce 
the person as a hybrid that is not subject to genetic determinism but makes social and 
affective relations from her chance inheritance. The post-Schneiderian kinship project 
likewise welcomed extensive analysis of these and other forms of Western social 
relations that are forged beyond the confines of genetics, marriage and blood. As 
Strathern (Zgg[b) asserts above, this includes taking seriously the affective as well as the 
biological relations that connect people through processes such as adoption and the 
like. As Carsten remarks, the place of biology was critically reassessed in: 
 
studies of gays and lesbian kinship in America. Weston (ZggZ, Zggh) discusses 
coming-out stories which reveal that 'blood ties' are described as temporary and 
uncertain in the light of the disruptions to, and severance of, kinships ties 
experienced by gays who declare their homosexuality to their families. Meanwhile 
'chosen families' of friends are invested with certainty, depth, and permanence, 
and spoken about in an idiom of kinship by those whose experience of biological 
kin has been thoroughly disrupted. This implies a view of kinship which, by 
displacing biology, turns the conventional understandings on their head - 
although Strathern underscores how the critique of gay kinship actually consists 
of making explicit 'the fact that there was always a choice as to whether or not 
biology is made the foundation of relationships'… ([jjj, p. Z[). 
 
As we can see in the thinking of Strathern (Zgg[b), Weston (ZggZ, Zggh) and Carsten 
([jjj), it is no longer the case that such biological or genetic facts can be accepted as 
a rule of kinship. Indeed, in anthropology, we are a long way past accepting that 
assumption, as Strathern (Zgg[a, p. Z[) attests, ‘the pre-existing character of 
relationships need not after all be taken for granted.’ Developing upon Strathern’s work 
on relationality and Weston’s findings in America, Putnina ([jZZ, p. ZZj), in her 
examination of homosexual families in Latvia, identifies loves and choice not merely as 
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oppositional to biological heredity and kinship. Affect and choice, she posits, are also 
significant in linking people ‘when biological categories are not available’ (Putnina, [jZZ, 
p. ZZj). Gay and lesbian families, she continues, thus do not necessarily introduce new 
categories but ‘displace already existing ones by taking a new standpoint on what is 
already present’ (Putnina, [jZZ, p. ZZj). People are and can be profoundly innovative in 
relating to others as we see in these examples.  
 
Consequently, Marks ([jZe, p. [WX) surmises, anthropologists see that ‘genetic facts are 
not natural, with meanings inscribed on them, but are instead natural/cultural: the 
natural facts have cultural information (values, ideologies, meanings) integrated into 
them, not layered on them.’ It is now part and parcel of anthropological analyses to 
regard the once natural, given facts of biology and genetics as social constructions, and 
to approach their assumed hierarchical dominance with a good deal of suspicion. People 
make relatedness, it is not in post-post Schneiderian kinship, given. As Franklin (ZggX, 
pp. [Zj-Ze) puts it, ‘science can no longer be viewed as extra-cultural; kinship is no 
longer defined against 'natural,’ 'biological' facts; it is no longer 'given,’ an assertion 
supported by Taussig ([jjg). Birke (Zggg, p. W`) has gone as far as to show how science 
itself is recasting the given facts of biology, referring to research that demonstrates the 
‘active engagements of the embryo’ in its development. It is not, she purports, a ‘passive 
victim of genetic inheritance… its essence, if there is one, is not fixity, but 
transformability’ (Birke, Zggg, p. W`). Biology and genetics are, like kinship, not static 
nor immutable to change and flux.  
 
It is certainly the case that anthropologists have insisted that genetic kinship is, in the 
lives of those living with the risk of hereditary disease, subject to the stronger pull of 
chosen, affective kinship. Finkler ([jjj, [jjZ) asserts, perhaps the most vehemently, 
that it is affectively oriented agents that resist being organised into the ‘facts’ of genetic 
relatedness. In such an imagining, the affective individual emerges to triumph over the 
genetically composed individual. She asserts her ability to array her kin as she so 
chooses despite the pull and pressure of attending to those to whom she is genetically 
related. However, notions of genetic relatedness also connect bodies in a way that is, 
somewhat ironically, impervious to individual boundedness. In an important respect, 
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genes blur the parameters of bodies, in the sense that our cells are created from 
combinations issuing from partial donations of other bodies (hj% of our chromosomes 
come from our mother, hj% from our father). These partial donations create a 
composite form that is not entirely its own, but rather is the result of a combination of 
the matter, the genes, of others. Genetic material is, as Strathern (Zggg, p. W[) suggests, 
relational and composite; ‘created in the combination of sequences.’ DNA sequences 
are, she posits, like a ‘sort of life-force transmitted from one person to another… the 
ancestral traces of connections between the generations, [are] material evidence of the 
fact that features exist only as the outcome of relationships…’ (Strathern, Zggg, p. W[). 
Genes not only make us unique but bespeak our inherent connectedness with others. 
This point is further developed in Strathern’s (Zgg[b) work on new reproductive 
technologies.  
 
New reproductive technologies, writes Strathern (Zgg[b, p. [W) make evident the fact 
that ‘no one comes into existence without the joining of complementary substance.’ 
Relations are thereby ‘before’ persons in the sense that parents ‘already united in a 
relationship’ make children (Strathern, Zgg[b, p. Zh). The result is a child that is at once, 
made of the stuff of its parents, a hybrid, and yet also a unique being in the world, a 
result of a recombination process. A child is thus, as Strathern (Zgg[b, pp. ZjX-f) asserts, 
‘endowed with material from both parents, literally formed from parts of them [my 
emphasis]’ and yet remains unique. The child is:  
 
equivalent to neither mother nor father, nor to the relation between them: rather, 
it was a hybrid product in another sense, a genetically unique individual with a life 
of its own. It was only a part of their life, despite the fact that genetic material was 
formed wholly from theirs (Strathern, Zgg[b, pp. ZjX-f). 
 
It is, indeed, difficult to rescue the bounded genetic individual as isolate from such 
partial constructions of being, a point that has been made time and time again by 
Strathern (Zgg[a, Zgg[b) in her considerations of English modes of kinship and new 
reproductive technologies. And yet, as Latimer ([jjg, p. hf) notes in her examination 
of composite figures in the works of Frida Kahlo, Western society often worries about 
the erosion of the discrete individual. When persons are seen as the plural and 
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composite site of the very relationships that produced them, it generates unease. 
Latimer ([jjg, p. hf) remarks upon our discomfort when we witness in plain sight the 
combinations of ‘all the parts that make [a person] up, the flows of substance and 
relations,’ that resist categorisation as the individual.  This inherent relationality of 
humans is something that has been increasingly explored by anthropologists in the era 
of the posthuman, human-animal, humanimal, Anthropocene. As Haraway posits 
‘“[h]uman” requires an extraordinary congeries of partners... We are quite a crowd, at 
all of our temporalities and materialities’ (Gane, [jj`, p. ZW` in Franklin, [jZe, p. f`).  
This relationality has not been lost on anthropologists of hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer. Felt and Muller note in the specific space of genetic testing, there is a strong 
emphasis on:  
 
the relational character of genetic knowledge. From the beginning it is performed 
as knowledge not only about the person tested, but also about her/his genetic 
kinship, figuring the individual as the ‘family patient’… As a representative of a 
familial collective, the ‘family patient’ actively collaborates in materializing 
him/herself in the risk-based, genetically grounded construction of the medical 
pedigree [my emphasis] ([jZZ, p. eh[).  
 
The jump made here, however, from the individual as isolate to the individual 
representing the ‘family patient,’ is that the individual is thought to be subsumed under 
the weight of the family. When the individual comes to represent the ‘familial 
collective’, they assert, her own needs are likely to suffer. This relationality that emerges 
in the clinical encounter, they posit, may in fact have iatrogenic outcomes for the 
woman tested.  
 
Here then is a combination of unsettling notions, a contradiction as such. First, genetic 
kinship makes the ‘individual an isolate,’ an entity constructed of genetic facts possibly 
unrelated to the kin that the individual chooses. Equally, gene kinship reveals that the 
person is anything but an individual bounded entity, and is instead the yield of 
combinations of others (who themselves are combinations of others before them). 
These unsettling notions have provoked the rescue mission proposed by Finkler ([jje, 
[jjh), who argues that the affective individual must take precedence over both the 
individual isolate, and the set of partial relations that collectively make Felt and Muller’s 
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([jZZ, p. eh[) ‘family patient;’ a patient who may not even be known by the members of 
that (genetically constructed) family. Finkler, Skrzynia and Evans note that:  
 
the medicalization of kinship creates a tension between the stress on 
individualism and choice in a democratic society and an orientation to family and 
kin. Individualism insists on an autonomous person, standing outside any one 
socially defined unit and selecting his or her life course, whereas kinship 
relationships based on genetic inheritance call for connectedness and 
circumscription of choice ([jje, p. WZj). 
 
In this line of argument, Finkler objects to the individual being removed from her 
cultural and social context, as generations of medical anthropologist have before her 
(Helman, [jjf, p. xvi). Moreover, she takes issue with genetic versions of kinship as it 
produces relations, who may now ask and place demands on her. She instead envisages 
the emergence of an agent who is an affective individual, making social relatedness on 
that basis of affective choice. She notes that:  
 
[w]hereas family and kinship relations are fluid and can be tampered with to 
expand or truncate a significant same group, the genetic definition of family and 
kinship is grounded in biologically produced ties, especially where people enter 
the medical stream and are asked about their medical family history. The ideology 
of genetic inheritance promoted by the new genetics recognizes biological kinship as 
real kinship contrary to current practices that establish family relations by choice 
and manoeuvrability as much as by biology. It thus challenges the cherished 
Western notion of individual choice because the genealogies that geneticists 
construct adhere to rigid rules established by genetic testing that define who is 
and who is not family and kin based on the sharing of DNA. While medical 
technologies are assumed to be in the vanguard of Western technological progress 
and are expected to lead a new kind of revolution, paradoxically the ideology of 
the new genetics acts in the service of traditional conceptualizations of biogenetic 
family and kinship by excluding members of a significant-same group that may be 
established by choice comprised of adoptees, same sex relationships and their 
children, or any combination of blended families of today. The medical-genetic 
definition tends to limit the parameters of family and kin to specific biological ties 
that are identified by similarities in DNA [my emphasis] (Finkler, [jjh, p. Zj`Z). 
 
In Finkler’s ([jjh) view, genetic medicine and by extension gene relatedness poses a 
threat to the individual’s ability to array her kin by her own choosing, as it gives power 
to and renders legitimate ‘biological kinship as real kinship.’ This concern over the 
ability of genetic medicine to rewrite kinship along biological lines and over and above 
 hZ 
affective choice is taken up by Felt and Muller ([jZZ). As a result of genetic medicine 
and hereditary illness, family structures, they write, may be reconfigured in ways that 
are not always welcomed: 
 
generating a new and potentially unfamiliar vision of family in which members are 
not necessarily connected any longer through social bonds and collective 
memories, but through genetic kinship and a potentially shared genetic risk... This 
genetic version of family is rarely congruent with the counselee’s prior vision of 
her/his family. It might exclude some that are socially near (for example, step-
siblings) while it includes unknown or distant relatives, with whom they share a 
‘risk of risk’ but not much more than that. Some family branches appear affected 
while others seem to be spared and thus are rendered invisible within this new ‘at 
risk’ genetic family [my emphasis] (Felt & Muller, [jZZ, p. eh[).   
 
Felt and Muller ([jZZ), like Finkler, worry that genetic medicine and counselling 
establish modes of kinship obligation on the basis of shared genetic material over and 
above social and affective ties. This concern is likewise voiced by Sachs ([jjW, p. [W) 
who questions the degree to which the new genetic medicine will affect ‘people’s 
perceptions of family and kinship and to what extent genetic explanations conflict with 
broader social developments.’ These technologies, she argues, have produced what she 
terms ‘the molecular family’ comprised of geneticised individuals. This ‘molecular 
family’ and the medicalisation of kinship, she suggests, runs contra to ways in which 
kinship is configured in the modern world. Families, she posits, ‘are constructed by 
personal choice and individual decisions rather than based on what are accepted as being 
“natural” biological groupings [my emphasis]’ (Sachs, [jjW, p. [`). Sachs ([jjW, p. [`) 
worries that, as all members of the family or kin group come under examination by 
genetic medicine, relationships organised by genes may take predominance over those 
arrayed by affect, producing new ‘relationships that can alter people’s lives and be 
experienced as overwhelming.’ Consequently, Sachs ([jjW) ruminates, people may be 
brought into relations with others not of their own choosing, what she sees to be a state 
of no return. As she outlines in her ethnography of genetic counselling for hereditary 
illness in Sweden: 
 
The research related to the genealogy actually means that many persons become 
involved without having chosen to do so… The project for communicating 
information draws the informed person into something from which there is no 
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return; he or she can never return to a state of being uninformed [my emphasis] 
(Sachs, [jjW, p. [X).  
 
In a similar vein, Svendsen ([jj`) observes a bifurcation in kin relations that occurs as 
the result of risk-stratifying practices inherent in genetic medicine. Biologically related 
kin, in this context, are prefaced ahead of affective kin members as real or true kin and 
this information once exposed, as Sachs ([jjW) posits, cannot be unknown. The 
genealogy of the genetic counsellor she writes ‘spells out the implicit idea, inherent in 
genealogical diagrams, that kinship is established at the moment of conception’ and 
thus is fundamentally biogenetic (Palsson & Haroardottir, [jj[, p. [XZ; Svendsen, [jj`, 
p. ZWf). It is this understanding of relatedness as primarily a result of shared biogenetic 
substance that, she argues, emerges as paramount and produces actionable patients in 
the field of hereditary cancer prevention. The conceptual field of the genealogy 
produced in cancer genetic counselling, she writes:   
 
defines biogenetic (i.e., bodily relationships) between individual persons and 
presents them as belonging to a common unity—a family… Visualizing biological 
relations on the family tree plays a pivotal role in establishing biological relatives 
as the targets of prevention. With the family tree, the genetically defined family 
becomes an object of medical intervention… Such an intervention requires a social 
contact between relatives. In this way, the production of genetic risk profiles in 
counselling directly affects practices and experiences of kinship… What happens 
in counselling is that the ‘‘fixation’’ of biological ties (i.e., the map making) 
becomes a culturally creative act as implicit assumptions about the biological 
groundedness of social relationships are made explicit when framed by the 
powerful story of ‘‘the journey of the gene’’ and the moral imperative of prevention 
(Svendsen, [jj`, p. ZWf).  
 
Problematically, for Svendsen ([jj`) as is for Felt and Muller ([jZZ) and Finkler ([jje, 
[jjh), this production of the genetic family and genealogy by medicine subsumes other 
forms of kin relatedness based on affective ties of the individual’s own choosing. 
‘[B]iological ties’ Svendsen ([jj`, p. ZhZ) asserts ‘are described and objectified in terms 
of genes and, thus, are literalized as biogenetic relationships… What emerges is a genetic 
family.’ Consequently, Svendsen ([jj`) asserts, the family is transformed into a 
configuration more akin to what Rabinow (Zgg[) has coined a biosociality. This 
biosociality, an arrangement of people united by a common biological or genetic trait, 
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condition or abnormality, anthropologists such as Svendsen ([jj`) worry, will subsume 
affective means of relating, especially within the family.  
 
A rescue mission of sorts 
 
As I have indicated above, medical anthropologists have objected strenuously to the 
given nature of medical ‘facts,’ including genetic facts that have, according to Finkler 
([jjj, [jje, [jjh), Felt and Muller ([jZZ) and Svendsen ([jj`), arrayed both the 
individual and the family in ways fundamentally different from and opposed to affective 
choice.  
 
It is certainly the case that people enfold what might otherwise be called genetic facts 
into their lives and into the affective relations through which they form family. It is 
likewise the case that, as it was with my own informants, ‘family’ is not given by genetics, 
but instead persists in the affective ties that people make with the most significant of 
their relations. In this sense, there is no set of genetic facts that is not, already, social, 
chooseable, just as Strathern (Zgg[a, Zgg[b), Carsten ([jjW), Marks ([jZe) and Franklin 
([jZe) remind us. The affective individual emerges triumphantly. However, a 
fundamental problem emerges from the strict assertion of the affective individual who 
triumphs over the medical arrangement made for herself and her kin. In asserting the 
individual at all costs, and in reacting to genetic medicine as a ‘giver’ of kin relations, 
Finkler ([jjj) and others overlook something very pertinent in how genetic medicine 
formulates the body, in the terms of partiality.  
 
I return here to an important distinction I made in the introduction between what I am 
calling the discrete and bounded individual as a unit of analysis and what I see to be the 
person as a partial, relational being in the world, and especially, in the operations of the 
family. I am not saying that the self, defined by Desjarlais (Zggg, p. Wfj) as ‘embodied, 
feeling, thinking, possibly suffering’ consciousness does not exist. Indeed, it would be 
foolish of me to do so as it is this very being and their idiosyncrasies who is acutely 
mourned after their death from hereditary cancer. To replace the discrete, bounded 
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individual with ‘the social’ as the unit of analysis would be equally problematic. Just as 
the conceptual adoption of ‘the individual’ cannot capture the operations of the 
institution of family, nor can ‘the social’ capture that it will be one physical body that 
will bear pain, suffer and die. We need to look beyond a firm insistence on either. To 
assert the bounded, discrete body emphasises a discreetness of experiences issuing from 
a singular notion of ‘the individual,’ and to insist on a Western version of dividuality 
merely inverts the problem of a prefigured theoretical insistence in understanding the 
illness experience.  
 
We can see in Strathern’s (Zgg[a, Zgg[b) exploration of genetic medicine and kinship 
how this tension between genetic and social relatedness may be broached. In 
reproduction, she submits, we can see clearly the co-existence of the individual (used 
in this sense to describe a unique, hybrid being) and her relationships through her 
inherently relational, partial and composite creation. ‘The child that comes from its 
parents is not its parents… Tradition innovates; relationships produce.’ Genetic 
inheritance thus creates unique, hybrid persons that are neither the same as the mother 
nor the father. We can see the impulse of genetic medicine and technologies to 
emphasise individuality in terms of genetic uniqueness in the popularity of online 
genomic sequencing companies such as [eandMe which allow for a person’s genome to 
be coded for less than $Zjj. However, this uniqueness is only possible, can only emerge, 
as a result of relationality, that is, the mixing of people together. In Strathern’s words, 
we might say that: 
 
relationships come 'before' persons. Parents already united in a relationship 
produce individual children. We might further say that their unity as one person 
presupposes the individuality of the child. Yet, in their children, parents (persons 
in a relationship) also produce other than themselves (individual persons) (Zgg[a, 
p. ZW-Zh).  
 
In light of Strathern’s insights into the co-presence of the person and her genetic and 
affective relationships, I take issue with how, at the conceptual level, anthropologists 
have overlooked these connectivities in purporting the discrete individual as the 
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exclusive unit of analysis. A distinction between data and concepts for analytically 
exploring the data is needed in anthropological approaches of illness experience.  
 
Looking from the perspective of a body constructed in parts, not (pre)given in wholes 
makes possible an appreciation of the person who is constructed in and through her 
partial relations with others – one who is herself relative to others. It is this congruence, 
between imaginaries of partial selves routinely made by my informants, and imaginaries 
of persons made by the partial inputs of others evident in the field of genetic medicine 
and biology that provokes me to suggest that anthropology’s knee-jerk reaction to 
biomedicine might not always be appropriate. In this case, it might even obscure what 
can be known of the person with a predisposition or risk of hereditary cancer.  
 
In the remaindering chapters of this thesis, I intend to think against rigid assertions of 
‘the body’ – whether that body is asserted and insisted to be individual or social. This 
intention manifests in my thesis as particularly attendant to the ‘individual’ body, as it 
is this body that is prefigured in existing literature. Any polar approach is, I think, 
problematic. Analysing the current conditions for anthropological thinking permits me 
to offer new insight into this profoundly prefigured space. This does not mean I claim 
some objective territory in that space, it simply means I include an analysis of the 
current thinking as part of the data I take for consideration. I detail how the long 
standing anthropological reaction to medical thinking preserves a particular notion of 
the individual that might prevent us from seeing her partiality. It is the case that 
anthropologists have privileged the thinking, choosing, socially competent patient who 
is a discrete individual capable of informed, affective choosing of her kin. This assertion 
obscures something already well known to genetics and genetic medicine – that this 
entity masquerading as the bounded individual is a composite of the flesh of others. 
This does not mean that this composite person does not affectively choose her kin and 
relations. But to prefigure the individual as a wholly bounded social and affective body 
that is somehow very different from the one genetics imagines is, in fact, highly 
consequential. It is significant in the terms that this patient is imagined as a bounded 
individual. This becomes most apparent in the actions that the hereditary cancer patient 
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understands to have available to her, as she deals with her affectively chosen kin: she 
can either be selfless, or selfish.  
 
The problem with the primacy of the bounded individual  
 
During the preliminary stages of writing this thesis, I would present sections of my work 
to my department, at conferences and amongst my peers. I put forth the argument that 
existing anthropological approaches to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer overlooked 
the family as a site of embodied, relational acts of care in key ways. I would often use 
the following quote from Valerie, one of my informants who you will meet in more detail 
in Chapter Two. Valerie, a eh-year-old linguist, explained to me why she chose to 
undergo a risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy earlier that year (autumn of [jZW):  
 
Cancer is a very selfish disease... I didn't want that for my husband and child. I had 
just had my first child, and I decided the impact of cancer would be enormous on 
my family and loved ones. It wasn't just about me anymore. 
 
Each and every time I gave a paper that included this quotation, I could not help but 
notice that a particular kind of question would undoubtedly arise, albeit in slightly 
different iterations. One of the following questions, without fail, was asked by my 
professors, colleagues, fellow students and panel mediators; ‘Do women think they are 
being selfish if they don’t get tested or have surgery?,’ ‘Are women seen as selfish if they 
don’t get tested or have surgery?,’ ‘Do women feel they are being selfish if they have 
children knowing they could pass on the gene mutation?,’ ‘Do women really want to do 
risk reduction or are they being self-sacrificing?,’ ‘Do cancer patients think at-risk 
women are being selfish in taking resources to undergo surgery when they might not 
get cancer?,’ ‘Does the woman’s family judge her decision to undergo testing and 
surgery as selfish as she is unable to work or care for others during this time?’ ‘Does a 
woman’s family think she is being selfish in passing on information about their genes 
that they might not want to know or selfish for withholding it?’  
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The frequency in which these questions were asked, often immediately after I have 
completed my presentation, became difficult to overlook. I came to wonder why it was 
that, as anthropologists, we were so interested in whether the decisions and actions 
surrounding hereditary breast and ovarian cancer risk reduction could or would be 
considered as selfish or selfless. It was such a frequently remarked upon prospect, that 
a woman would be considered either/or, that I turned to the literature in an attempt to 
locate these interests of my colleagues and peers within some sort of framework. What 
I found in the literature was that these questions on selfish and selfless behaviour were 
not, it turned out, limited to anthropologists attending my seminars. Rather, this dyad 
of selfless/selfish and the bounded, discrete individual such approaches took to be core, 
were at the heart of paradigmatic anthropological approaches to hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer.  
 
Concerns around the discrete individual, namely the at-risk woman, and the perception 
and ramifications of her actions (as selfish or selfless) in the face of such risk emerged 
as a dominant feature of the anthropology dealing with hereditary cancer. The analytic 
through which existing data is handled is one of moral obligation and responsibility. 
Consequently, so are the findings concerning the pressures women, predominantly, face 
when having to negotiate decisions about how they will handle their cancer risks 
relative to their significant others, that is, their affectively chosen kin. Goldmin and 
Gibbon ([jZh, p. [gZ) capture the dominance of this analytic perfectly, although 
unreflexively. As they note of their [jZh data collected in Brazil among cancer previvors:  
 
there is a sense of moral obligation to take care of the family, as participants in the 
cancer genetic clinics and in research. These sentiments about gendered 
responsibilities, expressed by those taking part in genetic testing for breast cancer, 
resonate with findings outlined elsewhere, in comparatively different national 
contexts... However, the strength of this articulation is particularly striking in 
Brazil. Here, the moral obligation to take care of the family is centrally situated in 
the motivation to participate in research. In Brazil, to choose not to participate is 
considered to be ‘selfish’ (Goldim & Gibbon, [jZh, p. [gZ). 
 
For Goldmin and Gibbon ([jZh), moral obligation and responsibility are key 
motivations for women to enrol in regimes of risk reduction. This pervading sense of 
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responsibility, they argue, also fuels at-risk women’s participation in BRCA research 
(Goldim & Gibbon, [jZh). Hallowell’s work carried out among previvors in the UK is 
perhaps even more telling of the dominance of the selfish/selfless binary upon which 
the moral imperative to handle cancer risk pivots:  
 
While some women described their risk management decisions as influenced by 
the ‘selfish’ desire to fulfil their destiny, all were acutely aware of the potential 
impact of their actions or inaction on others, and cited more altruistic motivations 
for managing their risks ([jj`, p. [j).  
 
In Hallowell’s view, selfishness or altruism are key experiential categories of living with 
the risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer.  These modes of classifying facets of 
the illness experience are well-established in anthropological analyses of genetic and 
hereditary disease. In one of the earliest anthropological examinations of hereditary 
breast and ovarian cancer, Lock in Zggf charted the emergence of an individual who is 
struck down by misfortune, and resultantly, becomes the bearer of responsibility not 
only for oneself, but the others whom depend upon it (Lock, Zggf). She identifies the 
dangers associated with genetic mutations and predispositions as coming to be 
shouldered solely by ‘responsible individuals’ as it is individuals who come to be ‘held 
accountable’ (Lock, Zggf, p. ZZ). As perpetuated in Finkler’s ([jje, [jjh) later works, 
Lock expresses a concern that the affective, choosing individual will be subsumed by 
genetic responsibility to her kin. She worries that the woman’s own concerns, 
experiences and ‘social facts’ of kinship will no longer be important in her decision 
making: 
 
The current politics of breast cancer, for example, appears to be moving in a 
direction in which individuals are increasingly being offered a chance to take 
responsibility for assessing and controlling the risks to which their genetic 
inheritance may expose both them and their potential offspring. With the hype 
associated with the newly discovered gene mutants BRCAZ and BRCA[ (others 
genes are in the pipeline), risk is internalized, medicalized and geneticized… and 
social factors fade into the background (Lock, Zggf, p. ZZ).  
  
In Lock’s (Zggf) work, we see the fear that the individual’s ability to assert their own 
agency in relating to kin and in making decisions about interventions into and upon 
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their bodies would be eroded by genetic medicine. This concern has been borne out by 
scholars of preventative medicine and hereditary disease over the following decades. 
The concern that the individual, most likely the woman, would be held responsible for 
decisions concerning her own and her family’s health in light of hereditary illness 
information, is a key anxiety for anthropologists in this area. As Sachs wrote in [jjW, 
‘genetic predisposition confronts individuals with the responsibility of, first, deciding 
what to do in order to avoid possible future disease and… to communicate [this risk] 
with significant others in the family’ ([jjW, p. [`). A refusal to do so or a 
mismanagement of said responsibility, as Krupar ([jZ[, p. hh) notes, may have severe 
consequences for the at-risk women. She may no longer be a ‘desirable subject’ of 
biomedicine or neo-liberal society. Consequently, the at-risk woman opens herself to 
criticism and judgment for to ‘ignore one’s responsibilities; to choose not to participate 
means that one is not a “good subject.”’ In failing to fulfil her responsibility to manage 
her own health and the health of her familial others, Krupar ([jZ[, p. hh) assets, the at-
risk woman is seen to put ‘society in jeopardy.’  
 
Initially I found it difficult to respond to the questions concerning selfish/selflessness 
that were posed to me during my presentations. All of my reading, as suggested above, 
clearly indicated that this analytic was dominant and thereby a well-established tenet 
in the field of hereditary cancer study. Much of the research to date on the subject of 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer syndromes has been confined to arguments about 
the risks to which women are put as a result of genetic medicine. Analyses in this space 
often focused on the notion that women’s engagements with genetic medicine, such as 
genetic testing, are not a straightforward ‘choice’ and represent yet another avenue in 
which medicalization impedes women’s autonomy, reinforces coercive gender norms 
and gendered hierarchies of power. Anthropologists have been necessarily critical of the 
potential of genetic medicine and technologies to veil social causations and 
determinants of illness and strengthen essentialist thinking about identity and social 
connectedness (Brodwin, [jj[, p. e[e). 
 
Whilst recognising the validity of these critiques of genetic medicine, I seek to push 
discussion in a new direction, one that, as Lock (Zggf, p. [jg) suggests ‘moves beyond 
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black and white arguments about oppressive paternalism and vulnerable women.’ As 
Abel and Browner (Zggf, p. e[[) remind us, we must be careful not to automatically 
assume that the expansion of biomedicine, including genetic technologies, inevitably 
results in women’s loss of control. Discussions of medical technologies, as Lock 
suggests, ‘must not only consider political and professional discourse about the 
construction and manipulation of individual female bodies but also articulate the range 
of responses of women from various walks of life to such discourse (Lock, Zggf, p. [jg).’ 
Thus, while I acknowledge the rationale behind the focus on the individual woman and 
her ability to assert her agency in the face of biomedical and genetic technologies, I 
remain uncomfortable with uncritically adopting such a paradigm in my own research, 
primarily because my informants did not privilege it in their descriptions of how 
decisions were made, and how they related to members of their family. I came to realise, 
also, that this analytic only makes sense if the bounded, individual is privileged. Relative 
to my ethnographic data, I could not analytically privilege the individual, since it was 
not dominant. What was dominant in my data was a sense of partiality very similar to 
that advanced in the medicine imaginary of genetic inheritance and hybridity, that is, a 
composite person composed of the parts of others.  
 
Since sick or potentially sick body parts are critical here, what to do with breasts, 
ovaries, and the like appear, on the basis of my ethnographic data, to be a collective 
decision. Instead of beginning with the idea that the parts in question initially belong 
to a bounded individual who makes decisions concerning them that will subsequently 
impact on her familial relations, I posit that they are instead parts of the family. 
Consequently, it is crucial to develop an analytic framework that takes account of such 
composites. 
 
Part/s of the family or biosocial families?  
 
I here want to set out an alternative analytic frame for thinking about previvorship. The 
concepts I use draw upon phenomenological ideas about the ways in which bodies are 
formed and relate to one another. One of my key influences is Merleau-Ponty (Zg`[), 
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who refused to recognise the bounds of the conceptual individual as aligning with the 
boundaries of the flesh. I also draw on Foucauldian notions of institutions, where parts 
work together to produce the manufacturing plant and the shop floor of late capitalism 
but also give fleshy form to the corps of the army, and to the family. These are unions 
not of bounded, whole, impervious bodies but of their significant parts. Contributors 
together yield a conceptual whole, a process not dissimilar from the way in which 
genetic contributions, as Strathern (Zgg[a, Zgg[b) asserts, produce the conceptual, 
unique and essentially hybrid person. A Foucauldian institution is, as Bevir (Zggg, p. 
eh[) suggests, sustained in the minutiae of parts working in concert with parts ‘created, 
sustained, and modified through the meanings and ideas of a host of micro-practices.’ I 
contrast this composite body of the person and of the family, with the somatic body 
proposed by Novas and Rose ([jjj). This figure, despite its somatic qualities, remains 
a discrete and bounded individual body operating in a network with other, whole 
discrete bodies. I establish this contrast as a means of grappling with the ethnographic 
data I collected. My data was replete with ideas about the partiality of bodies, and the 
collectivities these partial conglomerations produce.  
 
As I outline briefly above, Rabinow’s notion of biosociality has been used extensively by 
anthropologists of hereditary disease and illness experience. Biosociality speaks to the 
myriad ways in which social relations and modes of sociality form around what Hacking 
describes as ‘newly recognized (or, at any rate, newly asserted) biological or genetic 
lines’ (Hacking, [jj`, pp. fZ-f[). These genetic identities, Hacking ([jj`, pp. fZ-f[) 
posits, forge ‘new alliances… loyalties [and] identities.’ Anthropological approaches that 
premise biosociality grapple with the multiple and multifarious ways in which nascent 
genetic knowledge affects how individuals ‘come to understand themselves or relate to 
others’ (Gibbon & Novas, [jjf, p. [). Biosocial anaylses are interested in how nascent 
genetic identities can produce groups of like individuals who work to define and shape 
the ‘production of knowledge about their conditions’ and craft ‘novel self-conceptions.’ 
(Gibbon & Novas, [jjf, p. [; see also Hacking, [jjX; p. fW, Navon, [jZZ). This 
biosociality premised on a shared, genetically marked category, encourages individuals 
to enrol themselves into such biomedical categories that become ‘central to their social 
lives [and] entails the construction of an imagined kindred’ (Rapp, et al., [jjZ, p. egh). 
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These biosocial or ‘technoscientific’ identities not only foster a shared, collective 
identity with others so identified but may, as Sulik ([jjg, p. Zj`j) asserts 
apprehensively, motivate the individual to ‘become – think of oneself in terms of – the 
classification.’   
 
It is undeniable that the presence of a hereditary genetic mutation can bring, or at times 
force, together biologically/genetically related people who would otherwise remain 
estranged. In the case of my own fieldwork, informants often became aware of relatives 
with whom they had no previous social relationship, but shared the same genetic 
mutation. It was certainly the case that my informants formed new modes of sociality 
around their hereditary cancer risk. I engaged with a number of these communities 
during my own fieldwork including the US-based FORCE, a hereditary cancer support 
organisation, Pink Hope, an Australia based hereditary cancer support network, and 
BRCA Sisterhood, a Facebook group with `Xeh members (and counting). Biosociality is 
also purported to be a force or power capable of reworking kinship and refashioning 
existing forms of relationality, sameness and difference along the lines of genetic 
identity (see for example Rapp, [jjj; Gibbon & Novas, [jjf; Navon, [jZ[). As noted 
in the introduction, biosociality in this sense is carefully policed, lest it issue wholly 
from the field of medicine and thus arrange individuals into pre-given categories of 
relatedness, for example, by shared biogenetic substance.  
 
In her work on the intersection of gender, race and neoliberalism in genomic medicine, 
Happe ([jZe, p. ZXX) offers an alternative rendering of this coercive power of genetic 
medicine and identities by calling for ‘biosociality without genes.’ This approach, she 
posits, allows us to understand how people come to act, make alliances and form 
politics, based on their experience with and in connection to others but with an 
important caveat. A biosociality without genes, she posits, resists seeing such sociality 
as merely ‘the outgrowth of indelible, biologistic, bodily attributes and their implicit 
valorisation of atomist identity and politics’ (Happe, [jZe, p. ZZf). In a similar vein, 
Sharp ([jZZ, p. [`e) has drawn attention to the danger of an overly ‘bio’ biosociality, 
which would obscure the social complexity that accompanies genetic configurations of 
kinship. As Sharp ([jZZ, p. [`e) suggests, by invoking biosociality, anthropologists run 
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the risk of overlooking the forms of relationality and sentimental structures inherent in 
other forms of kinship.  
 
The ‘sociality’ of ‘biosociality’ however remains dominant in the concept. In the case of 
the biosocial grouping Pink Hope, people were flung together as a result of their shared 
genetic mutation and/or hereditary cancer risk, who might otherwise have never met. 
The quality of the social relations in which these otherwise strangers then participate is 
of enduring interest to anthropologists (see Rapp, et al., [jjZ; Rapp, [jjj; Navon, [jZZ). 
These constellations of sociality emerged time and again in my fieldwork data. For 
example, Billie, aged [f at the time of our interview, was only [h years old when she 
underwent a risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy. She told me just how invaluable the 
biosocial, patient advocacy and support group FORCE was during her recovery. After 
undergoing her surgery, Billie attended the annual FORCE conference:  
 
It was nice to be around people who had done the same thing and to see that they 
were okay… For me, going to the conference, there was one session – the young 
women networking group – and I didn’t know anyone, even though I connected 
with my local group. There was no one my age at the time you know I was thinking 
‘am I crazy to doing this at my age?’ and ‘am I being completely irrational and 
crazy?’ but I went to that and saw people who were the exact same age or younger 
and had already had it done and they were happy with it. That really made me feel 
a lot more comfortable doing it and made me feel less crazy… [you develop a] 
friendship almost because you have this really weird thing that you’ve had done, 
that no one else really has, so it’s like an instant bond like ‘you know we had 
surgery within a week of each other.’ Just through FORCE and some of the groups 
on Facebook, I have made friends that I will have forever. We try to get together 
once a year. So it’s kind of sad I lost some local friends but I made some really, 
really good friends.  
 
Such examples of sociality premised on shared genetic traits are just one of the bases 
upon which Novas and Rose ([jjj) assert that new medical genetics offers 
opportunities to explore existing and emergent networks of relationality. They note how 
‘the genetic identity of the counselled individual is established by locating him or her 
within a network of [familial] relations,’ but it is also the case that persons find 
themselves in social networks of affective non-kin relations, as the above example 
demonstrates (Novas & Rose, [jjj, p. Wgj). It is when it is applied wholesale to the 
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institution of the family, however, that the limits of the biosocial concept become 
apparent.  The limitations of such an approach became particularly evident in terms of 
accounting for my own ethnographic data as I tried to comprehend what was ‘at stake’ 
in the lives of my informants (Kleinman, [jj`).  
 
Biosociality, the somatic individual and the family: Lily   
 
As a means of illuminating the possible shortcomings of predominately biosocial 
approaches to illness experience, I include here an account of a conversation I had with 
Lily during my fieldwork. One afternoon midway through [jZh, Lily and I met for 
afternoon tea at her home. Sitting at her kitchen table, surrounded by the material 
artefacts of everyday life; catalogues for the Scholastic Book Club, jumbles of keys and 
wallets and some of Lily’s divine homemade caramel slice, she informed me that Beth 
had been recently put on a clinical trial for chemotherapy-resistant, BRCA-mutated 
ovarian cancer.  I asked Lily how this development influenced her own plans for risk 
reduction. Lily furrowed her brow as she thought, pausing before she answered, ‘Mum 
has ovarian cancer and I’ve been told I only have a X% lifetime chance of getting it but 
because I’ve watched her go through it, I want a hysterectomy so I definitely don’t get 
it, even with such low odds.’ As she was speaking, Lily’s eldest daughter wandered out 
from the lounge room where she had been building a blanket cubby house with her 
sister. After passing Lizzy some popcorn, Lily mused aloud on the prospect of her 
daughter’s futures: 
 
I have real issues with potentially not being able to donate eggs or whatever if 
either of the girls had fertility issues later in life. How would I feel knowing that I 
could not give them, nor even offer them, one of my eggs so that they could be 
mothers? Though it would be a hideous situation, I would feel worse knowing that 
I could not be of any help. It's just another thing to consider with surgery. 
 
Lily recalled how she asked another woman at a BRCA support day about this gamble. 
She asked the woman how she came to make the decision to give up her body parts and 
their functions without knowing with certainty whether cancer would develop. She 
asked whether the woman had been able to achieve peace with her decision. The woman 
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replied that ‘you will never know [whether cancer would have developed]’ but when she 
looked at her children, she knew she had made the right decision. While Lily 
understood this sentiment, the decision to remove her body parts and their attendant 
functions is not as straightforward as it may seem. What if, as she argued, in [j years, 
her daughters or one of her daughters was infertile? How would she feel knowing that 
she could not give them, nor even offer them, one of her eggs? Yet at the same time, she 
lives with the pressure of this ‘what if,’ as she told me, ‘I have a kid now, I can’t die.’ 
 
It is to this set of decisions that the social element of biosociality has been applied. 
Novas and Rose ([jjj) conceptualise the at-risk individual, who faces questions about 
whether to take genetic tests at all, and what to do with the results of those tests in 
relation to their family members, as the somatic individual. This individual is oriented 
to the needs of others as a result of their shared [genetic] identity. They are compelled 
to consider how their decision making might impact on their loved ones. The decisions 
of the somatic individual are taken, primarily, ‘in light of a knowledge of their genetic 
status’ (Novas & Rose, [jjj, p. WgW). This somatic individual bears the weight of genetic 
responsibility, and how it will impact others, as a result of her decisions and her future-
reaching actions.  
 
It is not difficult to unpack Lily’s remarks about egg donation, fertility and her 
aspirations for her daughters in and through the prism of the somatic individual. It is 
ostensibly Lily who struggles under the genetic burden of deciding what to do for the 
good of the others related to her, just as her mother Beth did before her. Lily certainly 
appears to be an individual ‘whose individuality is, in part at least, grounded within 
[her] fleshly, corporeal existence, and who experience[s], articulate[s], judge[s] and 
act[s] upon [her]sel[f] in part in the language of biomedicine’ (Rose, [jjX, p. Ze). Lily’s 
experience, when read in the terms of the somatic individual, is not all that fleshy, 
however much her genetic makeup is enfolded into her own understanding of her flesh 
and the flesh of her daughters. By this I mean that as a somatic individual, Lily remains 
a discrete and bounded fleshy entity, making decisions about her body parts and their 
functions that will then come to bear on the flesh of her significant others. But what if 
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we were to begin with the parts Lily is worried about, from the perspective of the shared 
flesh of the family? To do so would allow Lily’s remarks to be read rather differently.  
 
The fleshy body: part of the family  
 
In ZggW, Lyon and Barbalet proposed a mode of understanding the body that was freed 
from the tight constraints of individuality along with the mind-body separation insisted 
by the Cartesian divide. Their proposal was crafted in the form of a careful, almost 
technical, definition of what a family might be. Rejecting heteronormative norms, 
economic models and various social submissions based on affective groupings, Lyon 
and Barbalet (ZggW) dealt instead directly with the machinations of bodies that appear 
to create, manifest and sustain the group of people known as ‘the family.’ Lyon and 
Barbalet (ZggW) submit that family is formed in the manner in which other institutions 
are also formed, that is, precisely in and through the deployment of the body parts of 
one, relationally, to the body parts of another. The military and the factory floor of late 
capitalism also work along these lines, as Foucault (ZgXX) amongst others, have showed 
us. Whole, bounded buffered bodies, as units of productive work, do not make sense in 
context where hands work in conjunction with other hands, and legs march together in 
company time. Certain bodily parts come to the fore, being, in and through the relations 
of capitalist or military power, privileged or more important in each of their contexts. A 
hand, for example, is of more value in the nimble work of the factory procession line 
than is the foot. Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW) suggest that the same is true for the 
operations of the family. In families, emotion is the force that often organises the 
deployment of bodily movements in ways that meet and are met by parts of others. 
Emotion drives the activity of the parts in the same sense that capitalist productive 
values drive hands towards other hands on the factory floor. In the family, emotion 
might, for instance, impel a father’s lips to the forehead of his daughter, or a mothers’ 
slapping hand to the legs of her disobedient son.  
 
Such partial deployments, of hands to legs and lips to heads, are distinguished in subtle, 
habitual ways from the whole, buffered body that is conceptually ‘son’ or ‘daughter.’ 
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‘Son’ and ‘daughter,’ as whole bodies, are not involved in the receipt of kisses and slaps 
to quite the same extent that their foreheads and their legs are. These parts are the parts 
critically involved in the relation between them and their mother or father, and it is to 
these relations that Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW) attend. They do so because it is the partial 
deployment of bodies as they relate to one another that yields the family, not simply 
however many bodies operate in proximity as a network. These relations of parts, argue 
Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW), are critical, for it is these that together create the patterns 
and habits that yield and maintain the social body nameable as ‘the family.’ Indeed, as 
Collins (ZgfZ, p. ggh in Lyon and Barbalet ZggW, p. h`), suggests the maintenance of 
social institutions is tethered to the ‘distinct engagements of aspects of bodily 
disposition.’ In the case of the family, ‘[t]he most repetitive behaviours that make up 
family structure are the facts that… the same [people] sleep in the same beds, that the 
children are kissed, spanked and fed’ (Collins, ZgfZ, p. ggh in Lyon and Barbalet ZggW, p. 
h`). These are the relations of parts, not whole buffered, bounded bodies. The family is 
a relation of bodily parts, of porous bodies, impelled towards the parts of others by 
emotional force. Indeed, the relations of habitual interaction, of care, that make and 
sustain families are conducted using parts. Significantly, and as I will discuss in the 
following section, some parts are more fundamental to familial creation and 
maintenance than are others.   
 
This analytic of family construction also allows for relating as kin outside of the 
strictures of heteronormativity. As Putnina ([jZZ, p. ZZj) reminds us ‘it is not the 
category (given/chosen, natural/nurtured, biological/social) but the ability to relate, 
and to create and maintain relationships, however they are categorized, that lies at the 
core of family and kinship.’ Similarly, it is important to recognise, as do Lyon and 
Barbalet (ZggW), that not all families, constructed of parts acting in relation to other 
parts are necessarily impelled towards one another by emotions of love, happiness and 
unwavering devotion. Biehl ([jZ[, p. [WW), in his work on care and disregard in families, 
draws on Lacan (Zgef in Biehl, [jZ[, pp. [WW-[Wh)  to remind us that families are, in and 
of themselves, ‘plural and complex.’  Families are, he asserts, caught up in ‘conflicts and 
inertia of their own and they must be studied with care…’ (Biehl, [jZ[, pp. [WW-[Wh). A 
similar sentiment is expressed by Putnina ([jZZ, p. Z[[) in her ethnography of same-sex 
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relationships in Latvia. In moving beyond analysis of categories such as hetero-
normativity, she posits, we can begin to appreciate the work required to create and 
maintain families, whatever their configuration. Family, she suggests, is not necessarily 
a stable or given set of relationships, a sentiment evident in Strathern’s (Zgg[a, Zgg[b) 
early musings on relationality within families. As I gestured to earlier, a person may 
work to detach themselves from partial relations, including those partial bodily 
relations of the family. As Strathern (Zgg[b, p. Z[h) submits, ‘there is no axiomatic 
evaluation of intimacy or closeness’ in the family.  The process of relationality is 
‘constantly recreated in people’s dealing with one another’ (Strathern, Zgg[b, p. Z[h). 
These politics of the family are fleshed out below in the case of Anne, a woman who 
endeavours to expel the very parts of her body once crucial to relating her to her 
husband.  
 
Some parts are more important than other parts  
 
It has long been recognised within anthropology that certain body parts, within 
Western culture, carry particular symbolic weight. This importance is often linked with 
the biological function of the part or organ in question but also its role in fostering an 
embodied sociality between persons (see Sharp, Zggh; Manderson, [jZZ). In her recent 
work on surrogate motherhood, for example, Teman ([jjg) theorises the interaction 
between bodies undertaking individualistic pursuits and as collaborative body-part-
projects. Using the idea of the ‘shifting body,’ Teman ([jjg, p. ``) argues that we must 
move beyond the individualistic body to show the ways in which body parts become an 
important ‘tool of joint identity-work,’ as necessary for the familial unit, whatever its 
configuration. The social body, or shifting body, as an interactive process, thus requires 
‘related types of intra-bodily interactions’ to which these identity constructions are 
involved (Teman, [jjg, p. ``). 
 
A particular sense of this body-part-project applies to breasts and ovaries, the body parts 
most at risk of manifesting cancer, since both are highly relational; both are highly 
interactive sites of the body. The breasts are involved in relations of sexuality and 
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sustenance, and ovarian relations are the relations of kin, making evident and manifest 
sexual relations and the relations of family. The cultural significance of breasts in 
Western culture has been charted by scholars such as Bordo (Zgge), Yalom (ZggX) and 
Grosz (ZggW) and are summarised nicely in the work of Manderson ([jZZ, p. ZXe). The 
breast, she writes:  
 
is the flesh that nurtures, offers reassurance and comfort; an infant’s embodied 
memory is buried long after the last suckle. Breasts are matters of beauty and 
pleasure, sex and sexuality, flamboyantly exposed in fashion, represented and 
admired in art, omnipresent on screen, discreetly exposed with breastfeeding… 
(Manderson, [jZZ, p. ZXe) 
 
As Lock ([jjX, p. h`g) reminds us, human body parts do not carry universal value as 
seen in the variety of modalities described by Manderson ([jZZ). Just as the breasts carry 
multivalent meanings and import, so do ovaries. In her study of women who had 
undergone hysterectomies and medically induced menopause, Elson ([jjW, p. e[) 
writes that ‘while the uterus is most strongly identified with its childbearing function, 
ovaries are the primary producers of sex hormones, which are popularly considered the 
essential determinates of sexual difference.’ Ovaries and breasts are both parts that do 
important work in creating and maintaining the necessarily partial and collaborative 
familial body.  
 
Kim, a `Z-year-old musical theatre actress and composer based in America, spoke 
directly about the way in which her breasts did relational work in her family, and 
particularly with her husband.   
 
I was in college at the time when people were burning bras and fighting for equal 
rights… but I don’t think it is anti-feminist to say that when you attach yourself to 
another person, to your husband, that parts of you become parts of them. And to 
think that someone is a jerk because they are mourning the loss [of those parts]… 
well I have certainly talked to women whose husbands have been very jerky about 
that subject and accusing them of not being sexy anymore and leaving them but 
my husband… this has been really hard on him and in some ways it has been harder 
for him because he is expected to be strong, expected to not care, and you know, 
I got a lot of attention because I was the one getting cut up and he was supposed 
to suck it up and go to work because it wasn’t happening to him but it was 
happening to him. And I would love it if people were more sensitive to [him]… 
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when he saw my scars, he felt it as a failure, emotionally, he knew it wasn’t 
anything he did, but there is this woman who he had sworn his life to and he 
thought ‘I let her get cut up.’ 
 
Kim’s experiences of bodily connection to her husband and his sadness over the loss of 
her breasts, speaks of their relational capacity, making a certain sense of why Kim’s 
husband suffered at their loss. They were not of his ‘own’ body, but they were critical to 
the relation that tied he and Kim together. It was this loss of relating that he felt.  Having 
her breasts removed was difficult for both Kim and her husband as she mourned the 
demise of a particular physicality of their relationship; of his hand touching her breast, 
and what that meant to both of them. Kim and her husband’s bodies reach out and 
recognise one another as part of a social relationship of love and care.  Theirs was a ‘type 
of mutual, collaborative, dyadic, intersubjective and embodied identity work,’ a work in 
which whole individual bodies do not make relational sense, and in which Kim’s and 
her husband’s pain make complete sense (Teman, [jjg, p. ``).  
 
Unlike Kim, Anne, an Australian woman in her early `js, wanted to be rid of the 
relationality of parts that her breasts had enacted with her husband. When I met Anne 
in late [jZe, she told me that she has been very active in exploring her family’s health 
history, and offered to print me a copy of the extensive family tree she has been working 
on after testing positive for a BRCA[ mutation. When I asked about her recent bilateral 
mastectomy, Anne disclosed to me that she thought she had the wrong motives behind 
her decision to have her breasts removed. She paused for a minute, unsure whether to 
proceed. Her husband, she told me, had died suddenly at the end of the previous year 
from a heart attack when they were out hiking. After his death, Anne was cleaning out 
his things. He was, as she described, a ‘hoarder.’ Indeed, her front lawn was littered with 
scrap metal from his collecting. She discovered large amounts of pornography on his 
computer and in boxes throughout the house. Her husband, she said, had obviously 
taken some of these photographs. Anne recalled being ‘so angry’ that she immediately 
wanted to be ‘desexualised,’ to have her breasts removed. ‘They belonged to him [my 
breasts]. Your boobs belong to your partner’ and she no longer wanted that. Angered by 
his deception, Anne looked to have the memories of their intimacy and their past 
relationship that remained inscribed upon her very bodily being excised. In a way, she 
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said, having them removed was a way of punishing him. She felt that she was removing 
that ownership of him over a part of her body, as he had violated this relationship. Anne 
disengaged from what Mattingly ([jZW, p. ZX) describes as a ‘history of commitments 
and memories’ forged between her breasts and her husband’s partial engagements with 
them.  By removing her breasts, Anne sought to not only reduce her hereditary cancer 
risk but to relieve herself of any lingering memory of the relationship her breasts had 
created, maintained and made manifest with her husband. As his whole person lay dead, 
the memory of his relationality with her, while she still had the breasts that had 
maintained it, had, also, to die.     
 
When I included Anne’s comments in a seminar presentation to an anthropology 
department in [jZh, one attendee was particularly shocked and noticeably outraged as 
I described Anne’s motivations behind her surgery. During question time, the attendee 
vehemently declared that Anne’s actions represented a failure in the healthcare system 
to provide her with adequate care and vital information about her options. She 
suggested that, had she been provided with sufficient, professional psychological 
support, she would not have made such a rash and ‘drastic’ decision, one that was likely 
to impact on her emotional wellbeing for the remainder of her life. I mention this 
attendee’s response as it is suggestive of a particular reading of the interventions into 
the body that are enacted by women at-risk of hereditary cancer. This particular 
attendee’s outrage at Anne’s removal of her breasts, not only as a form of risk reduction, 
but as a mode of eschewing the now problematic and undesirable material memories of 
her husband’s touch in the light of his adultery, speaks of a fundamental understanding 
of Anne and her body. In this reading, Anne is a bounded, discrete individual, and as 
such, is either inherently rational or irrational. Anne, for this attendee, was a somatic 
individual who attended to her buffered body and genetic identity in reference to a 
network of other, whole discrete bodies, both alive and deceased. Consequently, she 
irrationally sacrificed her own health and wellbeing due to displaced emotions of 
betrayal and anger. I read Anne’s actions through a different lens. I argue that we need 
to take seriously the necessarily partial creation and maintenance of the family through 
habitual bodily actions. These profoundly embodied and enfleshed modes of sociality 
were felt acutely by Anne. We can thus read her decision to excise them from her very 
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bodily being as indicative of their import, rather than her ‘irrationality.’ I take this co-
inhabitancy or co-presence of bodies and body parts across time and within the family 
for analysis in the following chapter.  
 
Conclusion  
 
Several anthropologists have worried that a woman’s individual ability to assert her own 
agency in relating to kin and in making decisions about interventions into and upon her 
body would be eroded by genetic medicine (Finkler, [jjj, [jjZ). Likewise, they have 
demonstrated a long-standing concern that the individual, most likely the woman, 
would be held responsible for decisions concerning her own and her family’s health in 
light of hereditary illness information (Sachs, [jjW; Krupar, [jZ[). On the basis of my 
ethnographic data, I have offered an alternative analytic frame that departs from a focus 
on the discrete and bounded individual to consider the ways in which my informants 
explained how their bodies are formed and relate to one another. 
 
Fundamentally, genetics points to the sharedness of material and the hybridity of 
person. Anthropologists have read this genetic body as markedly different from the 
‘individual’ who makes decisions in the social world. But, the social world, too, might 
also be seen as dealing in the sharedness of matter. And, in this sense, medical insights 
into the genetic body might not be incongruous with anthropological ones into the 
social body. The use of the’ individual’ may not be understood as the best corrective to 
what I am suggesting is a misunderstood threat of genetic medicine to both isolate and 
subsume the at-risk woman. In asserting the need to rescue the individual from the 
weight of genetic medicine and kin, we overlook how notions such as partiality are 
pertinent to the creation and maintenance of the family unit. Drawing on Lyon and 
Barbalet (ZggW) I have offered an alternative reading of the family, one based on the 
habitual deployment of body parts to receiving body parts, driven by the agentive force 
of emotion.  
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If we return briefly to Lily and the decisions she faced concerning her risk reduction and 
her children’s future fertility, we can see how these readings flesh out in contrast to the 
figuring of the family as biosocial and comprised of ‘somatic individuals’ relating in a 
network. These decisions are, as she described them, at least as much informed by the 
flesh of others. That is, her actions regarding her own flesh are propelled by her mother’s 
illness, her concerns for her children and her possible grandchildren. In a sense, these 
others are Lily’s body, her flesh, cast forward into the future through her children and 
grandchildren, and backwards to the beginning of her own time as a body, through the 
body of her mother. In her thoughts on her children’s future, and her considerations of 
her mother’s past experiences, we see Lily speculate on her ‘temporal arc’ (Mattingly, 
Zggf). She considers how cancer may not only eliminate her, but also her children and 
possible grandchildren, as a result of her decisions. Her body parts reach out to 
incorporate, to enfold, others now, in the future and previously, these entailments 
crucial to such actions. These matters partial and temporal are the subject of the next 
chapter.  
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Chapter Two  
Partial, habitual and syncopated deployments of 
bodies 
 
To understand the complexity of subjective life, writes Throop ([jZj, p. Ze) we must be 
attentive to how such experiences are situated in time. The importance of temporal 
matters and rhythms of life is encapsulated by Brough ([jjZ, p. [g) when he writes: 
‘[a]ll of the tasks and objects and activities that form the stuff of our daily lives are 
soaked with time… We ourselves are not only beings in time but beings whose very 
fabric, mental and physical, is temporal.’ I argue that temporality is co-constituted, like 
the body and, as such, is experienced as a shared in the context of illness. In this chapter, 
I take as a point of departure the notion of the ‘patient-in-waiting,’ who waits for her 
own body to become ill. In the existing literature, this individual patient-in-waiting 
makes reference to others in her family, particularly mothers, who prefigure her 
experience and might inform her decisions about what actions to take, or not take as 
the threat of cancer looms (Timmermans & Buchbinder, [jZj, p. Wjg). In contrast, I 
take a much fleshier view of time and the time-course of illness. In doing so, I suggest 
that temporality is not primarily the experience of one, ill body, but is instead the 
collective experience of syncopation that draws in the most significant parts and 
operations of what Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW) imagine as the family.  
 
In her book Illness as Metaphor, Susan Sontag (Zggj, p. e) wrote of illness as: 
  
the night-side of life, a more onerous citizenship. Everyone who is born holds dual 
citizenship, in the kingdom of the well and in the kingdom of the sick. Although 
we all prefer to use only the good passport, sooner or later each of us is obliged, at 
least for a spell, to identity ourselves as citizens of that other place. 
  
As with all territories arrayed around poles, here, poles of ‘well’ or ‘sick,’ there is a liminal 
terrain in which one might be said to be neither unwell, nor well. Cancer previvors dwell 
in this middle space of Sontag’s kingdoms, in its twilight, rather than the bright daylight 
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of wellness or its night-side of illness. Temporal matters loom large for those who are 
the bearers of mutated genes linked to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. Will I 
become ill? When? Should I have preventative surgery? When? Should I have children 
now, and then have surgery? Should I never have children? Time for women at-risk is, 
as Munn (Zgg[, p. ge) purports, an ‘inescapable dimension’ of their sociality. As I 
pointed out in the preceding chapter, such questions have been firmly incorporated into 
analyses that attend to the guilt and the selfishness or selflessness of decisions that will 
affect others in the future. In the hereditary cancer literature, the women who are 
making these decisions are often described as ‘patients-in-waiting.’  
 
Patients-in-waiting? 
 
According to Timmermans and Buchbinder ([jZj, p. Wjg), ‘patients-in-waiting hover 
for extended periods of time under medical attention between sickness and health, or 
more precisely, between pathology and an undistinguished state of normalcy.’ This 
liminality is exacerbated by the fact that new screening technologies often produce 
uncertain results that do not necessarily ‘correlate with defined disease categories’ 
(Timmermans & Buchbinder, [jZj, p. Wjg). Timmermans and Buchbinder ([jZj, p. WZX) 
ascribe a number of core characteristics to patients-in-waiting. Patients-in-waiting they 
submit: 
 
inhabit a liminal state between sickness and health, or more specifically, between 
pathology and a state of normalcy. Observational assessments, screening, and test 
results may suggest something is awry but leave ambivalent whether patients-in-
waiting are already sick, are going to become sick and, if so, what their sickness 
will entail... In this kind of liminality, illness experience and medical diagnosis 
have been severed and people experience illness in spite of symptoms or a 
diagnosis (Timmermans & Buchbinder, [jZj, p. WZX).   
 
It is not difficult to see how this description of the patient-in-waiting could be attributed 
to women at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. When entering into regimes 
of risk reduction through genetic testing, screening and risk-reducing surgery, women 
at-risk are subjected to multiple occasions in which a test result or scan may suggest the 
presence of something more sinister. This, for example, may occur in the form of a 
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slightly elevated CA-Z[h count or a small mass or calcification identified in the breast 
during a routine MRI or ultrasound. On a number of occasions, my informants spoke of 
the liminality they experienced whilst awaiting news of their screening results. Anita, a 
[g-year-old American PhD student recounted one such scare she experienced after 
undergoing a routine screening test: 
 
A few years ago my gynaecologist, based on a bad misreading of this test, thought 
that I had ovarian cancer. Cause I had these cysts on my ovaries and that caused 
an elevation in some test level… And I was driving from Boston to upstate New 
York when she called me and she said ‘I have never seen test levels this high 
before.’ And I am parked on the side of the road and there is a five-hour drive 
ahead of me and she said ‘I think there is a high chance you have cancer.’ Hearing 
a doctor say ‘we have never seen test results like this’ is not comforting. That 
means that you [the doctor] are convinced based on your experience that I have 
cancer and you are just waiting on a confirmation. That is what she was saying to 
me. And I am driving back for the next five hours with this in my mind. Three 
years before, my mother died. And now I have to be home and tell my dad, who 
just lost his wife of [h years and loved her greatly, that his only child potentially 
has cancer. And again, in my mind, I start projecting all these futures. ‘Oh I can’t 
have kids…’ I don’t remember if I was with anyone at the time but I was thinking 
about not being able to be with them or anyone and in my mind I kept going over 
all these things that were going to happen and that I needed to appreciate my life 
and then I get home, I play it down with my father, as I would never scare him like 
that, and I tried to call the doctor’s office and they don’t have an appointment 
available for six weeks! And then [after six weeks] the doctor was like, ‘you are [`, 
you are fine, you can go home.’ For six weeks I thought I was going to die. 
  
Anita experienced six excruciating weeks dwelling in the liminal space between health 
and illness as she waited for a doctor’s appointment. In a similar vein, we can see the 
second and third characteristics of Timmerman’s and Buchbinder’s ([jZj) patient-in-
waiting described in Anita’s experience of undergoing screening. Patients-in-waiting, 
they continue, ‘face externally imposed uncertainty about the nature of disease.’ This 
externally-imposed uncertainty was evident in Anita’s concern as to whether her test 
results were indicative of endometriosis or cancer (Timmermans & Buchbinder, [jZj, 
p. WZf). Additionally, patients-in-waiting often experience a ‘lengthy trajectory of 
medical gate keeping to establish or relinquish a diagnosis.’ Again we could apply this 
to Anita’s example as she was forced to wait two months for her pathology results 
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(Timmermans & Buchbinder, [jZj, p. WZf). In summation, Timmermans and 
Buchbinder assert: 
 
patients-in-waiting thus inhabit a liminal state between normalcy and pathology, 
imposed by medical screening and testing technologies aimed at secondary 
prevention, characterized by a lengthy process of medical surveillance to resolve 
diagnostic uncertainty, which may spill over into personal identity and other areas 
of life… Patients-in-waiting [is thus] an umbrella concept to highlight the 
iatrogenic liminality between an unremarkable state of ‘normalness’ and disease 
and to emphasize the patience required of those in waiting ([jZj, pp. WZX-WZf). 
 
In carrying a predisposition for hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, the women with 
whom I conducted ethnography, like Anita, would seemingly fit seamlessly into this 
category of patients-in-waiting or the ‘pre-symptomatically ill,’ as Rose ([jjg) and 
Konrad ([jje) refer to them. This patient-in-waiting as envisaged in the literature is 
seen to wait within and to act upon her own body. It is her body, imagined to be in a 
network relative to others, especially her mother’s body, that is potentially ill. It is she 
who will make decisions about what to do with her body’s cancerous potential relative 
to others, especially her children, who come after her. Subsequently, there is both a 
linear temporality that arranges the decision-making process, and a bounded actor that 
takes these decisions in her turn, from mother to daughter to daughter’s daughter. This 
linear progression underscores the sense that one bounded individual, namely the 
mother at the heart of the family, will be the bounded entity who will make decisions 
relative to other bodies that circulate in her familial network. They are, as Das ([jjZ, p. 
e) suggests, ‘connected body selves.’ 
 
I read my ethnographic data with a different view of the body in mind, one that is not 
bounded as such that it makes decisions that then impact on others in a network. My 
reading looks at the ways in which one is always and already connected to others and 
thereby makes decisions in concert with the bodily being of others. This is a reading 
that takes inspiration from the way that partial genetic contributions, genes from 
mother, genes from father, together make the body in which such contributions are 
collected. As I outline in my introduction, I am not suggesting that genetic and 
experiential knowledge of the partial body are entirely congruous. However, as 
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Strathern (Zgg[a) reminds us, notions of genetic medicine provide us with fertile 
grounds for rethinking the partiality and hybridity of the body. Genetic inheritance 
creates a unique being through hybridization and recombination. And yet genetics are 
also what make us composite, a production of the relationships between people. In 
taking such a view, a progressive and linear series of bodies that precede and come after 
the potentially ill person’s body – a patient-in-waiting, a somatic individual – does not 
make as much analytic sense as does a co-constituted body that suffers in collectivity.  
 
Part/ial relations 
 
Like Anita, Lily is, according to Timmermans and Buchbinder ([jZj), a classic patient-
in-waiting. During our first meeting, I asked about her experience of undergoing genetic 
testing and counselling and how she felt when she found out that she, like with her 
mother Beth, carried a BRCA[ mutation. Gesturing in the direction of Beth’s chest, Lily 
summed up her first meeting with the doctor with a flick of the wrist; ‘we will take this, 
and that [pointing at her mother’s breasts], and this [gesturing to her mother’s lower 
abdomen] when you’re done [having babies].’ She spoke of how difficult she found 
trying to make a decision about a course of action: 
 
All the doctors go chop, chop…it's frustrating that you can do nothing about your 
genes… Mum…. passed this gene onto me, not that she had any choice in the 
matter… [I may have] passed the gene onto my kids. I hate the thought of my kids 
having to consider removing their potentially perfect body parts. 
             
When we first met, Lily was eW years old, mother to two young daughters, one of whom 
she was breastfeeding, and was contemplating expanding her family with another child. 
The prospect of undergoing risk-reducing surgery, namely the removal of her 
reproductive organs; ovaries, fallopian tubes, uterus and cervix, in the near future was 
made more complex given the stage of life she and her family were in. Recounting a 
rather difficult appointment, Lily remembered asking her gynaecological surgeon what 
he would recommend, in terms of risk reduction, if she were his daughter. ‘I would 
remove your ovaries before you were forty’ he replied. Lily and her partner James were 
still hoping to have another child, shortening the timeline for completing their family 
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as she entered her late thirties. The risk of developing ovarian cancer during this time, 
however, also played on Lily’s mind, given the difficulty of diagnosing the disease in its 
early stages and the indeterminacy of its symptoms. After having her third child, a son, 
in late [jZh, Lily began researching the option of undergoing a risk-removing 
salpingectomy as a means of delaying the removal of her ovaries.9 She hoped that this 
procedure would help to delay the side-effects of surgically induced menopause and 
hormone replacement therapy. Certainly, this account of Lily’s experience of living with 
a BRCA[ mutation seems to fit a linear timeline of referencing her mother’s experience, 
using it to inform her own, and then thinking about how her decisions might impact on 
the bodies of her children. This reading also seems to fit the model of the patient-in-
waiting, who is, as of yet, not ill but makes rational, calculated decisions on the basis of 
clinical predictions. However, a close attendance to the parts of Lily’s body in and 
through which she conducted relations with her family troubles both of these concepts.   
 
Lily spoke to me at length about her breasts. She talked particularly about how they 
related her to her children. Beginning with remarks about them as a source of 
nourishment for her offspring in the way one might expect her to, she spoke about how 
they ‘don’t really have a purpose after breastfeeding.’ However, as she talked about the 
prospect of implants she revealed that her breasts were fundamental to relations with 
her children in other ways besides nutritional. She said she would be ‘furious’ if implants 
impacted on her ability to run and play with her children. She also worried about the 
stories she had read on forums that warned implants could be cold, hard and would not 
feel the same as before. For Lily, it was not so much that they would not feel the same 
for her; it was more that they would not feel the same for the people who would be 
feeling them. ‘I won’t be able to perform my normal ‘Mummy’ duties,’ she lamented.  
                                                
 
9 Recent studies have shown that more than fj% of ovarian tumours detected in at-risk women carrying 
BRCA germline mutations originate in the fallopian tubes (Crum, [jZ`, p. Zgf). Consequently, the 
practice of risk reduction through salpingectomy with delayed oophorectomy is being considered as an 
option for women looking to delay the onset of surgically induced menopause and its accompanying side-
effects. This being said, the efficacy of this procedure in protecting at-risk women from the forms of 
ovarian cancer conferred by a BRCA mutation has yet to be established through large-scale clinical trials. 
Outside of the trial setting, clinicians and researchers are yet to integrate this procedure into national 
recommendations for risk reduction (Swanson & Bakkum-Gamez, [jZ`). 
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Khloe, an American actress in her early thirties held similar concerns as Lily. She 
explained her reasoning for having her risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy before 
having children. She noted that:  
 
there is an aspect when you have your mastectomy where you can’t lift things for 
a really long time and if my child runs to me and I can’t lift him up that would be 
almost more devastating to live like that. And be like ‘oh don’t touch mum and 
this and that.’ And that might not be a big deal to anyone else but I am a very 
physical person. If a baby is crying I lift up the baby and hug the baby and I will 
put them on my back and I am very active in that sense. I knew that was really 
important that I wanted to be a mum that wasn’t living the way I was living right 
now. 
 
Like Khloe and Lily, Laura, aged [f, talked about breasts and their relationship to 
holding and cuddling children. She described how in the lead up to her risk-reducing 
bilateral mastectomy, she and her daughter ‘practiced for a few months,’ for what it 
would be like to cuddle with no breasts into which her daughter could snuggle: 
 
Like I would get on the ground with her, she would have been Ze or ZW months 
when I had it so she had no idea, but we practiced cuddling gently with pillows 
beforehand. It was hard, like I know she’d sometimes would want cuddles but I 
couldn’t do it and she became so reliant on my husband that afterwards it took a 
little while when I was okay for her to come to back to me. That was probably the 
hardest, getting her to see that she could cuddle me again. 
 
In her [jjf memoir Blood Matters, Masha Gessen, a Russian journalist and writer spoke 
of the grief and anguish she felt as she prepared herself and her daughter for the removal 
of her breasts after testing positive for a BRCAZ mutation:  
 
I weaned my daughter. I managed to convince her that big girls do not drink from 
the breast. It took a couple of weeks and then she took to holding my breasts – 
before she went to sleep, when she woke up, or for comfort when she hurt herself 
or felt insulted. Every time I cuddled her, I worried: How could I get rid of them 
when she needed them? The argument that ought to have trumped them all –  that 
any trauma was worth it if it meant having me around – did not convince me. 
What worried me, gnawed at me to the point where I felt a stabbing pain in my 
chest – my breast – was the fear of losing the physical connection with my 
daughter that I never remembered having with my mother… [Yet] sometimes I lay 
 f[ 
down with my daughter on a futon on the floor in her room and, as she nursed 
and drifted off to sleep, I thought that sacrificing physical parts of myself and even 
my youthfulness was a small price to pay for continuing this happiness (Gessen, 
[jjf, pp. Zj-ZZ). 
 
Monica, in her early forties, recounted how she agonised for almost a decade over 
whether to have a risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy after testing positive for a BRCA 
mutation. In front of a room full of people at a BRCA information day in Sydney in [jZh, 
Monica recalled being rendered almost paralysed by the decision whether to go through 
with surgery or to continue a routine of screening. She told of how, having come home 
from an exhausting day of consultations with breast and plastic surgeons, she perched 
herself on the corner of her son’s bed as he sprawled on his stomach playing a video 
game. Fifteen years old and having reached the stage in life where disinterested grunts 
and perpetual eye rolling had become his main form of communication, Monica was 
not expecting much of a conversation. But she began speaking to him anyway, telling 
him that she had finally decided to have the surgery and that she was scared. Switching 
off the game, he turned to her and asked ‘what of?’ ‘I am scared,’ she told him, ‘that it 
won’t feel the same when we hug because I love hugging you.’ Her son sat bolt upright 
and immediately wrapped his arms around her. He said, ‘my cheek touches your check 
and your shoulder touches mine and my hands are on your back and nothing that you 
do will ever change the warmth of your hug.’ 
 
As these examples suggest, significant parts of these women’s bodies, the parts that are 
snuggled into and cushion hugs, connect with the significant parts of their children’s 
bodies. These connections undermine the notion that individual bodies stand apart 
from other individual bodies to make decisions that will impact them. This is not to 
suggest that the patient-in-waiting or the somatic individual as analytically imagined is 
not an affective and somatically oriented body. Rather it is to posit that the body these 
women imagined and enacted was one already made in and through the partial relations 
they had with significant others. These women often chose surgical and reconstruction 
methods that permitted them to return with the greatest speed possible to these partial 
relations in and through which, as Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW) argue, family persists. 
These are not bodies that are discreet and then relate to one another in a networks of 
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hugs. The parts of bodies involved in hugs make the family and the body. It is always, 
already, persistent in its partial relations, not just with the partial deployment of others’ 
bodies, but in and through them.  
 
Using a series of ethnographic examples, I have disputed the idea of the whole 
‘individual’ body, the somatic individual, the patient-in-waiting, and introduced as a 
counterpoint the existence of a key partial involvement between significant parts of 
relating bodies. But what is to be made of the fact that these very significant parts that 
relate to the parts of other bodies, these acts instrumental in making the family, are the 
very parts that are removed? The act of removal is, as the above examples indicate, 
painful even to consider.  
 
Breasted and ovarian sociality 
 
Part of the reason why the removal of breasts and ovaries is so difficult and painful is 
because these parts are so pertinent to the creation and maintenance of the family, as 
Gessen ([jjf, p. ZZ) explains so poignantly, her breasts are key to the ‘physical 
connection with my daughter.’ The removal of parts that are instrumental in this way is 
gut-wrenching. But their removal increases the chances of the family’s continuance in 
the configuration established between its (part)icipant bodies. As the above 
ethnographic examples suggest, the breasted part can be replaced, or the set of relations 
it forged and maintained may be altered (with cushions, with new techniques for 
hugging, with added emphasis, as Monica’s son explained, on the touching of cheeks 
and backs). The significance of parts is in this respect malleable and open to change. 
Death however, precludes all prospect of adjustment or flex. Body parts, then, as 
significant as they are, are sacrificed to and for the continued presence of the whole 
family. They are removed and replaced in an effort to protect the ‘continuing happiness’ 
Gessen ([jjf) describes – that conglomeration of partial deployments that, even 
without breasted deployment, is still ‘the family.’  
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This proposition on part/ial relations holds across a range of relational domains in the 
lives of women at-risk beyond affectionate relations with children. Just as 
approximations were made in the absence of cuddly breasts, or replacements were made 
that permitted cuddling to continue, breasted sexual experience was also adjustable and 
malleable. Sexualised breasts were often regarded by my informants as pivotal in 
romantic relations between partners, being a body part richly endowed with bearing 
sexual relations towards another and receiving them. We can think back to Anne’s 
removal of her breasts as a means of excising the felt memories of her deceitful 
husband’s sexual embrace as evidence of such relationality. Subsequently, breasts 
operated as a very significant partial deployment of familial relations. Khloe spoke most 
frankly of this. She said, ‘I was really worried about sex because my boobs were always 
there during sex.’ After having her breasts removed, she underwent reconstruction with 
implants. ‘I remember the first time I had sex after my surgery, it was two weeks after 
[the implants were inserted] and I was obsessed. I was like “we are having sex.” I will be 
a sexual person even though I don’t have my breasts.’   
 
Khloe’s words show the taken for granted and, prior to her knowledge of her mutation 
status, unreflected upon role of her breasts as a key part of relations with her husband. 
The fact that she replaced them with implants equally indicates their importance in that 
role.  Breasted relations are conducted in the full view of their participants, in the sense 
that breasts and the relations they call forth from parts of other bodies, from the faces 
of snuggling babies, and from the mouths and hands of lovers, are observable. Ovarian 
relations, on the other hand, are not. Although internal parts of the body, ovaries play 
an equally important role in creating and maintaining the partial relations of the family 
as will be discussed in Chapter Three. Indeed, they are the very seat from which new 
parts of the family are issued.  
 
Now forty-three, Penelope, a Filipino-American creative writer, talked about how 
difficult it was to no longer be a part of the social circle in which she participated 
through ovarian means since she had her ovaries removed. After testing positive for a 
BRCAZ mutation, Penelope underwent a risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy and a risk-
reducing salpingo-oophorectomy. She talked about how difficult it was to consider how 
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her sociality with her female friends would be affected while deciding whether to have 
her ovaries removed. ‘My [mutation] status made me think about time, but it made it 
slow down, it became torturous’ she told me. ‘I thought I have till I am ee to have my 
breasts removed or till my forties until my ovaries have to be removed.’ ‘With 
menopause,’ she said, ‘my friends will be going through menopause together but for me, 
maybe I will be going off the hormones at that time but it won’t be the same it won’t be 
[spontaneous] like “oh I am going through menopause.” It will be a planned occasion 
where I would get off the hormones.’ Penelope worried about missing out on the 
sociality of shared menopause with her friends now that her ovaries have been removed.  
 
Thirty-six-year-old Ashley, who carries both BRCAZ and BRCA[ mutations, also spoke 
about the unhinging of ovarian sociality. She was worried that going into surgically 
induced menopause would make all the worst symptoms of menopause occur, and that 
this would fundamentally change the relations she currently enjoyed with others. She 
explained:  
 
I am just trying to find the time [to have my ovaries removed]. I have gotten back 
into teaching and I love it. I am in a school and teaching four days... I know my 
health is important but I am really enjoying that so I am thinking maybe January 
as that way I will have time to recover before going back [to school] or in 
December before the holidays when they are breaking up. I did my tubes last 
November and that was fine and the pathology was okay. So I am hoping just a 
few more months would be okay. I would hate it if I waited and got ovarian cancer 
but I just wanted to find the right time. So we will go and have the discussion 
today. He [the doctor] said I will do HRT [hormone replacement therapy] straight 
away, he is very pro HRT and so is my oncologist, so there shouldn’t be any big 
changes straight away. I shouldn’t have crazy menopausal symptoms or anything. 
That is what makes me most nervous, with the breast [surgery] I coped pretty well 
but the ovaries have always worried me. Maybe because first they didn’t have HRT 
as an option I was worried about the menopause and that it would make me crazy! 
I am not ready. I am not ready to do that. 
 
Angela, too, worried over mood swings related to surgically induced menopause and 
how this would affect her relationships with her significant others. I met Angela during 
one of my observation days at the Cancer Prevention and Genetics Clinic in Boston. 
‘There is lots of cancer on both sides of my family. I am basically screwed,’ Angela told 
her geneticist, Dr Franklin. Angela’s mother had been diagnosed with breast cancer and 
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died at age ` e. Angela’s mother had two sisters and two brothers. One brother died from 
lung cancer and both of her maternal aunts had breast cancer in their `js. On Angela’s 
father’s side, one cousin had ovarian cancer when she was `X and one cousin had breast 
cancer, diagnosed in her late ejs. Her paternal aunts, uncles and her father died from 
lung cancer. Dr Franklin told Angela that, based on her family history, she would be 
eligible for the chemoprevention drug Tamoxifen. Angela made a face, turning her nose 
up at the suggestion. ‘Mum had that [drug]’ she said. ‘I’m scared of it because my mum 
took it. It is the cancer drug.’ Dr Franklin explained how the drug is used for many 
different stages of cancer, including cancer prevention. ‘It is just a mental thing,’ Angela 
continued. Dr Franklin agreed that it was, ‘not an easy drug to take, it can cause mood 
swings.’ ‘Oh my poor boys and husband!’ Angela exclaimed. Dr Franklin asked how old 
Angela’s sons were, to which she replied, ‘ZW, [Z, and [e.’ ‘Well’ Dr Franklin joked, ‘they 
deserve anything they get.’ The [e-year-old, Angela told us, had moved out of home and 
the [Z-year-old was away at school, ‘but my poor ZW-year-old!’ she exclaimed. ‘Don’t 
worry,’ Dr Franklin responded, ‘I am sure he can outdo you!’  
 
For Penelope, ovarian sociality meant being able to engage in conversations with her 
female friends about their shared experiences of hot flushes, dry vaginas, sexual 
dysfunction, weight gain, and mood swings. For Ashley, ovarian sociality was fine, as 
long as one had ovaries. With that part removed, she worried that crazy mood swings 
might put her into significantly different relations than she currently enjoyed with her 
students, her co-workers and her family. For Angela, mother-son relations were at stake, 
as the presence of out-of-control and untimely hormonal fluctuations could set asunder 
the hitherto homely and amicable relations between them. For each of these women, 
ovarian sociality was a sociality conducted in and through the presence or the absence 
of a critical, relational part of themselves. Despite its containment within the body, 
these parts reached out to others to create and maintain a fleshy sociality grounded in 
the experience of having, or not having, that part.  
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Social, part/ial time  
 
Considerations of partial relations, like breasted and ovarian sociality, are also concerns 
about time, and particularly, the timing of children and reproductive capacity. 
Reproductive decisions, of course, often sit in the thick of romantic relations, as they 
did for ee-year-old Celia. Celia was only Zf years old when she tested positive for a 
BRCAZ gene mutation. Her doctor recommended that she should have her children as 
early as possible and then undergo a risk-reducing mastectomy and salpingo-
oophorectomy. She remembered being very overwhelmed by these recommendations. 
Celia had married young and by [e had divorced her first husband. As her divorce was 
processed, she remembered thinking, ‘oh my goodness I haven’t had children yet.’ She 
met her current husband and within a year and a half, they begun having children. ‘I 
had three out by ej. In nine years, I got three children and ten houses.’ She spoke of 
how she felt lucky to find a man who also wanted to have children early. Celia spoke of 
how the death of her cousin Michelle, who passed away from metastatic breast cancer, 
influenced her decision making. Michelle left behind three children, now aged Zf, ZW 
and nine. She recalled how, when they buried Michelle, her daughter asked ‘Where’s 
Mummy?’ Celia subsequently decided to have her breasts and ovaries removed in her 
early thirties not long after her cousin passed away.  
 
After her operation Celia remembered thinking to herself, ‘what if I want to have more 
children? It’s final, I feel robbed. This ability to have a child is such a strong female sense 
and I was taken from that.’ Celia went on hormone replacement therapy (HRT) to help 
with the possible side-effects of surgically induced menopause although she was still 
intermittently breast-feeding her youngest daughter. She recalled being worried about 
what she might be giving to her daughter [in terms of chemicals] through her breast 
milk. ‘No-one prepares you’ for the experience of surgically induced menopause and the 
conflicting feelings it brings forth, she noted. ‘What if I divorced my husband and 
wanted another [child]?’  
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Surgical interventions into one’s reproductive functioning through the removal of 
specific body parts brings forth the biological event of menopause that, as Martin (ZgfX, 
p. W[) asserts, is commonly considered as a ‘pathological state’ in Western societies. 
This view of menopause, she continues, results from a particular view of the ageing 
woman’s body as a formally productive ‘hierarchical information-processing system’ in 
breakdown (Martin, ZgfX, p. W[). Such concerns about premature aging and the 
accompanying bodily changes were voiced by a number of my informants including 
Celia. Being ‘feminine in the right way,’ writes Schwaiger ([jj`, p. ej), expanding on 
Butler’s work, ‘involves adjusting to age norms’ and expectations.  Certainly, how 
women experience their surgically induced menopausal bodies stands incongruously 
with heteronormative modes in which time is ‘socially organised’ with reference to 
gendered reproductive capabilities. Moreover, to focus solely on such socio-political 
understandings of biological time as governing and disciplining these women’s 
gendered bodies overlooks the multiplicity of ways in which they conceptualise, resist 
and subvert such singular, routinised temporal unfoldings. My informants were often 
innovative in the ways they strove to reconfigure their presently risky bodies to protect 
their capacity to live in familial time.  
 
Also standing congruously with such standardised modes of temporality is the patient-
in-waiting. Timmermans and Buchbinder’s ([jZj) patient-in-waiting is lost in time. The 
rigid markers of both diagnosis and treatment, then death or recovery, and the life 
course events, like childbearing and menopause, are undone from their linear temporal 
moorings. This patient waits, both hesitant and impatient to act upon her own body, 
drawing on the discrete experience of her mother, and the-as-yet-to-come-to-pass 
experience of her daughter. The patient-in-waiting is frustratingly unable to return her 
life course to its natural order without that all important diagnosis. Even her menopause 
will not be on time. She will have to induce it with drugs, and not at the proper or 
‘natural’ temporal point of her life. The waiting, the uncertainty, means she has to guess 
at the future, and be informed by what she knows of the past to make decisions in the 
present. Such a formulation, although easily applicable to my own ethnographic 
material, keeps in place linear progressions of time. An understanding of time, however, 
that is co-constituted in and through the fleshy contributions of others yields rather 
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different insight into the experience of being at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer.  
 
The following examples collectively demonstrate that it is crucial for the bearers of 
hereditary cancer gene mutations to be astute ignorers of strict lineal divisions, such as 
‘past,’ ‘present’ and ‘future.’ Of course, people bump up against these unsettling 
abstractions. Often they worry over what forms their decisions ‘now’ will take in the 
‘future,’ and whether their ‘future’ children, should they come into being, will, like them, 
be carriers and may be diagnosed with cancer. But in fleshy, day-to-day living past, 
present and future are not discrete forms or demarcated blocks of time that proceed in 
linear order. They are knitted together, again, in and through the partial relations 
between bodies. As Brough ([jjZ, p. ee) notes, ‘[w]e are always aware of the now as 
centred within a horizon of past and future. Now, past and future are inseparable in our 
experience, even if they are distinct as modes of appearance; to have one is necessarily 
to have others.’ Nevertheless, Brough ([jjZ, p. ef) continues, these forms of temporality 
are also inherently flexible ‘whether one’s experience of life is taken to be ordinary or 
extraordinary. The extraordinary, however, brings home their flexibility most vividly.’ 
Brough ([jjZ, p. Wj) also remarks upon how such flexibility of temporal experience may 
be inhibited by illness. He suggests the ways in which our usual ‘freedom to move about 
the temporal landscape of ours’ can be disrupted by illness, causing a ‘collision between’ 
the ‘times in which we live.’ Giving attention to this temporal collision can offer us key 
insights into the non-linear temporality. 
 
Temporal collision  
 
The language of collision is not uncommon in phenomenological observations about 
how the arrangement of the world, in this case its temporal arrangement, meets the 
experience of the ill or potentially ill person. As Csordas ([jZh) noted in his work among 
chronic illness sufferers in the United States, a world that is temporally organised 
around the rushing and fast paced rhythms of capitalism upsets the body going through 
an illness experience. Because the ill person cannot meet its frenetic pace, they become 
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slower than the world. In such experience, there emerges a collision between temporal 
regimes and bodily capacities: the ‘vector of agency from the world towards one’s body,’ 
and ‘the vector of agency from one’s body towards the world’ collide. Rather than 
reciprocity:  
 
there comes to be an impasse. In this impasse, the afflicted person becomes 
bogged down in the practice of everyday life, increasingly exhausted by the 
resistance of the world, and eventually incapacitated… a vector of agency from 
one’s body toward the world is characterized by sufferers as a lack of stamina, a 
feeling of being slowed down, and unpredictable fluctuations in symptoms and 
their severity. This impaired agency comes up against a vector of agency from the 
world toward one’s body, characterized by the demand for constant activity, 
speed, or an accelerated pace of everyday life, and tight scheduling that extends to 
multiple domains of practical activity (Csordas, [jZh, p. h`). 
 
This collision of vectors of agency from world to body and body to world is explored in 
even more detail by Toombs ([jjZ) as she reflects upon her own experiences living with 
the degenerative disease multiple sclerosis. Chronic bodily disorder, she reflects, 
profoundly impacts on temporal and spatial experience and one’s ability to engage with 
and relate to others: 
 
Not only are the body’s natural rhythms of sleeping, eating, working and resting 
disturbed, but the time it takes to do things – get out of a chair, put on one’s 
clothes – is necessarily prolonged. One is forced to give unusual attention to the 
present moment, to concentrate on what is required this minute. This goes against 
the natural tendency that we have to focus our attention on the future – on the 
next project, the next task… The change in temporal experience can be extremely 
disruptive not only in the sense that one is necessarily ‘caught’ in the present 
(unable to ‘get on with’ things at the usual pace) but in the sense that the person 
with a physical incapacity is ‘out of synch’ with the able-bodied. This difference in 
temporal experiencing affects one’s relations with others. ‘What’s taking so long?’ 
others ask impatiently. (Think for example how difficult it is to communicate with 
someone whose speech is unusually slow or halting. One finds oneself desperately 
fighting the urge to hurry things up by interrupting and putting words in their 
mouth) (Toombs, [jjZ, p. [hf). 
 
The profound disruption to temporal rhythms is something that many at-risk women 
have witnessed while caring for their family members during cancer treatment. It also 
becomes a profound concern as they consider options for risk reduction. In 
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phenomenological approaches to temporality, Husserl’s early musings of time-
consciousness and his metaphor of a melody is often called upon to demonstrate how 
past, present and future unfolds in concert within a person’s experience. When the 
present note is sounding, the just-past note is remembered and the future note is 
anticipated and so the melody unfolds in linear progression (Toombs, Zggj). In their 
ethnography of women living with metastatic breast cancer, Bell and Ristovski-
Slijepcevic ([jZZ) discuss how these women are forced to concentrate their energy on 
anticipating notes far into the future, such focus disrupting the linear unfolding of the 
melody as they try to establish a legacy for their children. A similar interpretation is 
offered by Jain ([jjX, p. fj), who suggests that women diagnosed with cancer live as 
‘already-always-ill,’ this status emerging from a particular Western cancer culture in 
which the temporality of the sick is ‘relentlessly future-orientated.’ While a definitive 
cancer diagnosis may bring forth temporal disorder, I argue that women at-risk of 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, yet to be diagnosed with cancer, encounter a 
different experience of temporal awareness.  
 
For women at-risk, the present, that is the note played in the now is not merely prefaced 
nor succeeded by just-past or future notes, they are sounded in unison, like a pianist 
pressing down multiple fingers to produce a resonating chord. At times, they may come 
to attend and attune to particular temporal registers over and above another, as 
Desjarles and Throop ([jZZ, p. gj) explain; ‘[a]s we focus closely on one aspect or reality, 
other potentially experienciable aspects of reality are relegated to the fringe of our 
awareness as a now yet still potential horizon of future experience…’ Continuing with 
the metaphor of music, they suggest: 
 
[A]s we foreground the sound of a bass in a jazz quartet, the sounds produced by 
the pianist, drummer and sax player fade imperceptibly into the background 
horizon of our experience of music. If we then shift to listen to the chord 
progressions played by the pianist, however, then the sounds of the bass guitar 
shifts from foreground to background, all the while remaining potentially 
available for once again returning to the focus of our attention (Desjarlais & 
Throop, [jZZ, p. gj). 
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This shifting of attunement between temporal registers in the lived experience of the 
now is particularly pertinent to the at-risk women. The body and body parts of her 
relations, her mother and her daughter, come to inhabit her and she them as the threat 
of cancer looms large. Women at-risk, I argue, conceptualise and experience their 
bodies and the temporal and spatial registers of bodily experience in ways that are 
different to the dominant, linear understanding of time characteristic of Western 
society as a whole. Tactical inventions into the body through the removal of potentially 
dangerous body parts may be read as servicing this temporal regime of linear order and 
productivity. Preventative actions, in this sense, are enlisted to ward off potential bodily 
failing through illness in the future. Conversely, the pre-emptive removal of body parts 
that may develop cancer in the future could be seen as a hastening of the decay of 
womanhood as reproductive functioning is relinquished decades before its otherwise 
natural onset.  
 
I wish however to take an alternative approach to understanding the temporal 
experiences of women at-risk of hereditary cancer and their decision to intervene in 
their risky bodies whether through surgery or surveillance technologies. A number of 
anthropologists and sociologists have drawn attention to the ways in which time is 
conceptualised in regards to genetics. Mutations are biologically inherited, harking back 
to the enduring germlines of ancestors whilst simultaneously projecting forth to create 
what Adams, Murphy and Clarke ([jjg) describe as anticipatory regimes of time, 
characterised by speculative forecasts. Enabled by biotechnology and predictive forms 
of biomedicine, this movement back and forth between past, present and future, 
Adams, Murphy and Clarke ([jjg, pp. [W`, [he) suggest, creates anticipatory regimes 
in which citizens are expected to secure their ‘best possible futures’ through 
preparedness, thus ‘reterritorial[zing] and expand[ing] the domains and sites’ of 
experience to be monitored.  While this approach holds much promise in evaluating the 
temporal politics that emerge as a result of future-orientated, preventative 
biotechnologies, there needs to greater attention paid to how these temporal politics 
are taken up or resisted in everyday life.  
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This sharedness of time experience in everyday life is not restricted in any especial sense 
to living relations. The strictly linear progression of movement from life to death is 
undone when the flesh or parts of others remains at the core of fleshy relations.  Familial 
life continues on after the death of a member as Strathern (Zgg[b, p. ZjX) reminds us; 
‘at death, what gave the individual uniqueness was left as the acts and relations 
exercised during the lifetime.’ This continuing dialogue between the absent and the 
present is discussed by Ribbens McCarthy and Prokhovnik: 
 
Rethinking the lived reality of the material, corporeal, visceral, fleshy, seeping, 
affective, ‘enfleshed’ embodiment of the person provides a basis for revaluing all 
that the now-dead person brought to their relationality, much of which remains… 
Dominant social meanings in Western societies around the death of a loved one… 
[lead] to the conclusion either that there is nothing left of the loved one but the 
morality remains, or that one can still have a strong relationship but without 
embodied presence. This binary thinking, and the biologisation of death and 
personhood underpinning it, leads directly to the underestimation of the 
significance of the physicality of grief and the materiality of continuing bonds. 
What is missing is the understanding that the embodied relationship with the 
dead person does not die with the person… [Thus] specific connections [exist] 
between an intensive form of relationality, and embodiment and materiality in the 
context of care after death, in a non-binary way that indicates the porous nature 
of the boundaries… and manifests the possibilities of relative (dis)embodiment 
([jZW, pp. eh-`).  
 
As I take up in the following section, the ways in which the deceased person continues 
to live on, inhabiting in a non-lineal sense the bodies of loved ones and transforming 
existing forms of relationality, is particularly pertinent to the experiences of women at-
risk of hereditary cancer. For women at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, the 
world organized in this linear fashion is met not head on, but ovary on, breast on, as 
she deals with illness or its possible manifestation. Moreover, and what is clear from the 
foregoing examples, is that the experiences of people’s ‘past’ are knitted tightly into the 
bodies of those in the now, as are the experiences of those in the future. This framing 
creates a fleshy body comprised of the parts and experiences of others in ‘the past’ and 
‘the future,’ drawing them into a fleshy co-presence. 
 
BRCA mutation carrier and author Sarah Gabriel details in her memoir the presence of 
her mother’s hands in her own, noting that: 
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mine are not quite so long as hers, not quite so graceful. But they are of the same 
genus. Fine wrists, slim palms, the knuckles gracefully articulated. And it is her 
voice I hear telling the children to mind the cracks in the pavement, to walk round 
and not under a ladder, to eat up their carrots so that they can see in the dark 
([jjg, pp. [hh-h`).  
 
Gabriel’s mother, who died of ovarian cancer, remains present in the body of her 
daughter. She is present in much the same way that women in my study called upon 
and called into their own fleshy bodies the experiences of their mothers that were not 
bracketed into the far off past, but now constituted ‘my own’ body.  
 
What I mean to suggest here is that ‘my mother’s body,’ is brought into ‘my own,’ 
despite the fact that she lived in a different and distinct time. Her ovaries become mine, 
and I decide what to do with them, for I am also, now, my daughter’s ovaries. I decide 
what to do with them, now, in the same moment as I have my mother’s ovaries inside 
of me to consider. I am not my mother, as Strathern (Zgg[a, p. Zh) reminds us, ‘parents 
already united in a relationship produce individual children… yet, in their children, 
parents (persons in a relationship) also produce other than themselves (individual 
persons)’ but I have her ovaries, and I have my daughter’s ovaries. They are comprised 
of shared genetic matter, and it is this part, this breast, this ovary, that makes us one 
body, mine. As Kleinman, Brodwin, Good and DelVecchio Good (ZggW, p. g) note, to 
regard illness or ‘pain as the experience of an individual… is so inadequate as to virtually 
assure inaccurate diagnosis and unsuccessful treatment [my emphasis].’ This is a most 
pointed remark in respect to genetic illness, for the sufferer cannot be an individual that 
is bounded and discrete (this is not to say that, in such a situation she, as an agent, must 
be rescued as Finkler [[jjj, [jjZ, [jjh] and the like would suggest). Nor can she be 
bracketed off in time, regarding the ills of others as existing in another time or space 
They must be knitted together, in the present, for, in both a genetic sense and in a social, 
affective, relative way, your ovaries must be mine, for what I do to mine, I do to yours. 
In this sense, in the case of hereditary cancer, illness can never be understood to have 
happened in the isolated block of time called past, nor to be set out to be experienced 
only in the future, it happens in the lived now. Once again, this is not to say that past 
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and future become irrelevant, engulfed by the lived now. Rather, as Brough ([jjZ, p. 
eg) reminds us, the ‘now, past, and future, in their mutual interdependence, is not 
abrogated when the now expands [but rather], the now seems to crowd out past and 
future precisely because they retain such an intense presence in [one’s] field of awareness 
[my emphasis].’ The same crowding of the now by the presence of past and future occurs 
in the case of those who would ‘come after’ oneself, one’s children. 
 
Consider the following ethnographic example, in which Leanne, aged h[, effectively 
inhabits the bodies of her children, to consider how laborious (or not) the results of her 
‘own’ decision, to have a risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy, might be for them. She 
also considers how certain acts of resultant medical surveillance would feel in their own 
bodies. After her mother was diagnosed with breast cancer at age of WZ, and developed 
secondary breast cancer Zh years later, Leanne, a nurse and mother of two young boys 
with her partner Helen, decided to have a prophylactic bilateral mastectomy last year 
after undergoing eight years of surveillance: 
 
For me, as I said to my partner, if it wasn’t for my children and her I probably 
would have just gone on surveillance and done the normal [screening] but because 
I remember what it was like going through the various different cancers that my 
mother had and the family had, I just didn’t want to put my children through that. 
There is enough shit in life that they have to deal with and I don’t want them to 
have to watch that if there is anything I can do to stop that then I will. And both 
my boys have the potential for hereditary bowel cancer, our donor has been tested 
and has come back as positive so for me it was also walking the walk not just 
talking the talk as I work in an area of prevention and… um so this is my way of 
saying, if I can take such a radical step to prevent this from happening then, to me, 
the fact that you guys are going to have to have an annual colonoscopy [something 
that Leanne will continue to have] isn’t too bad. 
 
We see this in excerpt Leanne’s awareness of her bodily interventions as forming a 
mode, an example of intervention, that she hopes her own boys will inhabit in the 
future, even after she is gone. Similarly, Gabriel ([jjg) recognises that her hands, 
washing the dishes, are her mothers, the fleshy relationality hinged on the person may 
persist although the tangible presence of the person has expired. 
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Bodily co-presence  
 
Ribbens McCarthy and Prokhovnik’s ([jZW) ideas on enfleshed connections and 
material bonds of care after death are borne out in director and actress Angelina Jolie’s 
[jZe open letter to the New York Times. In this piece, she described her decision to 
undergo a bilateral risk-reducing mastectomy, her response to her positive BRCAZ 
mutation test. Jolie’s mother, actress Marcheline Bertrand was diagnosed with ovarian 
cancer and died aged h`. Jolie also lost an aunt to breast cancer, aged `Z. Entitled ‘My 
Medical Choice,’ Jolie wrote:  
 
My mother fought cancer for almost a decade and died at h`. She held out long 
enough to meet the first of her grandchildren and to hold them in her arms. But 
my other children will never have the chance to know her and experience how 
loving and gracious she was. We often speak of ‘Mommy’s mommy,’ and I find 
myself trying to explain the illness that took her away from us. They have asked if 
the same could happen to me. I have always told them not to worry, but the truth 
is I carry a ‘faulty’ gene, BRCAZ, which sharply increases my risk of developing 
breast cancer and ovarian cancer… Once I knew that this was my reality, I decided 
to be proactive and to minimize the risk as much I could. I made a decision to have 
a preventative double mastectomy. My chances of developing breast cancer have 
dropped from fX percent to under five percent. I can tell my children that they 
don’t need to fear they will lose me to breast cancer. It is reassuring that they see 
nothing that makes them uncomfortable. They can see my small scars and that’s 
it. Everything else is just Mommy, the same as she always was. And they know that 
I love them and will do anything to be with them as long as I can (Jolie, [jZe). 
 
In the letter, Jolie’s mother, and more particularly, her mother’s breasts and cancerous 
ovaries, dwell in Jolie’s own, as she frets that her mother’s body will manifest not in, but 
as, her own. It is not as straightforward as the notion that Jolie uses her mother’s 
experience of cancer and early death as merely a template for planning her own 
treatment. This line of thinking is evident in the theorising of Hallowell (Zggg, [jj[) 
and others. It is more than this, as Jolie comes to dwell in her mother’s body, to 
experience it as her own, and deal with it as her own. As Jolie’s chances of developing 
breast cancer drop from fX% to less than five percent, her mother’s breasts and her 
mother’s ovaries retreat. Jolie’s parts will not become her mother’s parts. But Jolie had 
to take them to be her own for a time, to prevent a cancerous outcome like her mother’s. 
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She also had to take them as her own breasts, eventually reconstructed, to remain 
present for her children. In this way she could continue to be ‘mommy,’ not ‘mommy’s 
mommy.’ She would not become another memory of a loving and gracious woman 
whose presence her grandchildren will be told of but not experience firsthand. It is only 
in taking up her mother’s body as her own, that she could not become her. And even as 
her mother’s diseased breasts are expunged from her body, Jolie’s mother yet lingers, 
both as the breasts and ovaries that were made manifest in Jolie’s own body, but also as 
the remembered presence of a loving and gracious woman who will not ever fully leave. 
She remains embedded, too, in a more concerning way, that is, as the remaining five 
percent chance Jolie still has of becoming mommy’s mommy.  
 
Jolie further spoke of the nuanced ways in which her mother’s body came to inhabit her 
own as she explained her decision to have her ovaries removed in [jZh. In her letter to 
the New York Times she recounted meeting with her mother’s doctor to plan her 
salpingo-oophorectomy:  
  
I last saw her the day my mother passed away, and she teared up when she saw 
me: ‘You look just like her.’ I broke down. But we smiled at each other and agreed 
we were there to deal with a problem, so ‘let’s get on with it.’ I chose to keep my 
uterus because cancer in that location is not part of my family history… It is not 
possible to remove all risk, and the fact is I remain prone to cancer. I will look for 
natural ways to strengthen my immune system. I feel feminine, and grounded in 
the choices I am making for myself and my family. I know my children will never 
have to say, ‘Mom died of ovarian cancer’ (Jolie, [jZh). 
 
In an interview given shortly after her letter was published Jolie described how:  
 
[w]e had some of the same nurses, some of the same doctors… So, the doctor that 
did my ovary surgery was my mother’s doctor. And apparently my mother had said 
to her, ‘Promise me you will take Angie’s ovaries out.’ So when we got together, 
we both had a big cry, and she said, ‘I promised your mother, and I’ve gotta do 
this’ (Jolie, [jZh). 
 
For Jolie, her experience of having her ovaries removed, like her breasts, bespeaks the 
ways in which her mother’s body and its parts came to inhabit her own as she too comes 
to inhabit the bodies of her children. Jolie meets with the same doctor, in the same 
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hospital. She sits on the same waiting chair and consults with the same woman who 
would have cared for her mother with whom she looks so much alike. But by removing 
her ovaries, she is ensuring that her mother’s cancerous body parts will not, cannot, 
become her own. They will be removed as her mother made her doctor promise they 
would. Jolie’s mother made clear that she did not want her own cancerous ovaries to 
become her daughters, just as Jolie makes certain that her own experiences of losing her 
mother to cancer will not become her children’s experience. ‘[M]y children will never 
have to say, “Mom died of ovarian cancer,”’ Jolie ([jZh) reminds us, as she herself must 
say. Jolie’s body will not become her mother’s body. But it did, for a time, have to be 
inhabited by it for her to make sense of what this cancerous potentiality could mean for 
herself and her family. Likewise, this co-presence is evident as Jolie’s body is not her 
children’s, in full, but did, for a time, come to inhabit them so that she knew for sure 
what she did not want for them, what was, as Kleinman ([jj`) reminds us, most at 
stake.  
 
This fundamental part/iality of the body, as body parts coming to inhabit one another 
in a mode that does not conform to linear time progression and bounded confines of 
the individuated body, has been a source of consternation for some anthropologists. 
Strathern (Zgg[b, p. ZhX), for example, cites the apprehension shown by Braidotti (Zgff) 
over the fragmentation of the body that is permitted by biotechnology and biomedicine. 
For Braidotti, by ‘[s]wapping the totality for the parts that comprise it, ignoring the fact 
that each part contains the whole, the era of “bodies without organs,” is primarily the 
era that has pushed time out of the bodily picture’ (Zgff:Zhe in Strathern, Zgg[b, p. ZhX). 
I, however, read this situation differently on the basis of accounts given to me by my 
informants, and evidenced in the statements made above by Jolie. Rather than seeing 
time as pushed out of the bodily picture, as Braidotti (Zgff) suggests, I, alongside 
Strathern (Zgg[b), draw attention to the ways in which such linear conceptualisations 
of time were in fact never part of the at-risk body in the first place. For Braidotti 
(Zgff:ZhX in Strathern, Zgg[b, p. ZhX), the ‘ever-receeding fragmentation and traffic in 
organ parts’ denies a generational difference between body parts: ‘my uterus, my 
mother’s uterus.’ Yet, as Strathern (Zgg[b) asserts, this view is fundamentally flawed. By 
taking bodily fragmentation to be an affront to the boundedness of the bodily whole 
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and the linear progression of time, one ignores the very composite, hybrid and co-
constituted state of the body. Such an approach to fragmentation, writes Strathern 
(Zgg[b, p. ZhX) ‘evokes a counterpart idea of some prior whole.’ This discrete or priorly 
whole body however is untenable if we are to take seriously the experiences of enfleshed 
and partial co-presence, of a mother’s ovaries dwelling in one’s own, that are described 
by at-risk women such as Jolie.  
 
These points are perhaps even more sharply evident in Valerie’s case. Valerie, a British 
eh-year-old linguist now living in Australia, has spent much of her life thinking about 
her potential risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. Testing positive for a BRCAZ 
mutation after the birth of her first child, Valerie underwent a risk-reducing bilateral 
skin and nipple sparring mastectomy with implant reconstruction and a bilateral 
salpingo-oophorectomy. Her mother was diagnosed with breast cancer when Valerie 
was only Z`.  
 
Valerie recalled making an appointment almost a decade ago at a familial cancer clinic 
in London where it was advised that her mother undergo genetic testing given their 
family history was ‘strongly suggestive’ of a genetic mutation. Valerie’s mother, 
however, did not want to be tested. ‘I just assumed I had it,’ Valerie recalled and for 
eight years she arranged her own screening and surveillance in Australia while she 
waited for her mother to agree to be tested. During her mother’s cancer and recovery, 
Valerie had been one of her primary carers, an experience that prompted Valerie to 
think about the practical issues associated with illness from a young age:  
  
My priority was getting life insurance, rather than things most [j-year-olds get 
done. The cost [of insurance] was just like [paying for] electricity: it was something 
that I had to do…. I always had the idea that I wouldn’t live past a certain age. It 
was always in my mind that I would get cancer and that I wouldn’t survive. I had 
the idea that, around forty, I wouldn’t be alive. I just knew that there was a 
likelihood that I would die at an early age. It’s hard to [think you will] live past the 
age that your parent’s [get sick]. My relationship with my husband became serious 
and practical very early on, [more] than other couples had to deal with. Our 
financial concerns, like paying life insurance, were different from other couples. 
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Valerie felt that she too would come to inhabit the same temporal unfolding and follow 
the same illness trajectory as her mother. This concern prompted Valerie and her 
partner to make decisions and plans about their life together faster than was the case 
for their friends and peers. Valerie’s mother decided to be tested two years ago, just after 
the birth of her first granddaughter, Valerie’s first child, in [jZ[. Valerie’s mother tested 
positive for a mutation in the BRCAZ gene. This news bought about a range of emotions 
for Valerie: 
  
I spent lots of years angry at my Mum for not testing. I was also angry about when 
she got the test. She got the results four days after the birth of my baby and told 
me [in the hospital]. My emotions were already all over the place after having the 
baby, I had postnatal depression, my view of the future was in flux and then I had 
to deal with BRCA stuff at the same time. It was a perfect storm. Four months after 
having my baby, I was tested for BRCA. I wasn’t diagnosed with postnatal 
depression till months after. It drove a wedge between us. It’s a bit better now but 
she wasn’t there when I needed her.  
 
Consequently, Valerie decided to undergo a risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy while 
her daughter was a toddler. She and her husband hoped to have another child and so 
have discussed the possibility of Valerie removing her ovaries: 
 
I just wanted to be able to look my loved ones in the face and know that I had truly 
done everything in my power to minimise my risk of cancer. This was not 
something I felt some of my close family members could say, and I remember 
feeling angry about that as a child... I didn’t want that for my husband and child. 
I also have a close friend who survived ovarian cancer, and I lost another close 
friend to breast cancer some years ago after a long period of illness. I believe that 
both these friends would have grabbed the opportunity for health with both hands 
had they been offered the same choice I was being offered. Once I tested positive, 
it became clear that the risk was very high. I was also approaching the age of typical 
onset in my family. I had just had my first child, and I decided the impact of cancer 
would be enormous on my family and loved ones. It wasn’t just about me anymore. 
It made sense to go for surgery which at least I had some degree of control over. 
Also, I was tired of the screening which I’d been actively pursuing for almost ten 
years. I wanted this new stage of my life to be about something else… So there were 
lots of factors, but I would probably say a big one was that it wasn’t just about me 
anymore. And I didn’t want to be my mother, or my aunties... certainly I feel more 
angry and distant from my mother by going through this. I understand even less 
the choices she made, and her words and actions hurt me even more now I feel I 
have somewhat earned the right to say, ‘OK, you can’t use the fact that you went 
through tough times with cancer as an excuse any more.’ Because I’m experiencing 
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similar tough times now too, and I can see that you always have a choice in how 
you handle these things [my emphasis]. 
 
Somewhat eerily, Valerie had to come to, even for the briefest of time, be inhabited by 
the body of her mother and of her aunt to know, most profoundly, that this was not the 
type of body, the type of being, she wanted for herself or for her family. Inhabiting and 
being inhabited by the bodies of familial others as Valerie suggested is thus, not 
necessarily, a welcomed experience but nevertheless a significant one. By inhabiting the 
body of her mother, of going through the ‘tough times,’ Valerie came to know what she 
did not want to do and who she did not want to be – her mother or her aunt. Valerie, 
for the briefest time, came to inhabit what it would have been had her breasts become 
her close friends, diseased and without the option for preventative action. She envisaged 
what would have been if this friend could have inhabited her body parts, at-risk but not 
yet pathological, and how she may have acted had this been the case, if she has been 
‘offered the same choice… the opportunity for health.’ She also came to inhabit the body 
of her daughter. She considered how it would feel for her baby girl to have to go through 
the experience of caring for a mother with cancer, of ‘feeling angry’ that she did not do 
everything in her power to reduce her risk, as Valerie felt her own mother had not. The 
way in which at-risk women speak to and of this porous flesh underscores the ability of 
the unbounded body to seep across what the paradigmatic anthropological approaches 
otherwise recognise as ‘individuals’ and be effectively shared between them. We can 
remember that this sharedness of bodies is underscored by genetics, as Strathern (Zggg, 
p. W[) reminds us, reproduction ‘makes children part of the bodies/persons of their 
parents.’ Genetic inheritance thus ‘points to duration,’ to a sharedness across and 
throughout time (Strathern, Zggg, p. ``). In taking cues from these fundamentals of 
genetic medicine, we can underscore the very sharedness of the experience of suffering. 
This reading allows us to see suffering across bodies and times, doing away with the 
overreliance on notions of the individuated, discrete and bounded body as the figure 
who experiences the linear progression of illness or the potential for illness. 
 
This experience of a non-linear and porous enfleshed bodies, where body parts come to 
inhabit one another across time has been expressed at length by Gessen ([jjf). In her 
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memoir, Gessen ([jjf) spoke of her experience of living with the spectre of hereditary 
cancer after her mother passed away from breast cancer and Gessen ([jjf) tested 
positive for a BRCAZ mutation. She writes how the risk of hereditary cancer became part 
of the legacy she inherited from her mother, forming an affront to her best attempts to 
differentiate and distance herself from her mother and their tumultuous relationship:  
 
And even though, like all daughters of mothers who die young, I had a difficult 
time visualizing myself past a certain age, I had always, without really thinking 
about it, assumed that I would make better of what I had, and for longer, because 
I am not as afraid, I thought my gifts were my own, making me free from her legacy 
altogether. Then I found out that I got everything from her, including the flaw that 
killed her (Gessen, [jjf, p. `).  
 
Despite her conviction that she was freed from her relationship with her mother, she 
came to realise that she was intricately and intimately entwined in her very being, even 
after she had her breasts removed prophylactically. While Gessen ([jjf) wanted her 
life and her body to be her own, when her mother passed away and she tested positive 
for a BRCA gene mutation, she became aware of how fundamentally connected she 
remained to her mother. She realised how she would miss the security that her mother’s 
presence bought her despite their differences. She was inhabited by her mother’s 
presence. She carried her physical traits, her gestures, turn of phrase and her genes, just 
as Gessen’s own daughters carried forth hers:  
 
My daughter will go on in the world with feet and eyebrows that are replicas of 
mine, a stubbornness just like mine, and the habit – my habit – of scrunching up 
her face when doing something that requires great concentration…. Most 
important, she will carry with her the memory of me, perhaps even the physical 
sense of me. That physical awareness is the essential element of security. Whatever 
trace of my mother I carried – even if it was the mere knowledge of her existence 
– had kept me from feeling mortal as long as she was alive. When I awoke on the 
morning of her death, I felt a fear that has not left me since. For months after I 
learned of my mutation, I would think about this in the sleepless early morning, 
when my daughter pressed her hot heels into the small of my back, and I know I 
was the only thing that protected her from the cold wind of fear and freedom that 
came into the room through the open balcony door. Then she would tap me on 
the shoulder and ask me to turn around so she could hold my breasts… (Gessen, 
[jjf, p. Z[). 
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At-risk women such as Angelina Jolie, Valerie and Masha Gessen spoke of the ways in 
which they hoped that their children would never come to have to inhabit their 
grandmother’s, aunt’s or mother’s cancerous or pre-cancerous bodies, nor have to live 
with the absence of these key figures in their lives. My informants however often voiced 
a concern about the inability to inhabit the cancerous familial body for those who did 
not live to see its suffering. As Penelope explained:  
 
I am a bit nervous for my niece’s generation as it is great that nobody is going to 
get cancer [after having the risk-reducing surgeries] but I worry that they won’t 
know how bad it is. And it will be more theoretical, like ‘oh maybe at age ee this 
might happen’ but to have been next to my sister while she had breast cancer at 
ee…. Oh I know I don’t want to have to go through that, it seems horrible. So I am 
a little nervous about the next generation. Because it [seeing family members go 
through cancer] had an impact. My cousin had breast cancer and it went to her 
brain and, she is alive still, but she had to get a shunt, but that didn’t work and 
then she had to get whole brain radiation, it is horrible. I don’t want to go through 
that and that could happen. So it is instructive to see those [things]… I wonder if, 
I don’t know, maybe it’s like, there was something I read about rises in HIV and 
they were saying that in this new generation they didn’t grow up in the fjs, they 
didn’t see the ravages of the community so they aren’t taking it seriously. My aunts 
died from these diseases and then my cousin and sister didn’t die but they suffered 
through the treatment and the uncertainty of being a cancer survivor and the fear 
that it will come back.  
 
Penelope’s, her cousin’s, her aunt’s or sister’s body could become her niece’s body - she 
too may carry a mutation in her BRCA gene. This troubles Penelope but what is of even 
greater concern is the fact that these suffering bodies may not be sufficiently enlivened 
or inhabitable for her niece and thus her ability to make sense of her risk may be 
jeopardised. The bodies of loved ones suffering from cancer, for Penelope, have to be 
enlivened through words, through stories, so that they can circulate within the next 
generation and be taken up as potentially ‘my body’ and in essence, a body that you do 
not want to be. Penelope worries that, by undergoing risk-reducing surgery and 
preventing cancer from developing, the body and the person suffering from hereditary 
cancer will be ‘too theoretical’ for the next generation. She worries that she and her 
sisters will not do a good enough job of enlivening them for her niece so that she too 
can make sense of the gravity of the situation she faces.  
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Having breast cancer and the suffering associated with cancer enlivened by her mother 
impacted on Billie’s decision to undergo risk-reducing surgery in her early twenties. 
Billie too worried for other women who may be at-risk and face the decisions 
surrounding risk reduction without having had cancer enlivened for them by loved 
ones. She told me:  
 
I pretty much grew up with breast cancer and I’m sure that had a lot to do with it 
[undergoing surgery in her early twenties]. I think… I think it’s always interesting 
to hear, you know, I’ve seen a lot of cancer in my family and that’s the reason why 
we choose to do it but I hear other women who haven’t seen it, maybe their dad 
passed it down, so they haven’t seen too much cancer and I almost feel like we 
have an easy choice you know. Because it’s been right in our face growing up and 
I think… I don’t know it’s interesting, I just think it’s a more difficult choice if you 
haven’t seen it. 
 
Some at-risk women, Billie worried, may find it even more difficult to make decisions 
concerning risk reduction as cancer had not been enlivened for them by their mothers, 
sisters and aunts. And yet there appears a fine line between the concern that one’s 
children and younger relatives must be able to inhabit the cancerous familial body in 
order to comprehend the enormity of hereditary disease and the worry that they will 
come to inhabit this body for too long, that they will be engulfed by it. Thirty-two-year-
old Melissa, mother to four children, aged Ze, ZZ, nine and seven, told me that she had 
always been open about her risk of cancer with her children from the very beginning. 
Melissa’s mother was diagnosed with breast cancer when Melissa was six years old. In 
late [jZe, her sister was also diagnosed with breast cancer and underwent a 
hysterectomy, bilateral mastectomy and genetic testing. Melissa told her own children 
when she underwent genetic testing and tested positive for the ‘cancer gene.’ She 
remembered her nine-year-old daughter asking ‘Mummy does that mean I have the 
gene? Am I going to get cancer?’ Melissa did not know what to say.  
 
Laura also contemplated how much she should tell her daughter about their family 
history of breast cancer and her BRCA mutation:  
 
I want her to be a child, because I never really [was]… I was ZX when my mum got 
cancer and I always knew that my nan died of cancer so I want her to live a bit of 
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a life and once she is Zf maybe talk to her about it. But I am sure she is going to 
know as she is going to grow up seeing my scars. I have no idea how I am going to 
handle it but I don’t want her growing up thinking about it all the time. 
 
Laura worries that her daughter may come to inhabit her body for too long, that it will 
become her entire body instead of her very own as Laura herself felt when she was 
growing up. In inhabiting her mother’s body and her grandmother’s body from a young 
age, Laura suggests that she missed her own childhood. In taking up her mother and 
grandmother’s bodies as they suffered from cancer, Laura experienced another form of 
suffering, a shared suffering. Melissa too remains unsure of how to explain her situation 
to her daughter. In each of these examples, we see how children seem to be intuitively 
aware that their bodies are taken up and inhabited by other bodies. Across and between 
generations, we see the body emerge as partial to others and, at times, non-distinct. 
This fundamental connectivity seems to be thought about and mused upon by children. 
Bodies are not separated out by generations, distinct and inaccessible, but rather are 
taken up and inhabited by one another. Indeed, they only appear as separate in a lineal 
view of time and family. However, to consider the cohabitance expressed by at-risk 
women such as Laura and Melissa, we need to move beyond such linear views to 
consider how temporality is shared in and through bodies and thus produces the co-
temporal body of the family. Just as genes live in multiple iterations and configurations 
of bodies at the same time, bodies come to inhabit bodies in a similar way through the 
presence of a gene mutation and the cancerous potential it confers.  
 
The rhythms of life – temporality on the small scale   
 
Bodies may be shared across generations, spanning across time in ways that challenge 
discrete notions of the past, present and future. On the micro scale, bodies may also 
share time in our day-to-day living, that is, they may become syncopated in their 
habitual and partial deployments and actions. In ZggX, Margot Lyon urged us to 
consider the usually un-reflected upon, yet wholly necessary, everyday bodily act of 
respiration, as profoundly social and syncopated:  
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Generally speaking, a phenomenon such as respiration is assumed to be ‘merely 
biological,’ a bodily function in the service of the intake of oxygen and the 
elimination of carbon dioxide. Respiration, like most basic bodily capacities such 
as heart rate, blood pressure, circulation, is widely considered to be irrelevant to 
sociological analysis per se. Further, given the conventional boundaries of the 
discipline, there are few means to give such bodily phenomena a voice – except 
through descriptive commentary drawn largely from biology itself. The general 
assumption is that such basic bodily functions are unaffected by, and have little 
affect on, interactive exchanges. The ‘machinery’ of our organ and nervous systems 
is thought to be self-operating, while our overt actions are seen to be generated 
and governed by social and cultural forces. Such Cartesian dichotomies permeate 
our common categories of thought about the body... Yet, these basic ‘animal’ 
functions are fundamental to bodily being and have an important role in complex 
interactive processes. Their import needs to be acknowledged and better 
integrated into sociological accounts [my emphasis] (Lyon, ZggX, p. gZ).  
 
Her words are relevant today and to my thesis, since it is these smallest and least 
remarked upon processes of bodily being, such as breathing, that produce shared 
corporeal and temporal familiarity and family. Family, as I have suggested, exists and 
persists as bodies, or parts thereof, in relation. Tiny, unremarkable, yet wholly necessary 
acts, like breathing, link the partial bodily activity of one, with another, to produce the 
patterns that unite bodies and yields the ‘family.’ The importance of these habitual 
interactions has been recognised by anthropologists such as Carsten ([jjj, p. `gX), 
who asserts that ‘kinship is constituted out of everyday small acts and events in time.’ 
Similarly, Lyon (ZggX, p. gX) surmises, this vital sharedness of biological rhythms 
‘becomes clear when one consider[s] the role of the bodily function of respiration in the 
establishment of common interactional rhythms and synchronous behaviour in groups.’ 
Linking breathing to affectivity, Lyon notes that the interlocking rhythms or synchrony 
of respiratory capacity is: 
 
[o]ne of the basic bodily capacities which functions for the social integration of 
individuals, and which is an important mechanism for the continual process of the 
shaping of the emotions among individuals in social context. It is possible 
therefore to conceptualize the continual generation and modulation of emotion 
in the context of social relations and group processes through a concept such as 
‘affective order’ which reflects, through the concept of emotion, not only the 
various bodily mechanisms implicated but also the role of emotion in the 
generation of social order (Lyon, ZggX, p. gX). 
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An example of this integration of emotion and bodily mechanisms in enabling sociality 
was described by my informant Penelope. She spoke of how her recent difficulty 
respiring curtailed her ability to interact and emote with others. She recounted: 
 
I was just sick, here in the Philippines and I am still getting over it, bronchitis, and 
with the pollution I am still trying to recover because the air pollution is so bad. 
But I felt like everyone is out going about their lives and life is happening outside 
but there are things I want to do but I can’t. Sickness is a lonely experience because 
life goes on but you can’t participate. 
 
My fieldnotes are replete with examples of how the most unremarkable of bodily 
capacities were disrupted and made un-syncopated by the threat of illness, specifically 
cancer, and risk reduction and how this impacted on relationality especially within the 
family. Lucy, a W[-year-old British Australian with a BRCA[ gene mutation told me 
about her experiences with multiple surgical complications after her risk-reducing 
mastectomy. These complications meant she could not participate in the commensal 
rhythm of the family; of eating dinner together, putting her children to bed and lying 
beside her partner. She explained:  
 
It was a bit of a surprise for me and the surgeon that I didn’t heal as quickly as 
expected because I am healthy. I don’t have any big health problems, there was 
nothing. I was a bit overweight but that was because of the anxiety medication. I 
came off that, I was taking zinc and magnesium, the weight was coming off slowly. 
But within [W hours I knew something was very wrong. I had this stabbing pain 
and couldn’t breathe…The pain was huge for the first couple of weeks after. I 
stayed in hospital for a week which was unexpected and then they gave me 
morphine because it turns out a nerve was damaged. 
  
Lucy returned home for a few weeks before more problems arose. She developed a 
seroma in her reconstructed right breast that wept incessantly. ‘I can’t remember what 
happened but it was in the afternoon when I was driving home [from work to pick up 
her kids] and [the surgeon] phoned me and said “don’t go home, you are going into 
hospital and we will take that bit of skin out and put another drain in. Go home and 
have dinner and then go into hospital and you will be first cab of the rank in the 
morning.” So that’s what we did.’  
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After this corrective surgery, Lucy returned home, however it was not long before her 
surgical site began to ooze again: 
 
I had the drain removed a second time and we were going out for dinner. It was 
five in the evening, we were getting ready to go out for dinner and as I was doing 
my hair and makeup in the bathroom mirror. I looked down, I don’t know why, 
and my breast was like a teardrop. I called the surgery and they said I had to come 
back in and I was like ‘gah we are going out to dinner, we haven’t been out to 
dinner for months and this is our first time’ and eventually I begged and begged 
to go to dinner and enjoy the evening. I said it wasn’t pouring out anymore as it 
had been, the surgeon was concerned about infection but in the end I won as long 
as I put sterile dressings on it and called his mobile if anything changed in the 
meantime. And they would see me first thing Monday morning.  
 
For Lucy, the need, the desire, she held to once again participate in the minute rhythms 
and syncopated behaviours of commensality with her loved ones trumped her surgeons 
concern for possible infections and further surgical complications.  
 
The significance of shared rhythms of commensality was also expressed to me by Lily. 
Early in my fieldwork, Lily emailed me with an example of how her BRCA[ mutation 
disrupted the rhythm of her social life, within and beyond the family. She wrote:  
 
I had another random thought about how being BRCA[ affects me socially and I 
often get annoyed when people look at me like I'm a psychopath because I don't 
drink alcohol (not often, if at all). I've never been a massive drinker and have 
generally always been a bit annoyed at the social norm and peer pressure 
surrounding drinking but these days I explain to people that I don't need to 
increase my risks of getting cancer even more by drinking and they look at me like 
I'm crazy. It's also a bit socially awkward if/when I tell people that drinking alcohol 
increases your chances of getting cancer in general and then they all stand around 
drinking alcohol. I'm shocked at how people don't know this tidbit of information 
already. 
  
Melissa, as mentioned in the previous section, likewise experienced the unravelling of 
familial rhythms after receiving her mutation status. She told me ‘I didn’t realise the 
effect that [the genetic result] was having on my family, I didn’t consider how they 
would feel or where they were coming from, I didn’t expect that it would impact them 
as much as it did.’ Once she realised how being at-risk of cancer was impacting on her 
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family, especially her children, she made the decision to undergo risk-reducing surgery. 
Ironically her initial reluctance to undergo such surgery was tied to her concern that it 
would impact on her familial routines. She was worried about ‘who was going to take 
the kids to soccer, and to netball.’  
 
For Leanne, it is the uninterrupted unfolding of her own ‘temporal arc’ that was put at 
risk by hereditary cancer (Mattingly, Zggf). This shared time was important for relating 
her to her children and her partner. Her mother’s illness was etched upon Leanne’s own 
body in ways that exceeded the harmful genetic mutation she inherited. To prevent the 
illness cycle from continuing in the future, Leanne excised the bodily parts that held 
such potential cancerous futures. Furthermore, if we think back to Leanne’s earlier 
comments, we see how she takes her own actions in regards to her body and its 
screening as providing a guide for her sons’ bodily choices in the future. By choosing to 
undergo risk reduction, she hopes that her sons will make similar choices in regards to 
their predisposition to bowel cancer, in essence projecting her actions, rendered in the 
flesh, forth. Despite having her breast tissue removed and her breasts reconstructed 
through transverse rectus abdominis flap surgery, Leanne continues to undergo yearly 
screening to monitor any breast tissue that may remain. For Leanne, the timing of such 
surveillance is a point of great deliberation: 
 
I do it at a time when, if the results come through, its, yeah, kinda not going to 
impact on certain things. Like you don’t get it done too close to Christmas, you 
don’t get it done around your birthday or anyone else’s birthday. And there is no 
way I am going to get it done around the anniversary of Mum’s death. And it’s 
those little things that I would think about, the impact that a potentially positive 
result would have on people. Which is an interesting way of looking at it, rather 
than going ‘when does this fit in with my busy social life,’ instead it’s like ‘when 
does this fit into having the less [negative] impact on people?’ Cause you don’t 
want to go, ‘oh it’s the older boy’s birthday’ and I am going home with a diagnosis 
of cancer. Or just before Christmas and at Christmas dinner I’m going to say, ‘hey 
everybody guess what?’ And they are the things that you think of, the potential 
impact that a diagnosis is going to have on the people around you… Normally I am 
quite an optimistic person but it’s always in the background that we time it [the 
screening] in case it’s a negative [outcome].  
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Leder (Zggj) has written at length about how, in our day-to-day life, we remain mostly 
unaware of our body, its parts and functions. It is not until a variance occurs, Leder 
argues (Zggj); pain, discomfort, dysfunction, that the body dys-appears and we become 
hyper-aware of it and its potentially catastrophic failings. In attending to the 
experiences of women at-risk such as Leanne, I believe that we can extend this notion 
of dys-appearing further to consider how the potential failings or demise of the body 
due to cancer also generates a hyper-awareness of the sharedness of time, particularly 
within the family. In looking at the experiences of Leanne, we can interrogate the 
temporal dys-appearance that she experiences as a result of her hereditary cancer risk 
status and how she works to counteract this hyper-awareness of time and its properties. 
Leanne’s chooses to plan her screening so as to avoid getting results around the 
significant and shared times of her family; birthdays, Christmas and the like. In doing 
so, she organising screening outside of the linear intervals recommended by national 
guidelines. For Leanne, these events are crucial milestones for the family – both 
cherished, like birthdays and Christmas, and mourned, like the death of her mother, 
and thus require her intervention to ensure that they continue as such. She does not 
want them to take on the added significance of being the time when mum was 
diagnosed with cancer.  
 
Like Leanne, Joanie worked hard to fit the required schedule for regular screening into 
the rhythm of her family life. Forty-three-years-old and carrying a BRCA[ mutation, 
Joanie was enrolled in a regime of surveillance: 
 
I am currently having regular monitoring – twice yearly breast ultrasound, annual 
breast MRI and regular pelvic ultrasound and ovarian cancer blood test. However, 
as I work and have four children and four stepchildren I find this schedule isn’t 
really working for me – it sounds ridiculous to say so, but I find it hard to fit the 
necessary medical appointments in, although I know they are a priority. 
 
For Joanie, this rhythm of regular screening does not fit in with the micro-temporalities 
of her large family. While we could read Joanie’s comments as suggestive of her self-
sacrificing her health for her children and to fulfil her responsibilities as a mother, as 
Hallowell (Zggg) might suggest. I think we can approach her experiences from a 
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different direction, one that is attentive to the shared body and time of the family. To 
continue to participate in the shared rhythms of the family, Joanie decided to undergo 
a seemingly more ‘radical’ mode of cancer prevention. She removed her ovaries 
altogether. Removing the ability to menstruate and give birth [again] by entering into 
surgically induced menopause in their thirties and forties, at-risk women like Joanie 
complicate established models of linear temporality, especially in terms of ageing. 
However, Joanie resists the archetype of ‘production, waste, decay and breakdown,’ 
Martin (ZgfX, p. ZXe) sees ascribed to women in menopause in Western societies. Rather 
Joanie, as Martin describes, finds:  
 
in the concrete experiences of [her] bod[y] a different notion of time that counters 
the way time is socially organized in our industrial society. In the universe of 
cultures, there are different ways of conceptualizing time that contrast with the 
one familiar to us, in which we measure it, treat it linearly, and think of it as 
something to be saved, bought and sold (Martin, ZgfX, p. [j). 
 
To stay in sync with the current micro-temporalities of her life, her work and her family, 
Joanie made the decision to undergo surgery; ‘for this reason,’ she told me, ‘I have made 
arrangements to have a bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy, which doctors advise me will 
also significantly reduce the breast cancer risk.’ Although such surgery means that 
Joanie will experience surgically induced menopause, for her, this change in her bodily 
rhythms pales in comparison to the disruption to her familial rhythms that ongoing, 
invasive surveillance necessitated.   
 
Kat, a [`-year-old nurse and BRCAZ mutation carrier, also experienced how being at-
risk and undergoing risk-reducing surgery altered some of the temporal rhythms of her 
familial life with her new husband. Kat lost her mother when she was a teenager to 
ovarian cancer after various misdiagnoses. Kat decided to undergo a risk-reducing 
bilateral mastectomy in her twenties. Interestingly, her experiences recovering for her 
surgery were instructive of the types of micro-rhythms she did and did not want to share 
with her spouse. She told me, ‘I don’t want to play the sick role. I did for a while, I just 
wanted to be looked after because I had just had surgery so I milked it. I made my 
 ZZ[ 
husband do everything, I didn’t have to get up and I made my husband shower me and 
take me to the bathroom and all of that.’  
 
She then reflected on how the disruption of those ordinary rhythms of showering and 
toileting for herself had profoundly influenced the affective rhythm of her new family. 
She felt it was not supposed to be the case that her body was attended, at least for any 
extended period of time, by her husband when she showered and went to the bathroom. 
Having him entailed in her corporeal beats, having him syncopated into her toileting as 
he had been during her recovery had highlighted just how odd it was for them to make 
familial rhythms out of private acts. This entailment, she felt, was especially odd given 
that they were both young and recently married. The sharing of these most intimate 
bodily rhythms had brought the reality of cancer and cancer treatment home to them 
in a way that was fully appreciable to them. It had fundamentally disrupted the 
established rhythms of their family, inserting ones of reliance into the ordinariness of 
their familial routines. Kat said:    
 
I don’t want it [assisted toileting and showering] to be my life. In no way. I want 
this to be a portion of my life that yes, has defined me, and no doubt has a huge 
impact on my family. My family is the way it is because of our experiences with 
cancer. The whole way that we communicate with each other and show emotion 
and everything and the way that we view everything in the world is not to take 
things on face value ever and all that, it’s because of this cancer and all that. I’m 
pretty sure my dad was a lot more easy-going and happy to accept anything before 
all of this happened. And now he is like ‘don’t trust anything,’ ‘make sure it’s the 
right way’ and ‘how do you it’s the best doctor?’ and ‘how do you know it’s this’ 
and ‘how do you know it’s that,’ because this has happened but I don’t want it to 
be like that anymore… Because it has been in my life.  
 
Like Kat, Anita spoke to me at length about the ways in which her risk of hereditary 
cancer had upset the established temporal rhythms of her day-to-day life, forcing her to 
worry about the passing of time. When I met with Anita for coffee in a Boston café, she 
was the same age as Kat. Anita, whose mother died from breast cancer a few years 
before, described how the expected and established rhythms of her life – studying, 
finishing her degree, paying off her mortgage, getting married, having children – had 
been disrupted by her mother’s death. The absence of her mother and subsequent 
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disruption of the rhythms that had been entailed in their relationship resulted in 
something she called ‘recklessness.’ This recklessness was exacerbated when she was 
informed of her need to undergo genetic testing for a hereditary cancer syndrome. Anita 
was also diagnosed with ulcerative colitis during this time, a diagnosis that 
compounded her feelings of being unmoored and adrift. She felt her temporal arc 
fundamentally curtailed as she expected her death to come early, as it did for her 
mother: 
 
It’s been [rough]… well after my mother died… for those first three years, I was in 
this period of grief and so you already are experiencing that grief of losing your 
parent to cancer in weird ways, and even at that time, doctors were telling me that 
I need to get genetically tested and that I would have a risk because she died so 
young. But I remember engaging in really high risk behaviours even then, like not 
caring, you know. And then after I got diagnosed with this disease, I was already 
in this mode. I used to live alone, I didn’t have any security, I travelled a lot alone, 
I didn’t care about dying. Cause I was like ‘seize the day, seize the moment, live in 
the most you can,’ you know, all of the clinches of ‘you are going to die any 
moment so why not live the most?’ And it is not the same feeling of immortality 
that teenagers and people in their twenties have, it’s a feeling of accepting your 
mortality but also defying it by taking ridiculous risks. Still in a very immature 
way. But that is what I was doing, and I was just like, well I am probably only going 
to live till I am Wh too [Anita’s mother died aged Wh] so I am going to do things 
accordingly...  
 
These momentous changes to Anita’s life rhythms and temporal arc after her mother’s 
death, her feeling that her lifespan would be truncated likewise, caused her to rearrange 
the affective properties usually attending life milestones, like getting engaged, 
beginning a post-graduate degree, buying a house and getting divorced. She explained: 
 
I am doing very well in my life. I am successful academically and professionally, I 
have bought a house. And I also very recklessly got married a year and a half ago 
and then half a year ago I got divorced. I was married for less than a year. And it 
was all part of this reckless behaviour. I am not able to be as rational about major 
decisions as other people. After, when the divorce and separation happened, I 
ended the marriage like this [snaps finger], I ended it as quickly as I went into it. I 
ended it and that’s when I decided to see a therapist because I realized I was not 
making decisions properly. Like I see a pattern, I was with a Danish guy for four 
or five years and we were living in Copenhagen and had an apartment and were 
going to make our life together and I just left him to go to Afghanistan. And then 
I came back from Afghanistan and within five weeks of meeting someone [new] 
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he proposed to me. So within five weeks of knowing each other we were engaged. 
So it’s like, you see, I was like ‘I am out of control.’ I appear very successful but 
deep down my personal decisions and the way I conduct my life are so reckless 
because of this fear of my mortality.  
 
Experiencing her mother’s untimely and painful death from cancer and her own 
possible risk of developing the disease made the rhythms of life dys-appear for Anita 
(Leder Zggj). She fretted over her own mortality. She worried about what she could and 
would do with the little time she assumed she had left. As her existing temporal regimes 
became un-syncopated, she struggled to re-assert some sense of shared temporality and 
time with others in her life. Yet her decision to marry quickly and re-establish a shared 
time with a partner only worsened her feelings of being out of control. For Anita, her 
sense of time had been thrown into disarray by her mother’s passing as she felt she was 
now living an accelerated life she could not, despite her best efforts, slow back down to 
its once habitual and shared state.  
 
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter I have critiqued Timmermans and Buchbinder’s ([jZj) concept of 
‘patients-in-waiting,’ suggesting that it, whilst attending to the sense of liminality 
experienced by at-risk women, re-asserts the bounded, discrete individual as the subject 
who experiences illness and disease. I posited an alternative, partial approach to 
understanding time and the body as experienced by the at-risk woman. Particular body 
parts, namely breasts and ovaries, are significant in creating and maintaining the fleshy 
collectivity that is the body and thus, their roles in these acts of caregiving and receiving 
are replicated or replaced to continue the temporal rhythms and partial relations of the 
family. Like ovarian and breasted sociality, I have suggested that time unites bodies 
across generations and space, which would otherwise be seen as linearly arrayed. In 
examining the experiences of at-risk women such as Angelina Jolie, we can see how 
bodies are co-present. Parts of bodies come to inhabit each other just as genes unite 
bodies to bodies. Temporal dimensions, Munn (Zgg[, p. ZZ`) reminds us, are 
fundamental to everyday life, they are ‘lived or apprehended concretely via the various 
meaningful connectivities among persons… [these] continually are being made in and 
 ZZh 
through the everyday world.’ Drawing on my informant’s experiences of breasted and 
ovarian sociality in their day-to-day lives, I have suggested that time, like the body, is 
profoundly familial and shared. It is not the sole burden of an individual nor the 
profoundly linear register that is put forth by Timmermans and Buchbinder ([jZj). I 
have detailed the micro-rhythms through which the family is forged, these temporal 
rhythms generated by the syncopated, habitual and partial deployments of bodies and 
body parts in concert with other bodies. These rhythms of family life; of shared meals, 
holidays and school drop offs, are of importance to women at-risk of hereditary cancer. 
Women at-risk of hereditary cancer attempt to protect and maintain these shared, 
syncopated and habitual family rhythms in the face of the disruption that cancer 
presents to them. In the next chapter, I flesh out the ways in which this bodily co-
presence and the temporal rhythms of the family manifest in the circulating and often 
messy attempts to care in the face of hereditary cancer. I will suggest that caregiving 
and care-receiving are, like temporal experiences, familial, partial, and co-constituted. 
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Chapter Three  
Care in the meshwork 
 
In this chapter I argue that acts of caregiving are partial, collaborative and familial. They 
are fundamentally shared experiences as are those of time and the body as I have 
discussed in the foregoing chapters. In opposition to the general thrust of the literature 
on caregiving in hereditary cancer contexts, I critically question the role of the bounded 
individual as the sole bearer of information that she then uses to array caring relations 
with others. I do so in order to critically respond to the claims made for and of the 
‘individual’ in paradigmatic anthropological work regarding illness experience. The 
figure of the individual is a leitmotif of the literature, which pushes analysis into 
particular and well-rehearsed directions of either selflessness or selfishness in decision 
making. Decision making is seen through the lens of either obligation or responsibility 
to the self, or to the other, or both. To reiterate, I am not denying the existence of the 
self as a site of ‘agency, consciousness, interpretation and creativity,’ a unique becoming 
in the world (Rapport, ZggX, p. h). What I am interrogating is the figuring of the 
individual as both bounded and discrete, arraying relationships, experiences of time and 
the act of care in reference to other bounded, discrete individuals. In this chapter, I 
respond against the figure of the individual as foundational to understandings of illness 
experience, and closely examine what caregiving might look like if it, too, was 
considered in the terms of partial relationality and fleshy familiarity.  
 
This analytic position turns up a rather broader range of options than selfish or selfless 
decisions, and reveals a world in which caregiving is located in, with and through the 
often messy bodily relations made by persons in familial contexts. Caregiving, as 
Kleinman ([jZh, p. [Wj) suggests, is ‘a form of “doing” or a mode of “acting” on different 
levels and in different registers: more verb than noun.’ A key feature of the 
anthropological literature of caregiving in the context of hereditary cancer is that care 
is routinely considered to issue from the potentially-ill woman to the rest of her family. 
There is a lacuna in this literature of circulating care. The family or friends that care for 
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the women as she is tested for a BRCA mutation or as she convalesces after risk-reducing 
surgery remain absent from the literature despite their importance in my informant’s 
accounts. This, I think, has to do with the analytical grip of gendered understandings of 
the woman as caregiver, and how she might operate in that role in the face of the cancer 
that might limit it (Glenn, [jZj). I also posit that this lacuna has to do with the grip of 
the individual as the key figure of analysis.  
 
While a gendered approach is no doubt valuable in examining the structural constraints 
and pressures felt by women as they care for others in the face of illness, it risks 
overlooking the complexities of care in the familial sphere. As Putina ([jZZ, p. Zjf) 
submits in her study of same-sex parenting in Latvia, focusing on ‘gender role categories 
[is] just one possible means of relating and describing human relationships in a 
significant way.’ To trouble both these understandings, I recast Mauss’ ([Zghj] [jZj) 
theory of the gift from classical anthropology to consider how a concept of circulating 
caregiving challenges the individualising forces ascribed to the ill body by 
anthropologists. In doing so, I also revise the ways in which the gift-giving act of care 
does not, as a strictly Maussian reading would suggest, circulate between individual, 
discrete bodies. Alternatively, I consider care that circulates as a resource in and 
through the collective and partial body of the family.	‘By giving, one is giving oneself, 
and if one gives oneself it is because one “owes” oneself – one‘s person and one’s goods 
– to others’ writes Mauss ([Zghj] [jZj, p. W`). Caregiving is, like the gift exchange, an 
‘intersubjective relation’ that requires the ‘participation of multiple parties’ (Buch, [jZe, 
p. `j[). We need, however, to extend beyond this line of thought to see caregiving as a 
form of relationality that requires the participation of multiple parts in the sense of Lyon 
and Barbalet’s (ZggW) concept of the family. It is these necessarily partial bodily acts that 
sustain the family. Moreover care, being in this sense a verb, creates and maintains the 
family as a fleshy and embodied collectivity, co-constituted within time, as parts of 
bodies meet with and are enfolded into parts of other bodies (Kleinman, [jZh). Like 
bodies, care is already and always communal.   
 
In examining the experiences of caring in the family, we can discern the circulation of 
care not as a whole or discrete ‘thing’ that issues from one person to another. Just as 
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Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW) propose the family as issuing from the partial deployments 
and relations of the body, I suggest that care is a multiplicity of acts that by definition 
has no singular form nor place of issuance. The act of caring, in this sense, comprises 
both a multitude of physical acts; ‘touching, embracing, steadying, lifting, toileting, and 
so on,’ as much as ‘the way we look at someone, and receive their return gaze; the way 
we connect… the quality of our voice, our very presence’ (Kleinman, [jZh, p. [Wj). 
Paradigmatic anthropological approaches to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer locate 
care as a discrete property that moves outward from one to another, linking them as 
discrete parties. It is this approach that allows for women’s decision making to appear 
as inherently selfish or selfless. Developing upon Lyon’s (ZggX) exploration of emotion 
as the force impelling bodies towards one another, I conceive of care as an impelling 
force that is not held by one single person but rather is a resource that the family holds 
in common. Care in this sense is participatory, inchoate and characterised by flows.  
 
To explore this flow of care, I rework Mauss’ ([Zghj] [jZj) theory of the gift by attending 
to another of his concepts, techniques of the body. Mauss’ ([Zghj] [jZj) theory of the 
gift is helpful in drawing attention to the way in which caring is a solidarity-enhancing 
exchange. Recognising this reciprocity of care-gifting, however, can only take us so far. 
In existing anthropological accounts to hereditary cancer, the exchange of care takes 
place between identifiable partners. As such, care in these readings passes from one 
bounded, discrete individual to another and, consequently, falls into the selfish/selfless 
dyad in which one is owed and one owes care. In the paradigmatic anthropological 
approach to caring in this context, this manifests as women being givers of care, family 
members being the receivers of care. As such, a system of credit or debit operates within 
the family: one is owed or owing care. The offshoot of this neat theoretical approach to 
caregiving is that it overlooks the reality of care within the family. Caring, as my 
informants often told me, is messy. Things go wrong. Best intentions may not translate 
into action. The unexpected and the random throw careful plans into chaos. Despite 
concerted efforts, things fall by the wayside. People are unable to give the care they 
thought they could. People feel uncared about. People get tired of caring. People tire of 
being cared for. The resources for caring diminished are or were not sufficient in the 
first place. Tensions arise. Caring is hard as much as it is rewarding.   
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To apply wholesale Mauss’ ([Zghj] [jZj) theory of the gift to caregiving overlooks this 
inherent messiness of care particularly within the illness experience. In trying to fit 
caring into models of gendered responsibility or gift exchange, existing anthropologists 
of hereditary cancer come to classify people as givers or receivers, creditors or debtors, 
selfish and selfless. This form of categorisation is consequential. In our need for analytic 
neatness and boundaries, we overlook the messiness of everyday life. The ‘individual’ or 
the gift, as units of inquiry, make for analytic neatness. We need, however, to unhitch 
care from the individual to appreciate the mess that goes on in the social. In this social 
realm of the family, care is an enfleshed thing, a verb, as Kleinman ([jZh) reminds us. 
Rather than taking care as an abstract entity that one gives to another, we can come to 
appreciate the messy meshwork in which care operates, in profoundly partial, embodied 
ways, within the family. In this chapter, I put forth an alternative understanding of care 
that stresses its participatory qualities, considering it as a resource that circulates and 
is shared within the messy meshwork of the family rather than directed outwards to 
others and then, necessarily, reciprocally, directed back.  
 
How at-risk women care for the family: an overview of the literature 
 
As detailed in Chapter One, the idea of genetic kinship figures prominently in the 
anthropological literature of caregiving in the context of hereditary cancer. This 
manifests in the sense that at-risk women are in possession of genetic information that 
can be used to provide others with a foreknowledge of possible disease and access 
preventative healthcare. As Gibbon notes in her study of at-risk women in the United 
Kingdom: 
 
Offers may be made to patients in the clinic, who are mostly women, to extend a 
programme of ‘care,’ screening or monitoring to include relatives. In fact, 
attentiveness to the social context of the family, and the provision of care for 
others is not just about demonstrating a capacity for empathy or the holism of 
practice but is, like care for the future, vital and instrumental to predictive 
knowledge… in this sense knowledge and care is predicated on the shared actions 
and obligations by those considered most likely to yield predictive foreknowledge 
for the family or conversely those considered most at risk because of such 
 Z[Z 
foreknowledge. Situated as gatekeeper and moral guardian for the health of 
others, ‘care’ for the woman in the clinical encounter… perceived by her in terms 
of more regular mammography screening, is, as a result of her visit, now complexly 
caught up in other possible interventions by and for her father and two sons. 
([jjX, pp. XW-X`) 
 
In this extract, we see Gibbon ([jjX, p. X`) worry about a version of gendered care that 
forces the at-risk woman to act as the ‘gatekeeper and moral guardian of her family.’ 
This particular version of gendered caregiving, Gibbon ([jjX) purports, both reflects 
and advances oppressive regimes of female nurturance and caring. For Gibbon ([jjX), 
genetic kinship and its promulgation by clinicians is foundational to this convergence 
between medical and social modes of caregiving. She writes: 
 
Family trees in predictive medicine are far from univocal… but are in fact put to 
work in a variety of ways. That is, these tools are tied to a discourse about care that 
is subject to and a locus for traffic between the natural and the social in which a 
particular kind of ‘born and bred’ kinship… powerfully intersects with naturalised 
and socialised ideas of female nurturance… On the one hand clinical discourse or 
practice about the family and the future helps to make predictive medicine more 
explicitly synonymous with ‘care’ in a euphemistic sense associated with all 
hospital or medical practice. At the same time these pastoral modes are also 
instrumental to the utility and pursuit of genetic knowledge itself, where an 
orientation towards the idea of the patient as the family and notions of female 
nurturance as care towards others are both implicitly assumed. As a result, the 
promissory, familial and gendered modalities of pastoral care, so central to clinical 
breast cancer genetics, articulate particular kinds of patienthood… It is a 
willingness that must in part be linked to culturally valorised ideas of female 
nurturance… [my emphasis] (Gibbon, [jjX, pp. XW-XX). 
 
Above we see Gibbon ([jjX, p. fh) identifies a conflict between the mode of 
‘responsible, self-actualising individualism of preventative health’ integral to the culture 
of preventative medicine and the culturally valued ideals of female nurturance. Female 
nurturance in this sphere, Gibbon ([jjX) purports, involves a recognition of shared 
responsibilities and obligations to others whom are likewise implicated in the possibility 
of familial illness. This situation, Gibbon ([jjX) concludes, lodges the at-risk woman 
between the pull of individualism and the collective. Such tension, according to Gibbon 
([jjX, p. ge), can only result in ‘a disorientating flux’ by which the ‘awareness and 
pursuit of one’s own health in going to the clinic’ comes into direct conflict with the 
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‘necessarily more collective notion of patient identity required as a result of such a visit.’ 
On the one hand is ‘a neo-liberal ethic of being pro-active in relation to one’ own health’ 
(Gibbon, [jjX, p. ge). On the other is ‘the family’ both in the sense of the affectively 
formed up family, of one’s own choosing, and the pre-given genetic family. The at-risk 
woman, in this reading, must attend to both of these demands: ‘female nurturance [is] 
inimical with care and concern for others’ (Gibbon, [jjX, p. gW). Consequently, the 
woman is wedged between the responsibility to master her body, to take care of her 
body as a neo-liberal citizen and to fulfil the responsibilities and obligations associated 
with female nurturance, that is, to care for others before herself (Greco, Zgge). 
 
According to Gibbon ([jjX), this situation produces a fundamental imbalance. Women 
at-risk of hereditary cancer tend more toward the collective responsibility mode than 
they do to their own healthcare rights as individuals. They are thus selfless and self-
sacrificing, a point that Hallowell develops. In her work Doing the right thing: genetic 
risk and responsibility, Hallowell (Zggg) elaborates on the self-sacrificing figure of the 
female patient. She argues that her data collected in the United Kingdom: 
 
indicates that women who attend genetics clinics perceive themselves as having a 
responsibility to their kin (past, present and future generations) to establish the 
magnitude of their risk and the risks to other family members, and to act upon 
this information by engaging in some form of risk management. It is observed that 
in acknowledging their genetic responsibility for their kin these women not only 
relinquished their right not to know about their risks, but also committed 
themselves to undertaking risk management practices which may have iatrogenic 
consequences… [T]he construction of genetic risk as a moral issue can be seen as 
limiting the choices which are available to women who attend genetic counselling 
(Hallowell, Zggg, p. hgX). 
 
In Hallowell’s (Zggg) view, the individual here is subsumed under the moral weight of 
genetic responsibility and the needs of her affective, and genetic, kin. As a result of 
genetic counselling and risk-management, Hallowell (Zggg, p. hgg) argues, at-risk 
women are positioned as ‘responsible for their own health but also for the health of 
others.’ This responsibility, Hallowell (Zggg, p. hgg) suggests, referring to Steinberg 
(Zgg`, p. [Xj), is exacerbated by the role at-risk women are perceived to play in both 
carrying and giving birth to children who are likewise at-risk of such genetic ‘defects.’ 
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Consequently, the woman is seen as ‘almost single-handedly, bearing the responsibility 
for passing on their own and their partner’s genes’ (Steinberg, Zgg`, p. [Xj in Hallowell, 
Zggg, p. hgg). In Steinberg’s (Zgg`) reading, women, by dint of their gender and child-
bearing role, are more likely to shoulder the responsibility and blame for issues arising 
from genetic inheritance.  
  
Hallowell (Zggg) recognises that the at-risk woman may not be entirely autonomous or 
discrete in regards to her relations. The at-risk woman, she submits, is not individual as 
isolate ‘but [is] repeatedly constructed in-relation to others’ (Hallowell, Zggg, p. `Zj). 
She is ‘interdependent,’  in and through her obligatory connections with family of choice 
and family of genes (Hallowell, Zggg, p. `Zj). ‘Genetic information,’ was, however, 
perceived among her informants ‘as information about “the family” and as such, they 
reasoned that they had an obligation to ensure that all their kin had access to this 
information’ (Hallowell, Zggg, p. `Zj). The burden of this responsibility, Hallowell 
(Zggg) purports, resulted in women subordinating their own needs and concerns to 
meet the perceived needs of affective and genetic kin. At-risk women, in Hallowell’s 
(Zggg) study, acted selflessly in sharing genetic information with their kin. 
Consequently, for Hallowell (Zggg, p. `Zj), the pressures of genetic responsibility for 
others ‘ultimately threatened [at-risk women’s] autonomy, insofar as they constrained 
their choices.’ For Hallowell (Zggg, p. `Zj), it was the at-risk woman’s kin, her 
‘interdependence’ on others, that fundamentally curtailed her individual autonomy.  
 
Another example of this gendered reading of care in the context of hereditary illness is 
evident in the work of Sachs ([jjW). For Sachs ([jjW, p. [`), biotechnologies and 
genetic medicine have produced the ‘new age molecular family,’ not unlike Finkler’s 
([jjj) ‘molecularisation of the family’ discussed in Chapter One. According to Sachs 
([jjW, p. [`), knowledge generated by genetic medicine presents women with the 
‘responsibility of… deciding what to do in order to avoid possible future disease.’ Yet she 
must simultaneously strive to ‘understand genetic assessments and interpret medical 
facts so as to be able to communicate with significant others in the family.’ Under this 
burden, the at-risk woman is likely, just as Hallowell (Zggg) suggests, to sacrifice her 
own needs for her family. As such, she fulfils the responsibilities and obligations 
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associated with her role as female nurturer, lending such actions to a reading of selfless 
behaviour.   
 
We also see such reasoning promulgated by d’Agincourt-Canning ([jj`). In her work 
on at-risk women in Canada, d’Agincourt-Canning ([jj`) writes of the iatrogenic 
consequences experienced by women as they feel compelled to undergo surgery on the 
basis of their gendered responsibility to others. We can question, she writes, ‘whether a 
decision or action taken out of responsibility for others is truly autonomous if the 
factors that shape responsibility are overladen by oppressive norms’ (d'Agincourt-
Canning, [jj`, p. ZZW). The strength of this perceived duty and obligation to kin, 
d’Agincourt Canning ([jj`, p. ZWW) submits, leads some women to ‘experience their 
efforts as oppressive and denying choice.’ Such selflessness, Aureliano ([jZh, p. [f[) 
posits, may even come to hinder the wellbeing of the woman, as he observed in his study 
of Brazilian cancer sufferers. His informants ‘embraced their roles as caregivers for 
others, even while they themselves were suffering, because such roles made them feel 
useful.’ In another recent study, Hallowell and her colleagues ([jZh, p. Zge) comment 
on the competing demands experienced by women at-risk. They suggest that women 
at-risk of hereditary cancer struggle to achieve a balance between ‘the demands of their 
body – the need to reduce/manage or remove inherent risks – against the demands of 
society or their ongoing social obligations: being a mother, partner and employee’ ([jZh, 
p. Zge).  In these readings, at-risk women are seen to be caught between two conflicting 
paradigms; care of their own body and wellbeing and care for the other, a situation in 
which one must, necessarily, outweigh the other. This reading makes for a very narrow 
range of options for women at-risk; she is selfish or selfless, she prefaces the individual 
or the social/collective. As outlined in the introduction and first chapter of this thesis, 
these selfish versus selfless, individual versus social dyads are pervasive within the 
anthropological literature of hereditary cancer syndromes. 
 
I turn instead to what might be on offer, ethnographically and analytically, from an 
attendance to the relational space between persons, which equally resists the blockish 
power of ‘the social.’ Ethnographically, I attend to people’s experiences within the home, 
at the playground, in shopping centres, in cars, at cafes as well as in the clinical settings 
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that feature prominently as the primary ethnographic setting from which current 
anthropological data is drawn and analysed. One immediate problem of the literature 
that I have just described is that it bounds and contains the experience of care as a 
discrete part of life. However, as Mauss ([Zghj] [jZj, p. e in Graeber, [jjZ, p. Zhe) notes, 
‘[t]he first voluntary, contractual relations were not [solely] between individuals, but 
between social groups; “clans, tribes, and families.”’ Nor could such relations have been 
described as restricted to or bounded by one area of social practice, say, politics or 
economics, rather they were ‘total.’ These ‘total prestations’ or ‘total services’ brought 
together domains we might otherwise differentiate as religious, legal, moral, economic, 
or, in the case at hand, medical, or illness induced (Mauss, [Zghj] [jZj, p. W). In this 
instance, restricting data collection to the clinic rather reinforces the view that a single 
illness/medical suite of experiences is the base from which to analyse illness relations, 
gendered obligations and accompanying forms of caregiving. In contrast, my own data 
draws from a broader set of socialites, something which perhaps helps to illuminate the 
range of messy, lived experiences of caring into which knowledge about illness was 
placed and activated. These are small, ordinary, unremarkable contexts, the stuff of 
everyday living with cancer or its threat, as opposed to the high pressure clinical setting 
which women often attended alone.  What comes of an analysis of bodies caring in these 
mundane and everyday contexts is a different notion of care from that discussed or 
observed in the clinic alone. In this view, fleshy partiality is paramount to the circulation 
of care within the family.  
 
The gift’s receiver  
 
A key problem stemming from these approaches to caregiving in the context of 
hereditary cancer, has to do with the single direction in which care is seen to flow. In 
these works, we see one body – the at-risk women – isolated from the collective, whose 
dutiful acts to her kin are then fully equated with the entirety of care occurring within 
the family. Care flows from the woman, ensnared within relations towards which she is 
inclined and for whom she feels responsible. There is little sense in this literature that 
any caring relations might be returned. As my own ethnographic data suggests, 
 Z[` 
circulations of care are difficult to exclude from the ordinary operations of familial life, 
and certainly caregiving within it. The creation of permanent relationships across gene 
and affectively related kin members certainly entails reciprocity. As Mauss ([Zghj] [jZj) 
notes, the demands one side of the gift exchange could make on the other were open-
ended because they were permanent. This is why Mauss ([Zghj] [jZj) considered them 
‘communistic:’ they corresponded with Blanc’s phrase, ‘from each according to his 
abilities, to each according to his needs [sic]’ (ZfhZ in Graeber, [jjZ, p. [Zf). Most of us 
treat our family and closest friends this way, and my informants were involved in 
familial relations in such a mode. No accounts needed to be kept, because these were 
‘timeless relations of open-ended, communistic reciprocity’ (Graeber, [jjZ, p. [Zf). 
These exchanges create a solidarity and enduringness in which no ledgers are required, 
as such relations are treated as though there is no foreseeable end point. In this 
configuration, the giving of a gift that embodies some ‘human quality’ creates 
permanent and enduring relationships. The gift exchange forms an ‘open-ended 
agreement in which each party commits itself to maintaining the life of the other’ 
(Graeber, [jjZ, p. Z`[). The family, Graeber ([jjZ) writes, is the main locus of this form 
of open-ended commitment through gift exchange and, I posit, one of the most 
commonplace forms and sites of giving and receiving care. The family is, as Ochs and 
Kremer-Sadlik ([jjX, p. h) suggest, the ‘prime intimate social unit.’   
 
These particular remarks about gift giving stand in contrast with the paradigmatic 
anthropological literature on the at-risk woman. In these accounts, the at-risk woman 
relentlessly gives to her family and receives nothing in return, largely by reason of her 
gendered position. The benefits do not flow equally. Or the woman might get back 
negative responses, say from her genetic kin, if the information on genetic risk was not 
welcome or well received. This concern is voiced by d’Agincourt Canning and Baird 
([jj`) who see women as unfairly burdened by genetic information on illness 
predisposition on the basis of their gendered roles as caregivers. They write:  
 
in emphasizing the duty to disclose genetic information, most ethical analyses 
appear to be based on relationships between kin who are faceless and 
interchangeable. Yet, because of their care giving roles, women will most likely 
assume this responsibility to a greater extent than men. Although this is part of a 
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social practice that already assigns women disproportionate responsibility for 
family care, justice would require that the burdens as well as the benefits of 
disclosure be distributed fairly (d'Agincourt-Canning & Baird, [jj`, pp. ZZg-Z[j).  
 
But notions of reciprocal gift giving, as Mauss ([Zghj] [jZj) might conceive of them, are 
indeed directly applicable to this figure. She may well, for instance, receive negative 
responses when she provides information to genetic kin, but their reactions may well 
be conceived as negative reciprocity. This reciprocity is of equal return force in response 
to the unwelcome gift, in this case, of unsolicited knowledge of illness risk. As Narotzky 
and Moreno ([jj[, p. [f[) put it, ‘contrary to classical postures concerning a “social 
contract,” we do not believe that negative reciprocity should be framed in terms of an 
absence or transgression of reciprocal relations.’ The figure imagined in the 
anthropological literature that I have just reviewed may well look as though she 
sacrifices herself to give and give, and she may ostensibly appear to receive nothing. She 
might, for instance, make the sacrifice of relinquishing her ovaries so that she cannot 
receive the gift of children. She may array her own choices surrounding risk reduction 
to least impact her family.  She may be the victim of anger and stigma from family 
members for alerting them to their possible genetic risk. But Mauss’ ([Zghj] [jZj) 
insights suggest that she does not go uncompensated, nor is she alone. Indeed, these 
sacrifices of giving to and for the greater good only make sense if the individual is 
regarded precisely as that, the individual. Caregiving, however, resists reduction to 
individualism and neo-liberalism. We need to recognise care as a practice, ‘a daily need 
and a way of living’ that is premised on the recognition of ‘vulnerability, 
interconnectedness, dependency, embodiment and finitude as fundamental 
characteristics of being human’ (Sevenhuijser, [jZe in Martin, et al., [jZh, p. ` [f). What 
would happen to our analysis of care if we were to complicate the analytic neatness of 
the ‘individual’ caregiver? In the following section, I return to themes explored in the 
first half of this thesis, namely, the inherently partial construction of the person and the 
family. In complicating the discrete, bounded at-risk ‘individual’ I set the stage for 
considering how care circulates in the family rather than unidirectional outputs or even 
reciprocal exchanges. Just as the body is made up of partial inputs of others, be they 
through genes or the partial deployment of body parts in concert, care too restricts 
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confinement to a single site of issuance. It is this partiality, of the body and of care, that 
we risk overlooking in our existing approaches to illness experience.  
 
Parts of bodies, parts of care  
 
It is an interesting feature of the gendered terrain that female bodies bear the greater 
social and analytic weight of reproductive matters and the care they involve. Consider 
the words ‘teenage pregnancy.’ Perhaps more often than not, these words conjure the 
singular image of teenage mother who carries, bears and cares for the child. Perhaps 
less present is the teen father, who was equally involved in the conception and often the 
rearing of the child. This trend has been noted upon by Strathern (Zgg[a, Zgg[b) in her 
work on English kinship. In Euro-American kinship, she (Zgg[b, p. [hW) writes, the 
‘mother is recognized; the father, by contrast, is constructed… in short, the mother is 
constituted in her connection with the child, where fatherhood is constituted in his 
relationship to the mother.’ This certainly seems to be the case in the anthropological 
literature pertaining to cancer previvors. The woman who makes caring decisions 
towards others is already very much compelled to do so by dint of her gender. She is the 
one who will supply the ovaries to make that child and the breasts to nourish and 
nurture it. She will bear the responsibility of relinquishing these bodies parts in due 
course and the effects this act may have on her family and children. And yet, as Dudgeon 
and Inhorn ([jjW, p. Zef[) remind us, creating families ‘always involves more than one 
individual,’ it involves people ‘in relationship to each other [my emphasis].’ Perhaps 
reproductive creativity is so confounding to analysts because its consequences are borne 
more obviously in one body than another, as Strathern ([jZZ) suggests. It is clearly the 
case that children are the result of relations with others that come to be internalised 
within the very fabric of a woman’s physical being. It is equally clear, however, that such 
potential cannot realise itself, at least, not in any particularly significant way, except in 
coordination with another. The matter and output of these acts are fundamentally 
social. The same can be said for decisions taken about ‘my’ ovaries or ‘my’ breasts. One 
selfish or selfless ‘individual’ only ostensibly makes these decisions in linear relation 
towards another. 
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The decision to start a family together was something that e[-year-old Jodie and her 
husband considered for a long time. Jodie told me about her and her partner’s collective 
discussion around how to create their family with the knowledge of Jodie’s BRCA[ 
mutation:  
 
We looked into that [pre-implantation genetic diagnosis for BRCAZ/[ gene 
mutations], my husband and I.10 We knew we had BRCA and I was pretty 
determined not to pass it on. I really, really, really didn’t want to pass it on. At the 
time I was about [h, [` and was like ‘let’s do IVF.’ We spoke to a couple of 
geneticists and the PGD people and it was going to cost us, at the time, around 
$Xjjj just to harvest my eggs. I can’t remember the rigmarole but it would have 
been something like four injections for a couple of months and then harvest the 
eggs out. But they can’t promise you that you are not going to produce any eggs 
that don’t have the gene [mutation], so you could produce [j eggs and they all 
have the gene [mutation] or maybe one or two don’t. The next tricky thing is 
whether the eggs will keep so do you put one in and hope for the best or put two 
in for a backup or get twins. It was more uncertain than the BRCA gene. At least 
with BRCA we were told that there was a hj/hj chance that we would pass on the 
cancer gene [mutation]. IVF was just all over the shop, they had no idea. So we 
ummed and ahhed over it for ages, almost lamented over it is probably the right 
word for it and in the end I remember, we were catching a train in [to the fertility 
clinic] as they were located in the city. My husband and I were sitting on the 
platform a bit dejected as we tried to figure out what the plan was, as we were 
overwhelmed about what was the right decision to make. Do we not have kids 
even when we both wanted to have kids? Do we have kids and risk giving them 
the gene [mutation]? Which is what we ended up doing as we had them naturally 
or do we go down this horrendously expensive path… and see if that works? But at 
the time we were [`, we had a mortgage, we had bought a house just after I found 
out I had the BRCA gene. We still had a mortgage, we still were both working full 
time. The genetic specialists were all saying to me ‘it’s a hj/hj chance and in [j 
years, science and medicine are going to be so different you may as well have them 
naturally.’ That’s honestly what we were told so I had kids young to stop me 
getting sick and I just really hope that, if one of them or both of them have it, you 
know, science has changed. 
 
                                                
 
10 Preimplantation genetic diagnosis (PGD) through in vitro fertilisation (IVF) and embryo biopsy was 
created to screen pregnancies for serious and life-threatening genetic diseases such as cystic fibrosis. 
More recently, PGD technology has been extended to test for low penetrance, late onset hereditary cancer 
syndromes such as hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, allowing patients to test embryos for BRCA 
mutations before implantation (Menon, et al., [jjX, p. ZhXe).  
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Together, Jodie and her husband deliberated on the decision as to how and when they 
would have children. While it seems an obvious insight for me to make, the sharedness 
and mutuality of the decision to have children together or not is precisely what is not 
included in most anthropological literature of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. 
Rather, it casts such decisions as solely the responsibility of the at-risk woman as she is 
the bearer and carer of both gene and baby. It is she, in these accounts, who feels the 
pressure to have children at a young age. It is she who has to sacrifice her ability to have 
children at all. It is she who will care for them with all her efforts and energy as a means 
of making up for the genetic mutation they may inherent. Consider the comments made 
by Valerie, as she explained how she and her husband deliberated over having another 
child. After having her first child through IVF, Valerie had her ovaries removed. She 
would have to undergo IVF and hormone treatment to carry a second child: 
 
We already have the eggs ready [from previous IVF cycles]. If I have hormone 
replacement therapy, I can still carry the child [without my ovaries]. [Pre-
implantation genetic diagnosis] was an insane amount of money, so we choose not 
to test [the embryo of their first daughter for a BRCA mutation]. The clinic we 
were using said they had an ‘ethical issue’ with testing for BRCA. We could have 
pushed for it, but we decided we didn’t want to be tested. We didn’t test for our 
first child, so is it unfair to test our next? Part of me wants to do the test for the 
next one, but we don’t have a huge amount of embryos [left], pragmatic as it 
sounds, but if we discard [an embryo] because it is positive [for a BRCAZ mutation], 
we don’t have many left. We don’t have many chances for a future child, we will 
take what we have… Hopefully we will be able to say to our future child why they 
were born [with this mutation]. We are not helping eradicate it and we have to be 
ready to explain our decision to our children with our heads held high. 
Overthinking it wrecks your head. 
 
In this recount, Valerie refers to a ‘we’ who decided whether to undergo PGD, a ‘we’ who 
weighed up the drawbacks of the procedure and its possible flow on effects.  In Valerie’s 
account of family planning, it is not ‘she’ alone making the decisions on how to proceed, 
despite that fact that it will be her body in which the embryo is implanted and it is her 
body that will physically bear their next child. Significantly, this joint input into both 
the creation of the family and the decision to remove parts and reproductive capacities 
of the at-risk women’s bodies is not limited to heteronormative configurations of the 
family. Leanne, for example, explained how she and her partner Jane made a collective 
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decision concerning the risk reduction Leanne would undertake, informed heavily by 
their shared experience of caring for Leanne’s parents:  
 
I think the fact that we had gone through a few things earlier with my mum [made 
things clearer]. She passed away about five years ago now, not due to cancer but 
related to. She had about four or five colonoscopies in a period of three months 
trying to get a biopsy for some suspicious polyps and ended up with a perforated 
bowel. She was in hospital in a coma for about ten days and we didn’t think she 
was going to pull through, but the survivor that she was, she pulled through for 
six months and then she ended up with overwhelming sepsis. They removed her 
bowel but the external part got infected because she had renal problems and was 
on steroids. So we went through that together, and then prior to that, she had 
cancer of the kidney, she had the two breast cancers and a few other bits and 
pieces. And then my father was diagnosed with bowel cancer and so we had had a 
few things to go through, so anything that we could do [to reduce the risk] we 
would do it. My partner just said I can’t cope with you getting cancer, I can’t cope 
with you being sick and I can’t cope with you dying and I can’t cope with the 
children having to go through that so we will do what we have to do and I will 
support you all the way…’ I am so thankful I have a wonderful partner… We work 
to be happy and live our life as full as we can. We make sure our home is filled 
with love. This is not as easy as it sounds. It’s actually hard work and we have to 
remind each other and ourselves all the time 
 
In removing her breasts and her ovaries to reduce the risk of developing cancer like her 
mother, Leanne speaks of a ‘we;’ a ‘we’ who cared for dying parents during multiple 
cancer diagnosis and unsuccessful treatments; a ‘we’ who made the decision to remove 
Leanne’s risky breasts and ovaries; a ‘we’ who created their family of two mothers and 
two sons; a ‘we’ who will support Leanne through her surgeries and recovery and a ‘we’ 
who work hard to fill their family with love and happiness. It would be easy to read 
Leanne’s decision to undergo risk-reducing surgery as a response to her gendered 
responsibility and obligation to her partner Jane and her two sons. She removes her 
body parts so that they will not have to cope with her becoming sick or dying. To do so, 
however, would run the risk of evaluating such decisions as selfish or selfless, and thus 
ignore the joint production of Leanne’s family. 
 
We can take this a step further to consider how, in these accounts, we see an experience 
of the body that is not bounded nor discretely ‘individual.’ What I am suggesting is that 
Jodie’s ovaries, just like Valerie’s uterus, Leanne’s breasts and the materials produced by 
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these parts are not, wholly, their own in the context of their relations and caring. We 
need to take seriously the comments made by Jodie, Valerie and Leanne regarding the 
collective decisions that were made in regards to body productions and body parts that 
are only ostensibly their ‘own.’ In doing so, we can get closer to appreciating how care, 
as a practice, defies the individualising forces that are often ascribed to the at-risk body 
by anthropologists. Recognising the joint production of the family, and of the person is 
a necessary step in acknowledging the circulation of care that operates within the 
familial sphere. My informants’ body parts and their capacities are considered from at 
least a joint perspective. Just as is the case for something I’ve previously termed ‘ovarian 
sociality,’ it is not necessarily an analytic problem that Jodie’s and Leanne’s ovaries or 
Valerie’s uterus are located firmly inside their bodies. The terrain of the interior can 
defy sole ownership. Indeed, the very notion that it cannot depends entirely on our 
recognition of the boundaries of the body as constituting its very parameters. An 
ovarian potentiality, reaching beyond the bounds of the singular, bounded female body 
who bears them, is instead in play here, permitting the collective discussions and 
decision making that characterised the ethnographic interviews I conducted with 
participants. As Birke (Zggg, p. Wh) reminds us, internal organs, tissues and other 
interiors ‘constantly react to change inside or out, and act upon the world.’ Indeed, with 
the advent of medical technologies such as screening, MRIs and ultrasounds, the inside 
of the body has become no more private than its external parts. Scans make the interior 
public and one’s familiars make it shared (Lundin, Zggg, p. Zh).  
 
Merleau-Ponty (Zg`f) has theorised how bodies are effectively ‘completed’ for their 
‘owners’ by others. We may think of our own bodies as precisely that – our own as Billie 
does in the following example. For Merleau-Ponty (Zg`f), however, the fact that one’s 
own body cannot be held in one’s own self-conscious attention made the body socially 
constructed in the most fundamental of ways. The see-ers and those seen are 
inextricably intertwined with one another:  
 
As soon as we see other seers we no longer have before us only the look without a 
pupil, the plate of glass of the things with that feeble reflection, that phantom of 
ourselves they evoke by designating a place among themselves from whence we 
see them: henceforth through other eyes we are ourselves fully visible; that lacuna, 
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where our eyes, our back, lie, is filled, filled still by the visible, of which we are not 
the titulars. (Merleau-Ponty, Zg`f, p. ZWe).   
 
Elements of this complex idea are drawn out by Toombs ([jjZ, p. X). ‘One’s experiential 
awareness of the body,’ she writes ‘is limited in a variety of ways.’ The body’s 
‘orientational locus’ makes it impossible for one to visually apprehend all aspects of their 
body directly; ‘I cannot walk around my body to view the back’ (Toombs, [jjZ, p. X). 
Exactly the same can be said for the way the internal body and its capacities are 
absolutely seen, often by externally located expert see-ers. In the act of seeing what the 
bearer of the body cannot – either because it is out of her own sight, or because she 
must disregard seeing herself in order to move about competently in the world – these 
other see-ers, come to complete it for her. In terms of the first idea, that one cannot see 
one’s own back except by recourse to extra visual equipment and effort, I have direct 
experience. I have a cluster of freckles in the middle of my upper back which my family 
call my ‘dragonfly tattoo.’ Unless I make an explicit attempt to see this mark, positioning 
myself in front of the mirror at the correct angle, I am mostly unaware of this feature to 
which my familial others are so accustomed.  
 
Even in circumstances in which the body is not under specific visual regard, and even 
when it is not a whole body being unreflexively filled in by other see-ers, Merleau-
Ponty’s (Zg`f) sense that bodies are not discrete entities, stands. Indeed, bodies may be 
completed by others who do not even regard themselves as consciously filling in such 
bodies as we can see in the example of Billie. Twenty-eight-year-old Billie, who carries 
a BRCA[ mutation, found out about her mutation status when she was [h. Her mother 
was diagnosed with breast cancer when she was e[ and underwent chemotherapy and 
a mastectomy. Billie decided to have a risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy and 
reconstruction with implants not long after testing positive for the same mutation as 
her mother.  
 
Billie’s family had some opinions on Billie’s breasts which, up till now, had remained in 
the background. Even as they became nameable discrete parts that could be discussed 
as medically problematic, Billie’s family continued to understand her breasts as socially 
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connected to the bodies of others – even as sick parts, they could not be disconnected 
from others. Although in this state of possible disease, Billie’s breasts were 
indistinguishable from Billie and from her current and potential social relations, as they 
were for Billie herself. She explained:   
 
My family were somewhat supportive. There were some that questioned my choice 
[to remove my breasts] and thought that I would regret it and they kept saying 
like ‘wait till you have kids, wait till you have kids,’ but my whole thing was I want 
to be around to have kids and stay around and they were worried because I was 
not married and I wasn’t in a relationship… I don’t know, to me, it made more 
sense to do it before I got into that because that way I wouldn’t change in the 
middle, like I would be what I would be forever, at the start, and that would be 
okay. 
 
It is worth noting here that medical advice led to Billie having her breasts removed. 
Clearly, the medical call necessarily sees potentially diseased breasts as sick parts that 
must be removed.  Of course, medical and social priorities can sometimes be different 
as Abram (Zgg`) informs us. The body parts separated and diagrammed by medicine 
and biology, he writes, are experienced differently from the body as lived (Abram, Zgg`). 
As Abram explains:  
 
This breathing body… is very different from that complex machine whose broken 
parts or stuck systems are diagnosed by our medical doctors and ‘repaired’ by our 
medical technologies. Underneath the anatomized and mechanical body that we 
have learned to conceive… dwells the body as it actually experiences things, this 
poised and animate power that initiates all our projects and suffers all our passions 
(Abram, Zgg`, p. W). 
 
However, as her family members’ responses suggest, even when Billie’s body was 
diagnosed as at-risk and became medically present as broken parts, it was still nigh on 
impossible for near located others to see it that way. Billie’s family continued to 
complete her body for her, in and through its present and potential relations with 
others, including those yet unborn – in the form of eggs.  
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In these comments we see that Billie’s body is indeed her own – hers to intervene in and 
upon – as she decides to remove her breasts before she finds a partner or has children.11  
As will be expanded upon in Chapter Four, Billie experienced her body and its potential 
social relations as becoming increasingly present in her attention. She could no longer 
dwell in the comfortable disattendance and habituality of her body as she worried about 
its cancerous potential and its ability to relate with others in the future. Billie’s natal 
family, however, also experienced the dys-appearance of Billie’s body to use Leder’s term 
(Zggj). They worried that the key connective tissue in the maternal relationship, the 
breasts, would be absent from the relationship Billie would have with her children, and 
that she and the child might be poorer for their absence. They seemed equally to worry 
that breasts would factor in the caring relation between husband and wife or her 
capabilities to secure a partner. The usually unreflected upon parts of Billie’s body 
became a central concern for Billie’s family. Overall, they worried that Billie was taking 
decisions about her body in the absence of the socialites that would provide necessary, 
fundamental context to those decisions – if she made them in isolation, she’d ‘regret it.’ 
Billie operationalised an alternative understanding of her future, one in which her body 
would return to a state of disattendance and habituality. For Billie, and for her family, 
her body and its functions and capacities had become too present, a source of 
consternation and worry.  
 
In removing her breasts, Billie worked to return her body to a state of disattendence for 
herself but also her family. In removing parts of her ostensibly ‘individual’ body, Billie 
hoped that is would fade back into insignificance, as a vital yet unreflected upon aspect 
                                                
 
11 Billie spoke to me about her attempts to have her eggs frozen before undergoing her risk-reducing 
mastectomy. Her hopes of having her eggs frozen, however, were thwarted by the cost of the procedure 
and the fact that she did not, yet, have cancer: ‘I got denied right away for [egg freezing], they were like 
“no that’s not going to happen,” that wasn’t covered at all and then I tried to go through… someone 
connected me with another organisation that helps to fund women to preserve their eggs and help 
eliminate some of that financial load because it so much money. It’s ridiculous, I called every reproductive 
or infertility doctor that we could find and they said, “oh well when she gets cancer we will help her.” Isn’t 
that kind of backwards? I’m doing this so that I don’t get cancer but I still want the option to have kids 
so it’s like how much cancer are we talking, how much cancer do I have to have.’ 
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of her day-to-day life. Yet Billie’s body was still, profoundly, a body located within social 
relations. Billie’s family likewise worried about the increasing presence of Billie’s body 
and that the absence of its ability to breastfeed or connect with her future husband, 
would ironically render it present. Billie thought otherwise. Her body would be the 
orbital disc in a sociality arranged around absence of certain parts but the presence of a 
person. This, she optimistically mused, would attract the best of husbands. She joked 
about the arrival of such a candidate, wondering aloud, ‘how do you start handling 
dating like when do I tell you I have fake boobs?’ In other words, Billie was never without 
sociality, and never without something we might call breasted (or in other cases, 
ovarian) sociality. Her body, like all of ours, was not and could never be ‘her own’ – it 
was completed by see-ers and feel-ers both present and in the future. Billie was and is, 
as Merleau-Ponty (Zg`f) suggests, fundamentally constructed and completed in concert 
with others.  
 
Further, as Billie’s comments suggests, already existing or future circulations of care 
issuing from parts of bodies to the parts of other familial bodies, as Lyon and Barbalet 
(ZggW) advance, are not necessarily compromised or diminished by the removal of these 
parts integral to breasted or ovarian socialities. Rather, Billie is concerned about 
protecting her ability to cultivate new socialities of care with her possible future 
husband and children, of creating a familial body together that is not impaired by a 
constantly present, dys-appearing body. It does not matter, for Billie, that these 
socialities centred upon her body and its partial relations are not yet in existence. In 
fact, these future socialities of care she surmises will be more genuine as her partner 
will accept her body as a locus of love and will reciprocate care regardless of its altered 
form. Despite appearing as a bounded, discrete body all of Billie’s own, her experience 
of preparing for risk-reducing surgery and her family’s concern for her wellbeing 
bespeak the co-construction of the body and the seemingly ‘individualised’ decisions 
pertaining to it.  
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Re-reading the clinical encounter  
 
To underscore this alternative reading of care and the body, I include a somewhat 
lengthy extract from my fieldwork notes, detailing a consultation I observed at a cancer 
genetics and prevention clinic in Boston. Susan’s body, like Leanne’s, Valerie’s, and 
Jodie’s was not, solely, her own nor was the flow of her care unidirectional, even though 
it presented precisely as such at Dr Turkle’s consultation rooms. At the time of the 
consultation, Susan was in her late thirties, worked as a receptionist and had yet to be 
tested for a BRCA mutation. After introductions, Dr Turkle skimmed over her file. ‘So 
you were referred here today to talk about your risk of breast and ovarian cancer?’ ‘I 
want to be proactive,’ Susan asserted, ‘I have three young boys, two with special needs 
who are nine and six and the youngest who is one. I need to know about my risk.’ Dr 
Turkle began, as was common practice in the genetic counselling sessions I observed, 
with taking Susan’s family history. Susan’s maternal grandmother passed away from 
stomach cancer. Her maternal aunt was diagnosed with breast cancer in her early forties 
that later metastasised to her brain and she died aged WX. Her maternal cousin was also 
diagnosed with breast cancer at Wj but tested negative for the BRCA gene mutations. 
Two other maternal cousins tested positive for a BRCA mutation though Susan could 
not remember the specifics of either mutation. When asked about her father, Susan said 
that she did not know much about his health or family, as he left her mother and siblings 
when she was a child. Susan’s mother passed away when Susan was a teenager from liver 
sclerosis, a result of an addiction to pain medication and alcohol. ‘They did an autopsy 
on her body,’ she recalled, ‘but I don’t think they found any cancer. Maybe because she 
died so young it didn’t have a chance [to develop].’ Susan’s brother died when he was 
[e from endocarditis caused by a pain medication addiction that began in his teenage 
years. Susan’s sister, aged eW, is currently healthy. ‘It doesn’t look good for me does it 
doc?’ Susan sighed, as she counted the number of symbols on her genealogy marked by 
a diagonal line.   
 
‘Don’t fret,’ Dr Turkle replied. After explaining the categories of low, high and super-
high risk for hereditary cancer, he suggested that she was likely to have around a [h% 
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chance of having a BRCAZ or BRCA[ gene mutation. ‘But that is still quite high,’ Susan 
responded as she poured over her family history rendered into squares and circles 
before her. ‘They said I had a Z% chance of having my boys the way they are, and I did,’ 
she said with a nervous laugh. ‘But what if I have surgery, will that get rid of that [risk]?’ 
‘Woah,’ Dr Turkle replied with a chuckle, ‘I wasn’t going to get to that for another few 
minutes. You come late and hit hard.’ Susan offered a sheepish grin and said:  
 
Do it, take it all out. I am done having children. I am sad if I give it [the gene 
mutation] to my kids, but if I am positive, I am going to get rid of them [breasts], 
and get a brand new set. I have already nursed three kids, I am done. I already had 
two C-sections and I was fine, I have read the stats, I am happy with taking it all… 
I mean I pray that I don’t have the gene, I pray we don’t have that gene. But we are 
a small family you see, my boys don’t have much, I can’t go anywhere! 
 
Dr Turkle assured Susan that, if the need were to arise, they could help her reach the 
right emotional state of mind to remove her breasts and ovaries. ‘But I was in the right 
state of mind a few years ago,’ Susan proclaimed, ‘I was ready but then I got pregnant 
with my next boy and things just got away from us. I have thought about it for a long 
time.’ Dr Turkle seemed eager to steer the conversation away from surgery and back to 
ordering a genetic test. He recommended that, rather than doing the single site testing 
for the BRCA mutations, Susan undergo a panel test that examines DNA for [h different 
mutations linked to familial cancer syndromes and other hereditary diseases. Susan 
seemed ambivalent about panel testing. They had taken their oldest son, she told us, to 
be tested when he was a few years old to try and figure out what was causing his 
developmental delays:  
 
They did this whole test and it cost us like $Zhjj and after all of that he came back 
negative. It was a bit of a surprise, we thought it might help figure things out, to 
get help... My husband and I joke that I gave him my ADD and he gave him his 
ADHD and together it produced autism. We think that he inherited all of our bad 
traits and then they were amplified! But the tests showed nothing. So then we had 
our second son and it turned out that he was affected too. With my older boy, it 
was more obvious from the beginning, but with the second you wouldn’t know to 
look at him, but gosh the meltdowns, they are so much worse… If we had known 
that it was going to be like this, maybe we would have stopped after the first, which 
I know sounds horrible, but… it is hard and expensive, you know. But then we had 
the third, and he is fine. 
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Dr Turkle nodded sympathetically. There is a mutation that occurs in the gene ataxia-
telangiectasia, he explained, that some researchers believe may be linked to both an 
increased risk of breast and other cancers and developmental disorders such as autism. 
The panel test, he suggested, does look for this specific mutation and may offer some 
information about the link between her family history of cancer and her sons’ 
developmental delays.  
 
Tugging on the skin of her neck, Susan paused for a moment before replying. ‘I think… 
well I do want to know whether the cancer and the autism, whether it might be linked 
but I am worried… the boys already are different, will it [the knowledge of a mutation] 
affect them in the future, like their ability to get jobs or insurance?’ Massachusetts State 
Law, Dr Turkle explained, protects patients against genetic discrimination but if she 
was concerned, there were things that could be done. If Susan tested positive to a 
specific mutation, her sons could, when they are of age, request to be tested for that 
single mutation at the out-of-pocket cost of $[jj. By doing so, they would bypass the 
insurance companies and thus be able to ‘own the information.’ ‘But with testing,’ Dr 
Turkle concluded, ‘we can benefit your health acutely compared to how much we can 
damage it from insurance issues. The panel will allow us to track mutations and provide 
information for future generations of your family.’ Pausing for a moment, Susan decided 
that she will have the panel test and signed the consent form for her blood to be drawn. 
When her test results were returned from the laboratory, it was revealed that Susan 
carried a mutated ataxia-telangiectasia gene (ATM), one of the more recent gene 
mutations linked to hereditary cancer syndromes. It is currently unclear as to the role 
of ATM mutations in breast cancer etiology however, at the time, Susan made another 
appointment to begin the process of risk reduction through surgery (Mangone, et al., 
[jZh).  
 
Despite being younger than the age recommended for these surgical interventions 
Susan was prepared, and had been for some time, to remove her breasts 
prophylactically. Susan considered the removal of significant bodily parts worth it 
because it would assure her ability to continue being a part of her family, to care for and 
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be a presence in the lives of her sons and her partner. These body parts in particular, 
have been important in creating and maintaining the relationality Susan experiences 
with her children and her partner. They are the breasts that nourished her three sons. 
But they have done their job in this sense. As she told us; ‘I am going to get rid of them 
and get a brand new set. I have already nursed three kids I am done.’ Susan recognised 
how she and her partner are fundamentally entwined in the bodies of their sons, having 
passing on their traits to them for better or worse. In being tested for a genetic mutation, 
Susan may receive information about her own health and the cause of the 
developmental difficulties her sons’ experience. Yet to solicit such information, Susan 
surmised, may impact the care her sons receive in the future, putting them at risk of 
discrimination by marking them as different and vulnerable. Susan had already 
experienced the disappointment of a genetic test that she hoped would open up avenues 
for accessing support and care. Or she worried, it may impact on her family’s ability to 
care and be cared for in the future were they to be denied insurance.  
 
There are certainly both external social and economic structures that exercise control 
over Susan’s life and what is at stake for her in undergoing genetic testing and risk-
reducing surgery. Susan and her husband bear the brunt of care for their sons. Susan 
has a diminished family network of support as a result of hereditary cancer and drug 
addiction. Nakano Glenn ([jZj) is one of a number of scholars who have argued that 
women, especially women of poor and racial minorities, often shoulder the 
responsibility and many burdens associated with caregiving. ‘The social organisation of 
care,’ Nakano Glenn ([jZj, p. h) argues, is steeped with such multifarious forms of 
coercion that often it is women who ‘assume responsibility for caring for family 
members.’ Certainly, the practice of sustained caregiving is no easy feat, a reality Susan 
recognises in her own experiences of caring for her children with developmental delays. 
Caregiving is hard, as Susan proclaims. It is relentless, requiring time, energy, resources, 
money, unfaltering commitment and resolve (Kleinman, [jZh). It can produce tensions 
between people, within families and the broader community that can leave the caregiver 
and their loved ones vulnerable. Susan is aware of these risks, voicing concern over her 
children’s possible discrimination if they were to carry a genetic mutation. Yet it would 
be misleading to think of Susan’s determination to undergo risk-reducing surgery and 
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thus ensure her ability to partake in family life as merely the result of an externally 
imposed set of conditions. It is not enough to say that Susan is being coerced into caring 
for her sons and partner as a result of her status obligation as mother and wife. Modes 
of subjectivity, write Biel, Good and Kleinman ([jjX, p. ZW) are certainly influenced by 
external forces, ‘the vagaries of the state, family and community hierarchies… 
medicoscientific experiments and markets.’ Yet this does not mean that one’s actions 
are only the result of socialised and inherently gendered regimes of control. I think we 
can read Susan’s concerns about undergoing genetic testing as an example of the 
messiness of care in the meshwork of the family. This view of care is more complex than 
wholly generosity or self-interest; of Susan being selfish if she was to decline testing or 
self-sacrificing by putting her family over and above her needs.    
 
Mesh-work 
 
To appreciate the messiness of care experienced by cancer previvors such as Susan, we 
need to think of a fleshiness that is a little beyond the reach of the Maussian version of 
reciprocity. We could easily fit Susan’s experiences of caregiving into a Maussian 
reading of the gift. Susan will remove her breasts to ensure her ability to care for her 
family in the future and they, in return, will care for her as she recovers from surgery. 
But what if, as Susan worried, her sons are unable to receive or give care in the future 
on the basis of their mutation status and intellectual disabilities? What if her small 
family was to lose yet another member to cancer or disease? Who would care then? Here 
is the problem with a strictly Maussian reading of care as a gift exchange as it suggests 
that the ability to reciprocate equally and in kind is necessary for the solidarity-
enhancing exchange to occur. However, if we consider the notion of care as a resource 
that flows within the ‘meshwork’ of the familial body, as something that both creates 
and maintains it, we can come to appreciate the reciprocity of care in a more fluid sense 
(Ingold, [jjf, p. Zfj`).  
 
In his work on lines, Ingold ([jjf, p. Zfj`) posits the idea of meshwork to describe the 
ways in which humans relate with one another and the environment. I think this 
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concept of meshwork is applicable for understanding the partial construction of the 
person and the family. Humans, Ingold ([jjf, p. Zfj`) posits, are not ‘externally 
bounded entities’ relating in a network but are better understood as ‘bindles of 
interwoven lines of growth and movement, together constituting a meshwork in fluid 
space.’ We can read Susan’s experiences of care as illustrative of this idea of meshwork. 
The skin, Ingold ([jjf) writes, appears to us as a singular, discrete unit. To a ‘casual 
observer,’ it is a ‘coherent, continuous surface…’ encasing an ‘individual’ within it 
(Ingold, [jjf, p. Zfj`). If we are to look more closely, however, we see that the skin is 
a ‘texture formed of a myriad fine threads, tightly interlaced.’ As such, Ingold purports, 
the skin: 
 
like the land, is not an impermeable boundary but a permeable zone of 
intermingling and admixture, where traces can reappear as threads and vice 
versa… It is not, then, that organisms are entangled in relations. Rather, every 
organism – indeed, every thing [sic] – is itself, as they become tied up with other 
strands, in other bundles, make up the meshwork… Let us imagine the living 
being, then, not as a self-contained object like a ball that can propel itself from 
place to place, but as an ever-ramifying bundle of lines of growth (Ingold, [jjf, 
p. Zfj`) 
 
Susan’s body, just like Ingold’s ([jjf, p. Zfj`) skin, is not a discrete ‘self-contained 
object.’ Her body is not fully her own, neither are her partner’s or son’s.’ Not only do 
they share genes, such as the mutated genes for cancer or the genes for ‘my ADD’ and 
‘his ADHD,’ they partake in a shared and circulating sociality of the care that constitutes 
their very being. It is crucial for Susan that her family, her ‘small family,’ goes on in the 
face of depleted resources of care – missing grandparents, uncles, aunts and so forth. 
For Susan, it is vital that the flow of care that she helped to create and in which she 
partakes, keeps circulating through partial bodily engagements. Despite how hard, 
time-consuming and tiring caring is, it is more important to Susan than the opportunity 
to possibly discover the genetic cause for their misfortune. We could easily see Susan as 
a bounded, discrete individual, the central node of a network of care, in which she 
directs her care out to her sons and to her partner that may or may not be reciprocated. 
In doing this, Susan could be seen to fulfil her gendered responsibility to nurture. I think 
however that we can reconsider how Susan, and other at-risk women, experience 
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themselves and the circulation of care in the family as a form of meshwork.  In attuning 
to the ‘intermingling and admixture’ of partial bodies that care for each other in 
complex and multi-directional ways, we can come to appreciate how the multitude of 
messy strands of caring bundle together to create both a familial body and the person 
that is formed by these relationships. 
 
Techniques du corp 
 
To flesh out how care operates to create and maintain the meshwork of the family, I 
begin with another of Mauss’ ([Zgeh]ZgXe) key concepts, techniques of the body. 
Attending more evidently to these partial relations that persist between caring, 
enmeshed bodies also serves to further disrupt the notion of the bounded female patient 
who wholly and unilineally delivers her care out to others. These intricacies of care are 
something that we do not get much of a sense of in the literature that draws its data 
primary from the clinical encounter alone. We rarely get a sense of the day-to-day caring 
for someone with cancer or someone recovering for preventative surgeries. In accounts 
based solely on clinical data, we often get a version of care that is, as Brenner ([jjZ, p. 
ehe) submits, treated as if it was ‘merely sentiment or attitude, void of cognition, skill 
and particularised relationships.’ Care, in its fleshed out form, is attuned to specific care 
practices that ‘contain within them knowledge and skill about everyday human needs 
for recognition, nurturance, shelter, food, hygiene, protection’ and so on (Martin, et al., 
[jZh, p. `[h). Importantly, for this thesis, it is this embodied ‘doing of care’ in its often 
messy and inchoate forms that creates and maintains the meshwork of both person and 
familial body (Kleinman, [jZh, p. [Wj).  
 
In deploying this expression, techniques du corp, Mauss ([Zgeh]ZgXe, p. Xh) meant to 
indicate ‘the ways in which from society to society men [sic] know how to use their 
bodies… the body is man’s first and most natural instrument… [M]an’s first and most 
natural technical object, and at the same time technical means, is his body.’ This body 
is communicative, beyond speech. This communicative body may be recognised, as 
Jackson ([jZe, p. hh) notes, ‘in the way our earliest memories are usually sensations or 
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direct impressions rather than words or ideas, and refer to situated yet not spoken 
events.’ Jackson ties Mauss’ techniques of the body to relations, to other bodies and 
things, noting that, ‘habits are interactional and tied to an environment of objects and 
others’ ([jZe, p. `[). He continues:   
 
Forms of body use ('techniques du corps') are conditioned by our relationships 
with others, such as the way bodily dispositions which we come to regard as 
'masculine' or 'feminine' are by our parents and peers encouraged and reinforced 
in us as mutually exclusive patterns ([jZe, p. `[). 
 
These learnt communicating and communicable gestures or ‘techniques du corps’ are, 
as Merleau-Ponty (Zg`[) critically asserts, profoundly and inherently relational. They 
bespeak the: 
 
reciprocity of my intentions and the gestures of others, of my gestures and 
intentions discernible in the conduct of other people. It is as if the other person's 
intention inhabited my body and mine his [sic]… There is a mutual confirmation 
between myself and others… The act by which I lend myself to the spectacle must 
be recognized as irreducible to anything else. I join it in a kind of blind recognition 
which precedes the intellectual working out and clarification of the meaning 
(Merleau-Ponty, Zg`[, p. fh). 
  
Families are a key site of Merleau-Ponty’s (Zg`[) communicable and reciprocal gestures. 
These techniques of the body, come to inhabit the fleshy collective, the meshwork, of 
the familial body. Young ([jj[) has explored how, in particular, these family 
dispositions are inscribed on and enmeshed in the body. The embodied habits of the 
family, Young ([jj[, p. [`) writes, are a crucial way in which the child learns to be in 
the world. Bodies memorise and learn the family’s way of being in the world and as such 
‘the body is one of our family traditions’ (Young, [jj[, p. [`). This enmeshed familial 
body stretches across temporalities, constituted of others from past, present and future.  
Held in this familial body are the ‘ghosts’ of one’s ancestors. Body parts such as breasts 
and ovaries come to inhabit and be inhabited by ‘other images’ as we saw in the 
preceding chapter – bodies are primary co-constituted (Young, [jj[, p. Wh). This 
inhabitancy of our body by parts of others, this entanglement of tissues, is a ‘constant 
[and] persistent familiar’ in our everyday lives (Young, [jj[, p. Wh). Enmeshed bodily 
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relations, as previously discussed in reference to Ingold ([jjf), are enabled by the 
permeability of the skin and the thickness of the flesh (Merleau-Ponty, Zg`[). ‘[B]etween 
my body looked at and my body looking, my body touched and my body touching,’ 
writes Merleau-Ponty (Zg`[, p. ZWZ), ‘there is overlapping encroachment, so that we must 
say that the things pass into us as well as we into the things.’ While the skin may 
ostensibly mark the boundary between the bodies, it is ultimately permeable, as both 
Merleu-Ponty (Zg`[) and Ingold ([jjf) suggest. Techniques of the body, such as those 
involved in caring, demonstrate the permeability between what are only ostensibly 
bounded bodies (Thrift, [jjj, p. ef). The body praxis that make us up ‘have come down 
to and inhabit us, passing into our being, passing our being back and forth between 
bodies and passing our beings on’ (Thrift, [jjj, p. ef). It is these partial bodily 
exchanges, these bodily techniques of care, that constitute the meshwork of the familial 
body.  
 
We need to expand on Mauss’ ([Zgeh]ZgXe) perspective on techniques of the body to 
appreciate the body as active and intercommunicative in the meshwork of familial care. 
In Mauss’ scheme, Lyon (ZggX, pp. fg-gj) writes, ‘there is no general representation of 
the place of emotions in social life.’ For Mauss, she writes, ‘the social conditioning of 
bodily techniques is harnessed to the rationalist enterprise’ (Lyon, ZggX, pp. fg-gj). His 
view of techniques of the body overlooks what Lyon (ZggX) considers to be a crucial 
element of what activates bodies towards and in syncopation with familial others. 
‘Active bodies’ writes Lyon (ZggX, p. gj), ‘are emotional bodies; emotion is embodied.’ 
Attending to emotion, Lyon (ZggX) submits, enables an appreciation of the sociality of 
bodies beyond biological and physiological explanations. By addressing emotion as a 
force impelling parts of bodies to act in collectivity, we can come to appreciate how 
body techniques play a crucial role in sustaining the family. Bodily capacities driven by 
emotion are fundamentally involved in this creation and structuring of relationality as 
Lyon reminds us:  
 
The body, after all, is the instrument of perception and the experience of feeling... 
Indeed, the concept of emotion includes bodily, cognitive and other components 
which are implicated in the evaluation of experience both external and internal… 
[B]odily aspects of emotion cannot be separated out from social action more 
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generally because they partly constitute that action, and this action is part of what 
constitutes emotion (Lyon, ZggX, p. g`). 
  
Emotion is thereby, for Lyon (ZggX), a key part of social relations that are likewise 
constituted through bodily means. Taking lead from Lyon (ZggX), I argue that care is 
both a driving emotion and a bodily technique crucial to the social relations of the 
family. Sociality, Lyon (ZggX, p. gZ) concludes, is embodied in complex ways because 
‘society exists partly as bodies in relation.’ Social relations, she writes, entail ‘emotion in 
both its phenomenal and physical aspects’ (Lyon, ZggX, p. gX). Basic bodily functions 
and processes, the ‘machinery’ of our body, may appear on the surface as having little 
to do with the ‘interactive exchanges’ that make up the entanglements Ingold ([jjf) 
describes. In developing upon Lyon’s (ZggX, p. gZ) findings, we can reappraise the 
concept of emotion to understand the sociality of bodily functions that would otherwise 
appear solely biological. In taking a more critical and attentive approach to the body’s 
mechanisms, including its affective orders, we can come to appreciate the role of the 
body as both physical and phenomenological in fostering sociality and care.  
 
The collective yield of Lyon (ZggX), Mauss ([Zgeh]ZgXe), Merleau-Ponty (Zg`[) and 
Ingold’s ([jjf) thinking here is that bodiliness can unite and form the grounds of an 
emphatic sociality. Bodily techniques driven by the emotion of care and caring both 
constitute and sustain the family. Following Lyon and Barbalet’s (ZggW) technical 
understanding of how, exactly, this comes to pass, I argue that the partial relations 
between bodies enact and maintain both the collective of person and family in some 
sort of social unity – a meshwork of care. Techniques of and for this social body are both 
the bearers of and receptors for ‘care.’ This circulation of care proceeds from and to a 
social body and thus cannot issue from one whole individual to another whole 
individual. Care flows in and through the partial, fleshy relations of the family, driven 
by emotion. Caring is thus a form of bodily engagement, a necessary act of relationality 
that treats the person not as an isolated and bounded entity but as an ‘entanglement, a 
tissue of knots’ (Ingold, [jjX, p. ZjZ). In recognising the ‘ever-ramifiying’ knotty 
entanglement of relations in the meshwork of the family, we also create a space in which 
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we appreciate the very messiness and inchoateness of caring in the everyday as was 
described to my informants (Ingold, [jjX, p. ZjZ).  
 
Enfleshed, enmeshed care  
 
In the following ethnographic excerpts, I detail the ways in which at-risk women 
described their experiences of care. In these examples, we see care in the messy 
meshwork of relations, variously arrayed. These accounts challenge assumptions on 
caregiving as neatly or lineally array and accompanied by an expectation of reciprocity. 
Laura underwent her risk-reducing mastectomy about a year after giving birth to her 
first daughter. Working at a pet rescue mission, Laura was able to take time of work to 
recover after her surgery and her husband took leave to help care for them. ‘He was 
amazing’ Laura told me:  
 
He knew [about the mutation] as soon as I did. We talked about it before [the 
surgery] and how we would be but he said he would much rather do this and have 
me around for longer. He was with me when we watched mum die and he said he 
never wanted to see me go through that. So he has been amazing. He helped me 
tape my scars and everything and if I am not doing something right, like I wasn’t 
doing my exercises, he would be like ‘have you done your exercises?’ He was really 
on to it, I didn’t have a choice [to slack off] as he was on my back, which was really 
good. 
 
This scenario of care seems very different to the accounts of the at-risk woman 
sacrificing her own needs and wellbeing to fulfil her obligations and responsibilities to 
her familial others. Nor does it fit within a model in which Laura, having been cared for 
by her husband, now has a debt of care to be repaid.  In this instance, care flowed in a 
multitude of directions within the family, circulating between Laura, her husband, her 
child and her dying mother. Together they cared for Laura’s mother and grieved after 
her death.  Laura’s husband took time away from his work to help care for Laura after 
her surgery and made efforts to remind her to do her physical therapy even as her 
enthusiasm waned. His hands reached out to her torso, covering her surgical scars with 
protective tape and it was he who reminded her to take care of herself and her ability to 
move post-surgery.  
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Fifty-year-old Bree, a BRCAZ mutation carrier, described to me her extensive family 
history of breast and ovarian cancer. Her mother, Hilary, developed breast cancer when 
Bree was only two years old. Hilary underwent a radical mastectomy and total 
hysterectomy but developed primary peritoneal cancer [h years later, passing away in 
ZggZ. Three of Bree’s aunts passed away from breast and ovarian cancer, all before the 
age of `j. Bree’s six first cousins contracted breast cancer as well as ovarian and 
peritoneal cancer. They all passed away between the ages of e[ and W[. Bree decided to 
be tested when two of her cousins found they were positive for BRCAZ: 
 
Unfortunately, my test came back positive for BRCAZ as well… It is weird but I 
expected the result to be positive so when they told me, I didn't really feel 
anything. It was like ‘I knew it.’ It was a bit of a shock seeing it on paper but I 
wasn't upset or freaked out. I knew I was going to test positive! The most major 
impact was growing up with it all around me. I was two when my mother was 
diagnosed with breast cancer and I still remember bits of that time. I remember 
visiting my mother in hospital and going with her in the pram to have scans done 
and seeing her go into the big machine. I apparently started stuttering at this time 
out of nowhere which I think must have been caused by the stress at the time, as 
I overcame that before I went to school. I remember my aunt being diagnosed with 
terminal liver cancer when I was ZZ. She had undiagnosed breast cancer (in both 
breasts apparently) that had already spread. It was an awful time! My mother made 
her fruit salad every day as it was all she could keep down and we made cassette 
tapes for her to brighten her days. I remember yet another aunt being diagnosed 
with breast cancer when I was ZW. She had six children. I saw her go through it all 
as well and pass away when I was ZX. I saw my beautiful cousin who was only e[ 
go downhill from her advanced cancer. She was told it was a ‘blocked duct’ as she 
was breast feeding at the time. The doctors wouldn't refer her for a mammogram 
at all. The same thing happened to my cousin who passed away last year from 
ovarian and breast cancer at W`. 
 
Ever since she was a toddler accompanying her mother to her breast cancer treatment, 
Bree has partaken in the bodily acts of care that created and maintained the meshwork 
of her family. When her aunt become ill, it was Bree and her mother who tried their 
best to bring her comfort, making tapes and food with the hope of rendering her hospice 
more bearable. In all the pain and suffering that Bree’s family experienced because of 
hereditary cancer, they continued with their best efforts to provide the small and 
everyday acts of caring for one another. Care did not issue forth from Bree to her dying 
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aunt, mother or cousins to be reciprocated in due course. This was not possible. No 
ledger was kept of who owed whom care. What we see in Bree’s family is a sociality of 
care, of family trying to comfort each other in the face of death. As family members 
died, others came to take up their cares. Care continued to flow throughout the family 
despite its many losses. Care constituted their very familial body in the partial and 
practical acts of helping each other; witnessing, recognising and participating in the 
prolonged pain and suffering of a cancer diagnosis. These flows are illustrative of care 
in the meshwork of the family.  
  
For Jo, Wg-years-old, risk-reducing surgery came with unexpected complications. Over 
the space of a year, Jo underwent seven surgeries beginning with her mastectomy and 
ending with her hysterectomy. During this time, she also underwent reconstructive 
procedures to correct her post-mastectomy infection, necrosis and hematoma: 
 
This period has affected my nuclear family a lot as I have been in the hospital or 
recovering a lot.  My husband shouldered much of the house and childcare duties 
during this time. Having my mastectomy was psychologically a relief but 
physically difficult. The post-surgical complications have been very difficult to live 
through. 
 
We could easily read Jo’s experience of recovery as suggestive of the iatrogenic 
consequences of at-risk women undergoing surgery to fulfil the gendered responsibility 
they have to care for their family. But this reading leaves very little room for appreciating 
the flow of care as it circulates in and through the meshwork of the familial body. Karen, 
aged We, had a similar experience of an unexpectedly long recovery after surgery.  On 
the surface, it would appear that Karen’s experience fits nicely with the Maussian notion 
of the gift. Karen sacrificed her body parts, her breasts and ovaries, to mitigate her risk 
of cancer, and thus continue the life she built with her husband. Her husband in return, 
reciprocated this gesture by caring for her while she convalesced for what was expected 
to be six-week recovery period. But this tidy theory of exchange masks the messy, 
complex realties of care permeating the meshwork of Karen’s family. Upon return from 
hospital, Karen found that her body, particularly her chest muscles, struggled to accept 
her implants. She started to experience full body spasms. For two months she was at 
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home bed-ridden. During this time, she contracted an infection that put her in a 
hospital isolation ward for two weeks. Medical staff and her husband could only enter 
her room in full surgical attire. After her hospitalisation, her husband gave up his job to 
be her full-time carer. Although she was told by her doctors that this severe reaction 
was likely to occur if she was to have her ovaries removed, Karen had scheduled the 
procedure for the month following our interview. Karen knew that, given the difficulty 
she had in recovering from her mastectomy, she was likely to once again need her 
husband’s help to recover. Together they had made the decision that Karen’s best 
chance to remain cancer-free was to undergo surgery despite the side-effects she would 
likely experience. Just as care had come to create their family, so too, she maintained, 
would it carry them through the threat of cancer and the difficult recovery period. It 
was not so much a situation of reciprocal caregiving, of equal parts and efforts to give 
and receive care. While Karen appreciated her husband’s dedication to care for her, and 
he appreciated the sacrifice she made in removing her breasts, the care they experienced 
was not a neat, reciprocal exchange. Moreover, it makes little sense to separate the 
individual giving and the individual taking. Caring in the meshwork, as we can see, is 
more complicated than these neat formulations allow.   
 
The messiness of caring  
 
The messiness of care as it circulates within the familial body was perhaps best clearly 
illustrated to me by a Polish-Australian mother and daughter I met in late [jZW. Alicja, 
aged WX, had long suspected that she had a genetic predisposition to breast cancer. 
Investigating her possible risk of hereditary cancer had been particularly painful for the 
Polish doctor as she told me:  
 
I had two sisters who died young from breast cancer, one was [g when she was 
diagnosed and the other was eW and one lived for two years and one lived for four 
years. I made the decision on my own to go to the genetic counsellor and they told 
me I had very low risk which doesn’t make sense. It was bullshit, I think I have 
very high risk, and they did all this computing and said I wasn’t high risk but gave 
some form of comfort that there was something I could do and one of these was 
mastectomy. And I woke up a few days later and thought I am doing this and I did 
it. And that was fine and then unfortunately one of my sisters died, one then 
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another one and I was like ‘okay so there is nothing else to do, how about I just go 
and get a genetic test.’ And I was told I have very low risk so I was like ‘great and 
we can celebrate that I don’t have the gene.’ So I got the blood test [to be sure] but 
I had to pay the $[jjj because they said I was very low risk, but I said I have to 
do everything possible because I have children. So we were eating at this French 
restaurant and I was telling my friends ‘oh its great I don’t have the gene.’ But then 
I got the call for the results and it had come quite quickly I was like ‘woah, I was 
told it would be six weeks’ and I got the call after three weeks. And she told me I 
had BRCA[. It was a few years ago. And so then I decided I would get my ovaries 
out at W[. I am WX now. So five years ago. And so I hated the genetics, Nadia was 
studying genetics and I would see the books and I hated it. I hated this, I can’t 
stand it, I can’t stand the genetics department or those people. And then I went 
again [to the doctors] and now she said I have less chance of getting breast cancer 
than any other women so in the end it was positive but I have to say I found it a 
very bad experience. Even I am a doctor but I found it a terrible experience, I hated 
it and this woman, oh I hate her, whatever we will call her. She was so negative, 
[telling me] ‘you have to tell your daughter,’ and I was saying ‘she is in Year Z[ now, 
she has so much stress already’ and I was pouring my eyes out I was crying and 
she was so… I found it quite an unpleasant experience the whole thing.  
 
Despite her best efforts to keep the news of her BRCA mutation, her surgeries and her 
traumatic experience of being tested from her children, the information come out one 
day when Nadia and Alicja were having an argument. Meeting Nadia and Alicja for 
dinner in early [jZh, they explained how the confrontation came out. Here, I quote 
directly from my fieldwork notes: 
 
Nadia: I found out in a fight we had, remember, it popped out.  
Alicja: Well you wanted to move out so you had to know. 
Nadia: And then we went to the genetic counsellor and yeah 
Alicja: Nadia decided to move out, which for me was worse than giving birth, it 
was such a raw experience, and then she was more and more [angry] and she was 
like ‘I am leaving, I am taking everything’ so really I said ‘well if you are moving 
out [I am going to tell you],’ because it was so emotional 
Nadia: I think I was angry that you didn’t tell me anything 
Alicja: But what difference would it make? You were going into year Z[, it wouldn’t 
make a difference. [When I got my ovaries out], I didn’t tell Nadia, nobody knew, 
I couldn’t tell anyone, I couldn’t say… I am surprised I am here, I am talking about 
it as I couldn’t talk about it. Only one of my close friends knew. I couldn’t talk for 
years about what happened to my sisters. I had a book club and one day I told 
them and they were like ‘what?’ they didn’t know. But for me it was very traumatic 
experience. Also because my sisters, I don’t think they got the right treatment. 
They were in Poland and I don’t think… It was just a complex experience for me 
Nadia: And in Poland they only test for BRCAZ 
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Alicja: It is very rare to have the BRCA[ there so they just weren’t tested for it. So 
I told her I had the gene and she needed to know it. And then she came and said 
‘OK that means I have a hj% chance of having it.’ And she said she wanted to 
know straight away. So we got an appointment quickly 
Nadia: I was like I want to know 
Alicja: Yes, we went the next day. And then it was the holy days, Christmas, and I 
said ‘let’s go together [to get your results]’ and she went on her own. She didn’t 
want me to go with her to get the results. And she didn’t tell me for a long time 
about the results either 
Nadia: Wonder who I got that from [laughs]. I told you eventually. I did a very 
dramatic tearing up of my results 
Alicja: Yes, we went to the coast and she said ‘I have to talk to you’ so we went to 
the beach and she showed me the results and then we went to the rocks and she 
tore it in half and then we tore it in many bits and threw it in the ocean.  
 
In the preceding exchange, we get a sense of the complexities, the messiness of care as 
it circulates in the meshwork of the family. Nadia found herself unexpectedly excluded 
from the sociality of care, of being able to care for her mother during her time of need. 
A sociality founded on the partial deployments and techniques of bodies; hands 
reaching out to change bandages, of applying post-surgical tape and helping to hold 
drainage bags was kept from Nadia by her mother. Her mother worried that if Nadia 
was to give this care, it would impact on her ability to complete her final exams and 
achieve her aim of studying at university. For Alicja, withholding knowledge of her 
mutation and her surgeries from her daughter was a means of caring for her. She felt 
she was protecting Nadia from any undue distractions, worry and stress about her 
mother’s health and by extension, her own, during her exams. Nadia, however, saw this 
withholding of information as an affront, almost a denial, of their relationship of care 
and their fundamental entwining. For Nadia, her mother had not only hidden the truth 
about her health, but had denied her the opportunity to care for her during her time of 
need. Alicja saw herself as caring for Nadia by shielding her from the emotional anguish 
she herself experienced during her sister’s treatments, subsequent deaths and her own 
genetic testing. Nadia, however, considered this secrecy as an insult to the circulation 
of care that should flow within a family. Consequently, Nadia chose to exclude her 
mother from her own experience of being tested. Given the importance of care in 
constituting the sociality of the family, to be denied the opportunity to give care to her 
mother was felt by Nadia to be a denial of their very co-entailment.  
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Two years after our first meeting, Nadia, underwent a risk-reducing mastectomy at the 
age of [h. She spoke to me about her recovery experience differed from her mothers. 
Nadia had moved in with her boyfriend before the procedure and, as she told me, was 
very open with him during the entire process. He helped hold her surgical drains as she 
showered to keep them from getting wet or from tugging on her sensitive skin around 
the insertion site. He would lift her in and out of the bathtub as her chest muscles were 
too weak and tender. We see the techniques of the body, of lifting and holding, as 
central to these caring exchanges between Nadia and her boyfriend. Her mother, 
however, also took part in caring for Nadia but in a different way. During her time in 
hospital, a mere Wf hours after her operation, Nadia was visited by the hospital 
psychologist. The psychologist, Nadia told me, spoke to her for a full hour about the 
importance of re-establishing a sexual relationship with her partner after recovery. 
Nadia was left feeling overwhelmed and upset. Within half an hour, her mother 
appeared at the hospital to give the psychologist a very thorough dressing down for her 
insensitivity.  
 
Despite the difficulties their relationship had weathered, the feelings of betrayal and 
injustice, of hurt and rejection, Nadia and Alicja still found ways to express their love 
and care for one another. They tried to re-establish the flow of care that had, at times, 
faltered. While the physicality of care, the bodily techniques of changing bandages, of 
lifting in and out of the bath, was not part of their relationship as it was for Nadia and 
her partner, they still found ways of ‘being there’ for one another. They worked to 
witness and respond to each other’s needs. Care, as we see in this exchange, is 
profoundly messy. Alicja sought to care for Nadia in the way she thought was best. Nadia 
felt uncared for as her mother would not accept, or allow, her care. Nadia rebuffed her 
mother’s attempts to care for her in accompanying her to her appointments. It was 
Nadia’s partner whose techniques of the body reached out to and received Nadia’s 
tender torso. It was Alicja’s fiery words that, in defending her daughter’s privacy, cared 
for Nadia’s emotional wellbeing. In the meshwork of the family, we see how care flows 
throughout the knotty entanglement of people, how it takes on a variety of forms that 
resist any confinement to a single ‘individual’ giver or receiver.  
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Caring in the face of cancer  
 
In ignoring the intricacies of care, Martin et al. ([jZh, p. `[h) inform us, ‘we might not 
only lose what is generative in care – what makes care possible – we would also elide 
the ways that care works to animate and activate inquiry and analysis.’ Ignoring the 
complexities and messiness of care in everyday life may have analytic consequences. We 
risk leaving intact binaries that organise our world into ‘legitimate and illegitimate 
knowledge,’ ‘the rational over [the] sensory and affective,’ the individual versus 
collective, selfish versus selfless (Martin, et al., [jZh, p. `[h). In the last section of this 
chapter, I offer a detailed example of the multidirectional flow of care that took place 
within one family profoundly affected by hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. In and 
through it, I hope to reveal a world in which caregiving is not defined as care issuing 
solely from the individual woman to the rest of her family, driven by her need to fulfil 
gendered expectations. Nor do we see care as a straightforward, reciprocal gift exchange 
where care is returned in kind. Rather, in reading the experiences of Gwen and her 
family, we can see how collective, partial and embodied acts of care circulate in and 
through the meshwork of the family. For Gwen, giving care was not burdensome by dint 
of her gender. Caring was indeed immensely challenging but also sustaining, incredibly 
difficult but profoundly meaningful.  
 
I met Gwen late in [jZh. She and Lily had been neighbours some years prior and had 
bonded over their shared family history of cancer and their love for card games. Lily 
invited me along for a cards night with her, James, Gwen and her husband Kim, after 
discovering my love for canasta. I was taught by my father and played together as a 
family every Christmas. After a long night of Gwen and her husband Kim, a good-
humoured couple in their `js, patiently explaining to me the ins and outs of Skip-Bo 
(and generously overlooking the multiple times I ‘accidently’ cheated), Lily suggested 
that I interview Gwen for my project. Several of her family members had been diagnosed 
with cancer – her mother, elder sister and twin sister. Gwen kindly agreed to speak with 
me.  
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Gwen talked me through her family members’ diagnoses and the mixture of ‘sadness 
and anger’ she felt during these times:  
 
When my elder sister was diagnosed with ovarian cancer Z[ years ago, my twin 
sister and I both immediately had a complete hysterectomy. We lost my sister ten 
years ago, and the anger [I felt] was because we had not insisted that Mum take 
the same precautions we had.  Initially I was always hoping for the 'cure' to arrive 
[after her mum was diagnosed]. Mum had a hysterectomy straight away and a bout 
of chemo. She was okay for a year or so but then it came back. I think she had 
another go at chemo, but she was just getting weaker and weaker. As well as my 
mother and elder sister passing on, my twin was also diagnosed with breast cancer 
about seven years ago. Thankfully she is fine now. My father's sister died at Wh 
from a cancer which they believe may have been breast to begin with. There may 
have been a distant cousin on my mothers’ side also. Mum's elder sister died from 
pancreatic cancer about eight years ago.  
 
Gwen’s mother, Ester, had been the main caregiver for her older sister Elaine when she 
was diagnosed with ovarian cancer. With Gwen’s father, Ester helped Elaine during her 
treatment and until she passed away. When Ester was then diagnosed with cancer, 
Gwen’s family came together to ensure Ester received day-to-day care. Gwen described 
the sense of mutuality she felt in caring for her ailing mother, in helping in whatever 
way she could to minimise her mother’s pain and suffering. Gwen, her father and her 
sister were determined to help Ester stay at home for as long as possible just as Ester 
had done for Elaine a few years prior. Caring for her mother, as Gwen explained, 
involved her entire family as well as professional nurses: 
 
Initially Dad was the primary career for Mum, then, in the last six months, it 
became too hard for him. They were living [down the coast], so my sister and I 
took it week by week to live with them and care for Mum. Although it was 
incredibly hard to watch my mum in so much pain, it was also an enormous 
privilege to be in a position to care for her. I felt like I was repaying her for all the 
care she had given me my whole life. It was the least I could do.  Mum had a 
community nurse visit each day and she had a port which helped alleviate the pain. 
Naturally, her biggest concerns were the daily routines such as toileting. I 
distinctly remember Mum attending to my elder sister before she died, it 
reminded me of coming a full circle - the way you would wipe your toddlers after 
they had been to the toilet. I figured I had come that full circle with mum also. 
Towards the end, mum was eating very little. She would struggle out of bed each 
morning, get dressed and lie on the couch all day. I think she felt that if she could 
just make it out of bed, then she would last another day. She was very determined 
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to remain at home as long as she could and to this end the community nurses were 
fantastic. In the end, Mum was only in hospital overnight before she passed on… I 
guess I was always hopeful that Mum might be one of the few to survive ovarian 
cancer, but that was not to be.   
 
Care, writes Kleinman ([jjg), involves an attendance to the extreme vulnerability of 
others. It requires both the materiality of assisting with bodily functions and ‘empathic 
imagination, responsibility, witnessing and solidarity with those in great need’ 
(Kleinman, [jjg, p. [ge). Attending to her mother’s needs was incredibly tender for 
Gwen, as she tried her best to help the woman who raised her, who shaped her, who 
was, literally, part of her very being, during prolonged periods of suffering. In many 
ways, Gwen feel grateful that she had the privilege to care for her mother. She felt 
honoured to be able to help her stay in the comfort of her own home, surrounded by 
her family, for as long as possible. Gwen recognised a sense of circularity and flow in 
caring for the woman who cared for her since she was a child. Gwen assisted with the 
physical tasks of toileting that her mother had done for her some `j years prior. It was 
care come ‘full circle.’ Gwen explained the great privilege she felt in being able to fulfil 
her dying mother’s needs but also immense pain of seeing her struggle: 
 
I think one of the hardest [parts of it all] was the fact that she had just done all this 
caring for her own daughter, now it was her turn. She had led an active life both 
physically and socially and it was hard to see her so debilitated.  And she had tried 
for so long to try and beat this disease and remain upbeat, but it got her in the end 
anyway. I have always loved and admired my mother and this was in no way 
diminished by having to care for her – it just increased my respect and admiration. 
I guess in one way, it was better than her dying, say, in a car accident in that I had 
time to tell her how much I loved her, but I would not wish that slow death on 
anyone. 
 
Care, as Gwen described, was almost reciprocal in the family but not in a positive sense. 
Ester cared for Elaine as she died and then Gwen took up Ester’s place in caring. Seeing 
her twin sister and then her mother in pain was incredibly upsetting for Gwen and her 
family. Nobody wishes to see someone they love suffer. And yet, these acts of caring and 
sustaining Ester, just as she had done for Gwen as a child, increased the ‘respect and 
admiration’ she felt for her mother. Care in a family affected by hereditary cancer does 
not easily fit into neat categories of gendered responsibility or the gift. It is too complex, 
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too multifaceted, too messy. Gwen found caring for her mother increased the love, 
respect and admiration that she felt for her. And yet having to care once again for a 
loved one as they approached death was a situation she wished on no-one.  
 
After Ester’s death, her family continued to care for one another during and beyond 
their period of grieving: 
 
Mum was always the homemaker in the family, as were most women of that era. 
Three years on from her death, Dad is coping much better than initially. He still 
talks about how much he misses her whenever we visit, but it is becoming later in 
the conversation. Because of the prevalence of the cancers in the family, we have 
always been close, especially the extended family. Because I live the closest to Dad 
at the moment, our relationship has probably strengthened as I see him fairly 
frequently and he knows I can be with him should he need me. [My sister and my] 
daughters are frequently in touch and very proactive in managing the potential 
threats to themselves. We all talk very openly about what's available and when 
things should be done.   
 
Losing her mother strengthened Gwen’s relationship with her father and her extended 
family. As noted by Peters ([jjW) and Strathern (Zgg[b), after the death of a member, 
the family is likely to continue on, albeit in different configurations. Care continued to 
flow within Gwen’s family even though her mother’s and sister’s absence remained 
acutely felt. Caring for her mother, elder sister and twin sister during their protracted 
treatments and deaths for cancer also crystallised for Gwen the type of care she did not 
want her daughters to one-day give to her. Although she felt privileged to care for her 
mother and sister as they died, she would not wish this upon her own daughters. Nor 
did she want her family members to have to do so over and over again. To prevent this 
cycle of suffering from continuing, Gwen, like many of the women in the previous 
chapters, decided to remove those body parts that, although crucial to creating and 
maintaining the family, also threatened its undoing. In reading Gwen’s experiences, we 
are made aware of the problem of considering caregiving as actively given and passively 
received or as reciprocated between discrete, bounded individuals. This was not the case 
for Gwen and her family. As sisters and mothers fell ill, daughters, husbands and siblings 
came together to answer the call for care. They offered both the practical assistance 
needed, of ambulating limbs, dressing and toileting but also the request made for love 
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and for empathy. They witnessed the seemingly senseless and endless suffering brought 
about by hereditary cancer and tried to alleviate it in any small way (Kleinman, [jZh). 
Care, as Gwen’s example suggests, resists neat theoretical containment. Care often 
eludes definition, complicates measurement and pervades evaluation. Yet for all its 
difficulties, care is a profound part of human life and thus demands our attention. As 
human beings, Brenner ([jjZ, p. ehW) argues, we live in worlds that are crafted in and 
through care and our reliance on others. We are suspended in the meshworks of care 
that ‘make up our lifeworld’ (Benner, [jjZ, p. ehW).  
 
Conclusion  
 
Without care and its attendant concerns, Brenner ([jjZ, p. ehW) argues, we would ‘rattle 
around capriciously in a vast, random universe, lacking the structures in which to 
ground our actions and choices.’ While care may appear as moral striving common to 
most human experiences, it takes on particular significance for at-risk women. Having 
witnessed many generations of their close family members suffer from cancer and being 
identified as at-risk of the same fate, exposes at-risk women to the fundamental fragility 
of life itself, not only biologically but more significantly, socially. In this chapter, I have 
developed a notion of care that circulates in and through the meshwork of the familial 
body. I use this version of care to redress current anthropological approaches to care 
that see it directed unilinear-ly from the at-risk woman to her family members. In 
reducing care to the gendered responsibility or obligation to care for one’s genetic and 
affective kin, we risk overlooking the ways in which care impels bodies, specifically body 
parts, towards one another in ways that create and maintain the family. I have suggested 
that we need to move beyond understandings of the at-risk woman as the central node 
in a network of caregiving, in which her care issues out to the discrete, bounded 
individuals in her family. I have put forth the notion of the meshwork to describe the 
ways in which the partial body and its cares are fundamentally intertwined and 
constitute the family. Care, in this sense, is not given and received in necessarily equal 
measure. This situation is not feasible in a family decimated by cancer. Care, is a 
collective of partial deployments that form up the meshwork of the family. It circulates 
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in and through bodies that are already, necessarily, constructed in and through one 
another. In appreciating the meshwork of the person and the family, we are able to 
move beyond understandings of care that see it as a whole or discrete ‘thing’ with a 
singular place of issuance. This view also allows us to move beyond the unhelpful 
selfish/selfless dyad characteristic of anthropological understandings of caring in the 
context of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. 
  
 Z`j 
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Chapter Four  
An Absent Presence 
 
It was around June of [jZ` that I was sitting in Lily’s lounge room with her daughter 
Lizzy. I had agreed to be part of her ‘hairdressing salon’ which I quickly discovered 
involved her dividing my hair into two very high pigtails and adorning them with 
bedazzled clips, ribbons and brightly coloured bands. From the bathroom, Lily called 
out to me, asking if I could spare a moment away from my ‘makeover’ to have a look at 
something. On Lily’s bathroom counter was a breast pad that she had just removed from 
her maternity bra. She pointed to the centre of the pad. ‘Does that look red to you? Like 
blood?’ Sure enough, in the middle of the white pad was a small smear of red. ‘Yeah it 
does,’ I replied. ‘Great,’ Lily replied, ‘I thought it did... Shit.’ For breastfeeding women, 
blood on a nursing pad is likely to indicate that the nipple has become cracked during 
feeding. For Lily, however, the presence of blood on her nursing pad triggered alarm 
bells. Blood or discoloured discharge from the nipple can be a symptom of breast cancer. 
In the days following this discovery, Lily made an appointment to see her doctor. The 
doctor assured Lily that the blood was most likely associated with breastfeeding rather 
than breast cancer. Over the following months, Lily breasts came to occupy much of her 
thoughts. Lily already thought about her breasts quite regularly while she was 
breastfeeding. She was aware of when they were heavy with milk and it was time to feed 
her son. After discovering blood on her nursing pad, Lily’s breasts assumed a different 
presence in her day-to-day life. They became a source of concern as she worried she had 
developed breast cancer while pregnant or nursing. What had been a pleasurable 
awareness of her breasts as connecting her to her baby, nourishing him and helping him 
to grow, transformed into a presence more troubling, one that she carefully monitored 
and scrutinised. She wished her breasts, she told me, back into habituality, into the time 
when she thought about them as a source of nurturing rather than disease.  
 
The centrality of the body and its parts, writes Sharp (Zggh, p. eXX) often ‘hinges on the 
degree of control that we feel we can exercise over them, or that they have over us.’ 
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‘During times of distress and disease’ she continues, ‘we suddenly become aware of the 
body as an integral part of us’ [my emphasis] (Sharp, Zggh, p. eXX). In the last two 
chapters, I made dual claims, for the ways in which parts of bodies care in habitual 
relation to and with one another to form fleshy collectivities or meshworks, and for the 
ways in which time becomes, equally, a fleshy collective that makes bodies, at times, 
blurred. Both these positions trouble the bounded individual, the progression of time 
and the direction of care that characterise most anthropological accounts of hereditary 
breast and ovarian cancer.  In the previous chapter, I used both notions to critically 
assess the notion of ‘care,’ arguing that, contra to anthropological literature of 
previvorship, care does not issue from a singular individual source towards others, 
resulting in assessments of actions as either selfish or selfless. Care, rather, issues from 
and is directed to a collectivity of body, pain, suffering and survival that need not ‘result’ 
in anything. Care is administered and received in the most unremarkable of contexts 
and places, a resource that sustains something called ‘the family.’  
 
In this chapter, I extend this notion to demonstrate how women at-risk of hereditary 
cancer deal with the risk of dying. Rather than focusing on the individual ‘rational actor’ 
and choices they make to reduce risk, I begin with the idea that previvors want, 
overwhelmingly, to be present among the bodies that collectively form their families. 
They wish to be a part of the familial whole. They want to ‘be around’ for their loved 
ones as Lily told me. It is important to focus on something known as ‘one’s presence’ 
rather than ‘the individual,’ since the use of the latter term suggests a whole and discrete 
body that relates to other bodies in a network as such. However, the presence I speak 
of here is sometimes not a ‘whole’ body, characterised as it is by the absence of ovaries 
and breasts, in favour of one that is able to ‘be around’ as a part of the family. Thus I 
dispel with the bounded, discrete body to make sense of the collectivity of parts that 
form the meshwork of the family, this being permeable to change and flexible to the 
inclusion or exclusion of new members. 
 
As I have argued in previous chapters, some parts of the body are more important than 
others in creating and maintaining the family. However, it is also the case that these 
body parts and movements are replaceable and replicable using other actions and even 
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stand in parts, such as implants, to ensure breasted and ovarian sociality can continue. 
What is not replaceable, however, is the multiplicity of partial relations the person 
conducts as a member of the family. Indeed, it is this very multiplicity of actions that 
come to form up the person. This is so because these partial deployments are driven by 
emotion, the same driver that makes it necessary for those especially important body 
parts to be replaced or replicated in some way. They may be replaced or replicated 
through a technology such as an implant or a new technique of the body (Lyon, ZggX, 
Mauss, ZgXe[Zgeh]). Indeed, as Mazis ([jjZ, pp. [j[-e) reminds us, the body is where 
‘emotion[al] investments are located.’ The continued affective presence of the person, 
their ability to ‘be around,’ is assured when the parts that threaten to eliminate them, 
that is, potentially cancerous breasts and ovaries, are removed. Because these parts are 
replaceable and replicable, the affective presence of the person remains and so too does 
the family. The at-risk woman remains a part of the meshwork of the family rather than 
a hole, an absence.  With all of this in mind, I engage critically with the Cartesian 
mind/body dualism, that is, the notion that minds remain even as bodies become 
fractual, a point of contention for anthropologists of hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer.  
 
Minds and Bodies  
 
Cancer scholars such as Kavanagh and Broom (Zggf) argue that living with the 
possibility of developing cancer and undergoing the risk-reducing regimes it engenders 
exacerbates the Cartesian divide between body and mind. The mind, for Kavanagh and 
Broom (Zggf) is synonymous with what they call the ‘self.’  In their view, parts of the 
body come to be understood and talked about as objects able to be excised from the 
bodily whole (Kavanagh & Broom, Zggf). At-risk women, they conclude, come to 
experience their own body as ‘potentially dangerous - as liable to destroy her’ (Kavanagh 
& Broom, Zggf, p. WW[). This fear, they suggest, creates an ambivalent, even 
disassociated relationship between the body and mind/self (Kavanagh & Broom, Zggf, 
p. WW[). As such, they ascertain, the at-risk woman clearly ‘separated her self from her 
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body. Her body could be dissected, hazardous parts identified and removed, while the 
self remained - no longer under threat from the body.’ They continue:  
 
with corporeal risk a part of one's body poses a threat to the self resulting in a 
dissociation between body and self. By contrast, with environmental and lifestyle 
risks body and self are at risk simultaneously so there is no separation. In the case 
of abnormal Pap smears, corporeal risk is managed by surveillance and sometimes 
removal of the dangerous part which is cast as separate, ‘other’ from the 
threatened self. The woman who developed symptoms after diagnosis may have 
been engaged in a symbolic effort to reunite her body with herself. At the extreme, 
the disconnection of body and self manifested in one woman's desire to remove 
all potentially hazardous body parts… Cancer amplifies the Cartesian split between 
body and self; cancer which is part of one's corporeality literally attacks the self 
(Kavanagh & Broom, Zggf, p. WW[).  
 
This line of thinking is well-established in approaches to hereditary breast and ovarian 
cancer. Hallowell and Lawton ([jj[, p. Wej) express a similar sentiment, writing that 
women at-risk come to see their breasts and ovaries as ‘dangerous objects.’ McEwan 
([jZZ, p. Wj) likewise purports a splitting along Cartesian lines amongst women at-risk 
of hereditary cancer in New Zealand. She argues that such a divide allows women to 
‘separate their bodies from themselves’ in order to make decisions about risk-reducing 
surgery (McEwen, [jZZ, p. Wj). Gibbon ([jjX, p. eX) in her work on at-risk women in 
the United Kingdom, states that the readiness and ease with which her informants 
considered and underwent risk-reducing mastectomies revealed ‘a sense of detachment 
and disconnection from their bodies.’ In a similar vein, Scheper-Hughes ([jZZ, p. ZfW) 
in her work on organ trafficking, speaks of the compartmentalisation and 
rationalisation of the body that is required and subsequently produced by medicine and 
science.  These practices, she writes, necessitates and creates bodies that can be ‘broken 
down into fragments, disarticulated, de-personalized, and rendered anonymous’ 
(Scheper-Hughes, [jZZ, p. ZfW). The body, she argues in reference to Weber, becomes 
‘disenchanted’ (Scheper-Hughes, [jZZ, p. ZfW). For Hacking ([jjX), like Scheper-
Hughes ([jZZ), the development of biotechnologies associated with Western medicine; 
organ transplants, cochlear implants, gene therapy and the like, only exacerbate what 
he terms ‘neo-Cartesianism.’ He argues that, in the West: 
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The body on the ventilator is, we solemnly assert (or decree), not the person! Just 
a lot of tubes and wires (to use Cartesian images), vessels and nerves and 
remaining organs being kept pumping by being plugged into a wall socket. This is 
just an instance of our return to Cartesian instincts. We are Cartesians when 
engineering cannot save organs but only preserve them. We are equally Cartesian 
when we engage in feats of surgical engineering for large body parts. Here is an 
unpopular inference: with the ongoing advances of technology, neo-Cartesianism 
is bound to win in the end (Hacking, [jjX, p. Zjh).  
 
In the work of the aforementioned scholars, we see a propagation of the idea of the part-
able body produced by medical and scientific technologies as symptomatic of a 
refashioned Cartesian mind-body divide. In this vision, parts of the body must be 
separated from the bodily whole if the self, here synonymous with the mind, is to remain 
intact. While Hacking ([jjX) and the like make convincing arguments for neo-
Cartesianism as a result of biotechnologies of medicine and the body (in which body 
parts are replicable and replaceable while the mind or self remains intact) I think we 
can approach the idea of the part-able body differently. To reduce the experience of the 
part-able body to a consequence of the various modes of biopower and governmentality 
excised through the structures of biomedicine, science and government fails to 
appreciate how at-risk women come to understand their bodies as fundamentally, 
necessarily part-able within their local moral worlds.  
 
It is of interest here that even though they speak of identifiable parts such as breasts, 
and ovaries, these theoreticians take the whole of ‘the body’ to be set against ‘the mind,’ 
with the boundary of the flesh the main site of conflict. As I have argued throughout 
this thesis, I take the body to be foundational to these only ostensibly ‘minded’ notions 
like ‘the family.’ In my view, the family is an affectively driven arrangement of partial 
bodily interactions, and a ‘will to live’ that only appears to rely on the idea that the body 
is something to be overcome with minded determination. Rather, as I will suggest 
below, the will to live and to live with, seems to issue from a kind of body-ness, in several 
senses. This body-ness includes a body that is intended to remain present alongside 
others, part of the familial collective. It is in this sense that bodily experience both 
creates and maintains something called ‘the mind,’ but also the thing for which at-risk 
women want to keep living – the family. ‘The whole’ Strathern (Zgg[b, p. Zjh) informs 
 Z`` 
us, is ‘composed of parts.’ The person is made up of a body and bodily parts. The family 
is made up of bodies living in proximity, impelled towards each other by emotion. What 
is important to acknowledge is that the totality, be it the person or the family, is not 
found ‘in the logic of the individual parts’ (Strathern, Zgg[b, p. Zjh). It is not a mind or 
a body nor does a mother or father, sister or brother make the family. What is crucial to 
understanding the experience of these entities is rather the ‘organizing principles and 
relations’ that lie between and beyond them (Strathern, Zgg[b, p. Zjh). Such an 
approach can produce a different viewpoint than one that is deduced from whole or 
part alone. Rather than producing a chasm between the mind and the body, the threat 
to the security of the embodied, familial relations surrounding the at-risk women brings 
to the fore the very importance of the body (and its parts and its dispositions) in the 
routine creation and maintenance of family. 
 
From mind-body to presence-absence  
 
Instead of a Cartesian divide, I propose a distinction between two bodies that appear to 
us in two different kinds of awareness. As briefly outlined in previous chapters, Leder 
(Zggj) in his work The Absent Body describes how two versions of the body appear to 
us: the present body and absent body. He writes of how, in our day-to-day life, we 
remain mostly unaware of our bodies. They are absent, beyond our conscious 
awareness, and they must remain so in order for us to live our lives competently.  As 
discussed in the previous chapter, this ‘habitual’ body as Merleau-Ponty (Zg`[) suggests, 
falls behind one’s self-conscious attention in the course of everyday life. This required, 
habitual absence of the body and its machinations remains, lying below our constant 
awareness, until something provokes it to surface. At this point the body becomes 
‘present.’ Lily’s breasts became present to her as they bore the weight of her 
accumulating milk, ready to feed her son. Her breasts also became present to her when 
they produced the worrisome spot of blood. It is not the case that the whole of the body 
becomes present. As I have made clear above, I have an issue with those who would 
treat attention to one part of the body as representative of its totality. The provocation 
or ‘affective call’ that makes a body part present is, as Leder (Zggj) notes, very often 
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pain or the potential to cause pain. According to Mazis ([jjZ, p. [jh), pain draws 
attention to what is often only ‘very indirectly ever perceivable.’ Pain announces the 
body, but ‘not from the body as an isolated mechanism, but rather as at the heart of all 
the relationships of the person to the activities, things, and people within his/her world’ 
(Mazis, [jjZ, p. [jh). In stark contrast with absent bodies, then, present bodies invite 
reflection and allow persons to discover their own activity ‘in shaping the world as it is 
discovered through our perception’ (Langer, Zgfg, p. e[). Dennis has explained this 
awareness and its partiality:  
 
If I am walking down the street, for instance, I usually do so unreflexively, simply 
permitting my feet to interact with the street – to so do is to walk competently. 
But this disattendance is rudely disrupted if, say, I suddenly stub my toe. The pain 
means instant self-awareness of my foot and its failure to have performed its 
unaudienced dance with the pavement (Dennis, [jZ`, p. ZZj). 
 
This sudden awareness of the body that Dennis describes in something that Connolly 
([jjZ, p. ZfZ) takes issue with. Connolly ([jjZ, p. ZfZ) concludes that attempts to return 
the present body back into a state of absence or habituality is symptomatic of the 
‘disembodied status quo’ of society. The dysfunctional body ‘must be treated, cured and 
returned to its normative docility’ (Connolly, [jjZ, p. ZfZ). While it is certainty the case 
that Western society values productivity and the functioning, well body, I read my 
informants desire to achieve an absent body differently (Connolly, [jjZ, p. ZfZ). For the 
participants in my study, the potentiality of pain and dysfunction caused by carrying a 
genetic predisposition to hereditary cancer brought particular bodily parts into sharply 
present attention. It was in and through the concern for possibility cancerous breasts 
and ovaries, for instance, that my informants came to realise just how crucially 
important these parts were in connecting them with their familiars, and how important 
they were to the operation of the family. It is with this difference, between absent and 
present bodies, that I replace the Cartesian divide utilised by other theoreticians such 
as Kavanagh and Broom (Zggf). It is not so much the case that women felt separated 
from their bodies. It was more that they had to work to reconcile uncomfortably present 
bodies and body parts with the habitually absent ones they longed to occupy. It was by 
having an absent present body that my informants felt they could ‘be around’ for their 
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loved ones.  Present bodies may come to be displaced from their ‘usual contexts of 
engagement, of concerns, loves, hates, tasks – lost somewhere in a time and space’ 
(Mazis, [jjZ, p. [jg). This ability of illness to fundamentally reorganise daily 
experiences was often made sharply obvious to at-risk women as they cared for their ill 
family members (Mazis, [jjZ, p. [jg). In taking this view, I follow Toombs application 
of Leder’s (Zggj) foundational principles of presence, absence and partiality, which she 
sets out in the following excerpt describing her own experience of multiple sclerosis:  
 
Illness changes our relationship with our bodies. In health we take for granted that 
we have control over our bodies.  If I am seated at the dinner table and I want 
some water, I am confident that my arm will respond when I begin to move it 
towards the glass and that my hands and fingers will perform the various motions 
required to raise the glass to my lips in order that I may drink. Indeed, I am so 
certain of this bodily compliance that I pay absolutely no attention to my body as 
I accomplish this task. As I reach for the glass, I am probably listening to my dinner 
companion and I am only vaguely aware of the location of my arm. Under normal 
circumstances, I am even less conscious of bodily functions such as breathing, 
seeing, hearing, or the beating of my heart… Bodily disorder destroys this taken-
for-grantedness… It was not just that my future bodily capacities were 
questionable, but that all my projects, plans and relationships were now in 
jeopardy… The familiar [and familial] involvements of everyday life – the 
workplace, the social world of friends and colleagues seem a ‘world’ away (Zggh, 
n.p). 
 
For many of the women in my study, the ability of cancer to shrink one’s world, making 
ever-present and aware one’s bodily capacities and their taken-for-grantedness, as 
Toombs (Zggh) describes, has been made evidently clear. They had witnessed and 
experienced the limiting capacity of illness as they cared for their familiars during 
treatment regimens and underwent their own risk reduction. They saw how difficult, 
nigh impossible, these present bodies made it to ‘be around’ for their family. In 
attending to the experiences of at-risk women, we can extend this notion of the dys-
appearing body that is offered by Leder (Zggj) and developed by anthropologists such 
as Toombs ([jjZ). To do so allows us to consider how the potential failings or demise 
of the body due to cancer also generates a hyperawareness of the relationships of care 
and of family that are a part of such bodily being. It is this very nature of being a body, 
of being a sensitive body, that equips us to truly be with others.  
 
 Z`g 
Not a Cartesian divide nor a neo-Cartesian divide  
 
The ability of illness or potential illness to produce a hyper-awareness of the body’s role 
in creating and fostering sociality was experienced by Khloe as she contemplated 
starting a family with her husband. Khloe, the e[-year-old Jewish American actress we 
met in Chapter One, spoke of what it was like the grow up in a family touched by 
hereditary breast and ovarian cancer: 
 
My dad is the only living survivor in his family. He is BRCAZ positive. Everyone 
else has died of various cancers. His first sister died at e[, when he was in his early 
twenties. I was born nine months later. My family called me a miracle baby but 
that is a lot of pressure to put on a tiny child, like ‘oh I am the reincarnation of my 
dead aunt who I have never met, okay, great.’  But I wore it as a badge of honour. 
But growing up in that world, I thought ‘oh I am going to get breast cancer.’ It was 
just a way of thinking like ‘you have blue eyes, you have diabetes, I am going to 
get breast cancer.’ It was very matter of fact but also very horrible, a very difficult 
feeling. My dad’s family was two older daughters and a younger son. That is my 
family now. My sister is [X and my brother is [Z and I just turned e[ so I grew up 
as a child thinking ‘well one of us will get cancer,’ just as it happened in my family. 
I did a lot of comparing, I was scared of death, I would say ‘I love you so much’ 
whenever I left a room because I was afraid what if something happened and one 
of us died. So I lived in that fear but so did my family…  
 
Growing up, Khloe considered breast cancer to be part of her very bodily constitution 
just like her blue eyes. Khloe did not consider her potentially ill body as separate to 
herself, rather it was central to her collective existence as a member of a family with a 
hereditary cancer syndrome. To Khloe, her body was like her father’s and her aunts’, in 
fact, it was what linked her to her namesake, her deceased aunt. As we will see below, 
Khloe was not a mind in a faulty body. Witnessing her father’s family, so alike in 
composition, both genetic and affective, as her own generation, brought to the fore the 
importance of her body in the creation of her family in ways she had not expected. When 
Khloe got married, she was convinced that she would have children and then undergo 
risk-reducing surgery: 
 
I love to eat organic, I was very earthy crunchy so I was convinced we were going 
to breastfeed so I decided we are going to have babies right away. So any time 
there was a quiet moment I was like [speaking fast] ‘well let’s have kids now so I 
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can breastfeed and have the mastectomy’ and that was how I was living my life 
which isn’t really fun or sexy to a newlywed couple... I remember thinking I cannot 
wait till I am Wh or hj years old to have a mastectomy. And I knew that wasn’t the 
right way to live. I knew I would be so mad at that stage if I waited till Wj to have 
it and be scared this whole time. So I told my husband I think I want to have a 
mastectomy and I think I want to have it soon and he was like ‘great!’ He was so 
relieved. I was like ‘aren’t you worried about breastfeeding’ and he was like ‘no I 
wasn’t breastfed’ and I wasn’t either and I was remembering all these other women 
who didn’t breastfeed and I was like ‘okay that is an option...’ So I [sat] down with 
the doctor and the genetic counsellor and said ‘This is emotional because I am 
going crazy and this is really hurting my relationship and my family planning and 
my future...’  The genetic counsellor said ‘I completely agree with you.’ Because I 
waited till I was ready to have my kids [rather than having before surgery], I didn’t 
feel pushed and I was so happy. And now I am so happy with them in my life. 
 
It would be quite easy to read Khloe’s decision to undergo a risk-reducing mastectomy 
through the prism of the selfish/selfless binary. Khloe felt it was selfish of her to have 
her breasts removed before breastfeeding her future child and this caused her great 
emotional distress. However, as we see in Khloe’s explanation of her decision making, 
there were many more factors that came into play, factors that bespeak the very 
collectivity of her body and of its reproductive capacities. Khloe’s increasingly present 
breasts and ovaries came to interrupt, to alter, her relationship with her new husband. 
She felt pressure to use them to produce new relations, the relations of bearing and 
nourishing a child, before their cancerous potential could be realised. For Khloe, her 
breasts had become too present. They were not however separate from herself as a 
Cartesian reading would suggest. Khloe still saw her breasts, and her ovaries as 
important in creating relations with her husband and her child, but in a form that could 
be, rather had to be, replicated and replaced by implants. It was more important, for 
Khloe, to be able to reside in an absent, habitual body. This body would allow her to 
relate to her loved ones in a way that was not under persistent and increasing temporal 
and emotional pressures. Khloe could no longer live in such an accelerated temporal 
regime. She could no longer cope with the pressure she felt to hastily create relations 
through procreation and breastfeeding so that her present breasts and ovaries could be 
returned to a state of habituality.    
 
 ZXZ 
Leanne explained to me how her two young sons, both under the age of six, reacted to 
the news that she was undergoing risk-reducing surgery and how they responded to her 
during her convalescence: 
 
They were pretty much really good… They knew mummy was having surgery but 
we didn’t go into it. There was something on the news about a women having 
breast cancer and the older son had said ‘so what is breast cancer?’ knowing that 
my mother had had breast cancer. So we sat down and talked about what breast 
cancer was and what could happen with different cancers. And we thought, ‘well 
this is the time,’ so we said, ‘well mummy has high risk of getting breast cancer 
because of things that have happened in our family and this is the type of 
operation she is going to have. So she is going to have her boobs cut off and she is 
going to have new boobies made from her belly and that is going to hopefully stop 
the fact of her getting breast cancer.’ And there were a lot of questions asked after 
we talked about it. And then that was it, there were no more conversations about 
it and we thought ‘okay we will see how it goes’ And they came to visit a couple of 
times when I was in hospital and I came home with the drain so I think that really 
helped that they could see, I had my little bag with the drain in it, so that helped 
them to be more gentle ... I think having that visual reminder for the first week I 
was at home was really good. But they were delightful, my oldest would grab my 
arm if we went to walk across the road, and he would walk me across so that I was 
okay. It was just so sweet I thought to myself ‘why can’t they be like this all the 
time.’ It went on for a while, they would be like ‘Mummy do this,’ and I would say, 
‘well I can’t do that but I can do this instead.’ Or it would be like ‘give me a cuddle 
but we will put pillows everywhere.’ They took it really well. And they went to 
school and the eldest one said ‘my mummy is in hospital having her boobs fixed 
up.’ And I was like ‘oh great’ but we told their teachers as well to warn them just 
in case they got upset. But they are quite intelligent children so I think they took 
it in and understood. They were really, really good ‘tak[ing] the little old lady 
across the road [laughs].’ 
 
Leanne’s sons did not see her altered body, or her absent breasts, as separating or 
changing who Leanne was or is as their mother. Incidentally, the visual cue of their 
mother’s surgery, the drains hanging from her chest encouraged the boys to be even 
more careful and considerate of their mother. Other parts of Leanne’s body came into 
service to sustain the relationships of care and love that create and maintain her family 
in the absence of her hugging breasts. Her hands were still what her children reached 
out to hold and guide across the road, pillows were enlisted to pad and protect her 
surgical site so that she could snuggle with her sons. What appears out of these 
comments of Khloe and Leanne is the ways in which previously unreflected upon 
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interactions such as cuddling and having sex as a newlywed couple make very present 
the breasts, for example, as creating and maintaining these relationships. When the 
threat of hereditary cancer is made known, these parts dys-appear, they come into 
consciousness in a way that cannot be easily suppressed into a comfortable absence.  All 
the relations that these parts are normally and habitually involved in cannot be 
overlooked. Bodily disorientation, weakness, pain and suffering, Mazis ([jjZ, p. [jh) 
writes have the ability to undercut our habitual bodily avenues of involvement. It 
disrupts ‘all the projects that were echoes of what my body could do without any 
thought – that constituted my past and future horizons of engagement.’ Yet this does 
not mean that these parts or the body that they constitute are spliced from the mind to 
be diffused of their risky potential. Bodies and families created by them adapt. Parts 
crucial to these relationships are replaced or replicable, so that they may return into 
habitual absence, ensuring the continuance of the familial unit.  
 
Remembering present body parts  
 
Pain and illness, Leder (Zggj, p. Xe) submits, reorganises ‘our relations with others and 
with ourselves.’ As genes and gene mutations are passed down, mother to son, father to 
daughter, so too are the embodied experiences of living with illness and caring for those 
who suffer most acutely. These shared memories are rendered upon the flesh of the 
diagnosed but also those loved ones that are intimately enfolded in such familial skin. 
The pain associated with cancer leaves an indelible mark upon those at-risk regardless 
of their diagnosis or lack thereof. They may not be fully ‘healthy’ nor yet ‘diseased’ but 
their bodies are nevertheless heavy with the memories of caring for their dying loved 
ones. They remember raising spoons to the mouths of their loved ones, carrying limp 
bodies from the bed to couch and back again, placing ice on blistering tongues and 
peeling skin burnt from radiation. These embodied memories as just as pertinent as 
those of embracing during times of joy and laughter, commensality and camaraderie.  
 
Khloe worried about her body becoming too-present, of it becoming diseased like her 
aunts, and rearranging her relations with her family in ways she did not want. Mia 
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likewise recalled how present her mother’s body parts became when she was sick and 
how much this presence of her breasts disrupted the relations that those parts helped 
facilitate.  Like Khloe, Mia, aged eZ, worried that her baby would not be able to ‘snuggle 
in’ to her after she had a risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy with breast reconstruction. 
Mia had tested positive for the BRCAZ gene mutation when she was [[ years old. Mia 
explained that she had always felt ambivalent about breasts, hers included. Breasts had 
become something that she associated with pain and suffering after seeing her mother 
suffer through multiple rounds of chemotherapy, radiation and surgery when Mia was 
a teenager. Mia’s mother was diagnosed with breast cancer when she was We and had a 
total of three different primary breast tumours in the space of five years. Mia saw her 
mother’s present breasts in many other women as she worked as a nurse in anaesthesia 
and on the ward in a large women’s hospital.  ‘I know breasts from that aspect, distorted, 
the source of pain and death… I don’t love my breasts, they are huge after breast feeding 
and in the end they are just going to end up in the grave.’ However, she said after a 
pause, ‘I think I might mourn mine once they gone.’ 
 
Following the recommendations of their doctors, Mia and her twin sister decided to 
undergo a regime of heightened surveillance for a few years after they tested positive 
for the mutation. This was not Mia’s original plan. Mia told me how she and her sister 
had sworn that, if they received a positive result for their gene mutation tests, they 
would get their breasts ‘just chopped off.’ Mia explained that surveillance was largely 
done to appease her mother who often spoke to her about the ‘beautiful thing’ that was 
breastfeeding children. Mia said that she would have undergone the surgery much 
sooner if it had not been for her mother’s insistence to wait until she had children to 
undergo surgery. After meeting her partner, an army officer (‘he didn’t run when I told 
him about me and my family,’ Mia said with a laugh), the couple had two daughters. 
Mia had given birth to her second child three months prior to our meeting. Mia 
explained that she and her partner were planning to have a third child within the next 
Zf months [Mia gave birth to her third child in mid-[jZh]. Six weeks after the birth of 
her second daughter however, Mia spoke of having an overwhelming feeling in her 
body, something ‘indescribable:’ 
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Something in my body was overwhelmingly telling me to have surgery, so that I 
would definitely be here for them. If it wasn’t for this gut feeling I would keep 
them [her breasts], so I can breastfeed my next baby. But I just had this gut feeling 
that is was time for them to go.  
 
‘I adored breastfeeding my girls,’ Mia choked up as she spoke. ‘I will miss the feeling of 
breastfeeding, of being with my baby, and I am scared the next baby is not going to want 
to snuggle in [but] I have to do what is right for me and for my children at the time.’ 
After spending much time and energy deliberating, Mia decided to undergo a risk-
reducing mastectomy with direct implant reconstruction. Although she had considered 
undergoing flap surgery, in which a part of tissue is removed and reconstructed to form 
breasts, Mia worried about the recovery time for this procedure. ‘My two babies love to 
be cuddled, I can’t take that away from them. Six weeks without being able to pick them 
up will be horrible enough, I couldn’t cope with the three-month flap recovery.’ With 
direct implants, she informed me, the recovery would be much shorter, so she could 
pick up her girls; ‘at least with implants, my kids can snuggle me.’  
 
The thought that her body parts, specifically her breasts, may become present in the 
way that her mother’s had was, somewhat ironically, making other parts of body present 
to her. Before making the decision to undergo the risk-reducing mastectomy, Mia had 
been experiencing weekly debilitating migraines, vomiting and nausea from the stress 
she associated with her hereditary cancer risk. Her husband, during these times, took 
leave from work to help look after her and the children. Not all members of her family, 
however, understood Mia’s need to make her increasingly present breasts absent. Her 
father, she recalled, protested when she told him of her intentions to undergo a bilateral 
mastectomy. ‘Why would you do that? You might not get cancer and if you do you can 
deal with it,’ he said. Even her mother who went through multiple breast cancer 
diagnoses and treatments struggled to understand or accept why Mia chose to remove 
what she thought of as ‘healthy breast.’ Mia remembers finding her mother’s response 
particularly frustrating and upsetting as she was the one person she thought would 
understand her decisions. Mia remembers vividly how, while still in her teens, she 
would go and sit with her mother during her radiation treatments. She saw firsthand 
the immense pain she was in and the ‘blisters on her tongue.’ Mia thought that her 
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mother probably did not realise what it meant for her to question Mia’s decision. Mia 
knew deep down that her mother ‘wouldn’t want me to go through the same thing’ that 
she did. 
 
In this example, we see that Mia does not want her breasts to become present like her 
mothers and the women who she cared for in the hospital. She does not want them to 
be a source of suffering and pain nor does she want her own daughters to remember her 
breasts or see their own in the same fearful light. Mia’s concern that her breasts may 
become too-present, as sources of pain and suffering, does not however equate with a 
mind-body spilt. It is not the case that her ambivalent breasts are excised from her 
bodily bounds to protect her mind. Mia’s decision to undergo her surgery was initiated 
by what she described as a profoundly embodied and somewhat indescribable bodily 
sense that it was time for her to remove them. It was not, for Mia, a minded, rational 
calculation of risk versus benefits. Mia was also astutely aware of forms of relationality 
that have been created and nurtured by her breasts as they nourished her daughters and 
created a bosom for them to snuggle into for comfort. It is with this in mind that she 
chose a reconstruction method that will allow her most rapidly to once again cuddle 
and pick up her children. Mia did not want her breasts to become present like her 
mothers’ nor want her children to remember their presence in ways other than sources 
of nourishment and connection.  This desire however was not understood by her 
parents. For Mia, her breasts were not just ‘healthy breasts’ as her father argued. Yet 
many other at-risk women did understand this complex and ambivalent relationship 
that Mia had with her breasts. Breasts and ovaries, for many of my informants, carried 
more than one meaning. Mia’s breasts were important in creating relationships with her 
daughters, to the degree that she worried that her next child would not want to snuggle 
in to her, to be comforted by her breasts. Yet they were also parts that were present in 
another sense, as sources of suffering, of pain and of disease. These parts could become 
so present that they would in fact destroy the relationships that they had helped create. 
They could impede Mia’s ability to ‘be around’ long into the future. Mia had to make 
her breasts absent so that they could not come to assume a presence like her mother’s 
had.   
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From absent to present body to body who is an absent presence  
 
What Mia’s experiences illustrate are the ways in which parts of the body, like the 
‘ticking time bomb’ breasts or ‘silent killer’ ovaries, become present or become known 
to be present when the risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer is made known. 
What many of my informants reported was the emergence of a present body, or bits of 
it, and the relations in which it is entailed as they were made aware of their cancerous 
potential. This awareness or presence of body part does not necessitate a separation of 
mind and body, a splitting along Cartesian lines as would be expected if we were to read 
their experiences along the likes paved out by Kavanagh and Broom (Zggf) and Hacking 
([jjX). Instead of experiencing a fundamental separation of themselves from their 
bodies, women at-risk of hereditary cancer want to return to the absent body, and 
absent time, as things run along habitually beyond their conscious attention. In what is 
a cruel irony, the means of achieving this habitual, absent body primarily entails 
removing the problematic body parts, that is, cutting off the breasts and recreating them 
or cutting out the ovaries and replicating their hormonal regulation through chemical 
alternatives.  
 
As Tricia, a eW-year-old BRCAZ carrier, knew, it was absolutely critical to remove the 
breasts that had played such an important role in her relations with her family because 
if she did not, she would never be able to make them absent again. They had to be absent 
again, in order for Tricia’s family life to be ‘normal:’ 
 
My mother went through a number of different cancers and passed away from 
them and I was there with her throughout the whole journey. At the time, I also 
wanted children and wanted to ensure that if at all possible I could prevent them 
going through what I went through and watched Mum go through… I have two 
young children and I want to be around to look after them and watch them grow. 
I don't want to go through what my mother went through, nor do I want this for 
my family. I decided to have the surgery because having the check-ups every six 
months is like waiting for bad news and it is a constant reminder that I could get 
cancer.  
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No one wants to be constantly reminded of cancer, no one wants to have breasts so 
present, for the consequence would be its constant, lurking presence. Tricia required 
her breasts absence, so her family could go on.  
 
Diana, aged e[, remembered when she first told her in-laws that she was having a risk-
reducing bilateral mastectomy after she tested positive for a BRCAZ mutation the year 
before. For them, Diana recalled, her decision to have surgery was drastic, and overly 
cautious. They suggested that she ‘just do screening’ to wait and see what would happen. 
Yet, Diana explained, waiting to see what would happen was not an option – she knew 
what would happen. Her mother died of breast cancer at Wj, when Diana was only five 
years old and during her childhood, Diana remembered knowing that this was ‘not 
normal.’ She knew from an early age that she and her sisters should be concerned. ‘I 
don’t want to get cancer, I don’t want to go through what my sister did [her eldest sister 
was diagnosed with cancer in her forties], I didn’t want to get cancer or have 
chemotherapy’ she told me. Thinking about what could have been her reality, Diana 
held back tears as she spoke. She remembered that her husband’s parents did make an 
effort to come and see her at the hospital and were very nice. But they ‘didn’t understand 
[the gravity of the situation] as they didn’t have the experience of cancer.’ About a year 
after her sister was diagnosed with breast cancer, her stepmother whom had raised 
Diana since she was a toddler was also diagnosed with breast cancer. ‘This [diagnosis] 
felt like some kind of cruel joke. I couldn't believe this was happening to our family 
again, especially to my dad… this was another factor in my decision to have the surgery. 
If someone who doesn't have a genetic flaw can get it, what chance did I have!’ Diana 
wanted to be proactive. She had the surgery, so she could forget about her breasts, forget 
about that ‘sword that hangs over you.’ Diana wanted to make them absent. By making 
her breasts absent, literally casting them off from her very person and the cancerous 
potential they possessed, Diana realised how living with such present parts had 
impacted on her life:  
 
I realized after I had surgery, I realized that I thought I would end up like my 
mother, I didn’t think I would make it past that age. I didn’t want children because 
I didn’t want to die on them. I didn’t realize that this was why I felt like this until 
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after my surgery. I did not grow up as a kid knowing that I wanted to one day be a 
mum as I didn’t think I would live long enough to see them if I had them.  
 
Melissa, like Diana, felt like she had a ‘time bomb in her body’ as she wondered when 
she would get cancer and if it would be aggressive. Melissa decided that she would be 
‘better off to get a double mastectomy and be off for a few weeks’ than develop breast 
cancer. Melissa was waiting to undergo her procedure at the time of our meeting. She 
told me that she often thought of how difficult it would be to explain breast cancer to 
her autistic son without scaring or upsetting him. However, she also worried about what 
would happen if her surgery went wrong, as it did for her sister, and thus failed to make 
her breasts sufficiently absent. Her sister contracted a number of infections after 
undergoing her risk-reducing mastectomy. Melissa was her primary caregiver and as 
such, Melissa’s children saw the suffering their aunt experienced. Melissa spoke of how 
she would hate for her children to see her suffering in the same way. However, she 
remained vehement that the alternative, getting cancer, would be much worse. She 
planned to ‘just keep going’ till her risk was ‘less than one percent.’ She did wonder if 
the surgery would impact or change her relationship with her husband and her children. 
Being a major operation and physical change, she wondered whether her family would 
look at her differently. She had always had a ‘love-hate relationship’ with her breasts. 
She loved them because she ‘had e[ years with them,’ they were a part of her and were 
crucial in the creation of her family. Yet at the same time, their overbearing presence 
made her hate them. ‘I hate them,’ she declared, ‘as they are going to make me sick.’ 
 
There is no denying that body parts such as breasts and ovaries are important in ways 
that are inherently gendered as Lily explained to me. ‘I hate the thought that one day a 
doctor might say to my girls (assuming they were carriers) “you should have kids early, 
breastfeed for ages and then rid yourself of everything that makes you a woman.”’ These 
parts are important and present in the creation and maintenance of the family in 
multiple ways as Lily suggests. They cannot, however, come to be nor remain too 
present if the family is to continue on in syncopated habituality. As I have said 
previously, this is the rub of previvorship – that one needs to cut off the very parts that 
play a crucial role in relations so that they can continue as a presence, and more 
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importantly, an absent presence. As Billie et al ([jZj) argue in their work on loss and 
bereavement, the relationship between presence and absence is more complex than 
merely a relationship between two antonymic categories. They note that a paradox 
‘exists in the properties of presence and absence showing that they inherently depend 
on one another for their significance to be fully realized and conceptualized.’ By holding 
absence and presence in concert, they take on meanings that ‘are local, complex, and 
not necessarily consistent’ (Bille, et al., [jZj, p. g). This seeming contradiction between 
absence and presence takes particular form among my informants, all of whom are 
striving for a particular type of presence. They want to be absent, as in habitual, absent 
as in ‘I don’t think about my breasts as ticking time bombs anymore.’ And yet they want 
a presence, as in ‘I’m still here.’ This previvor is still here, still in the family, but not 
haunted by the relentless anxiety her breasts might otherwise present to her as present 
parts. A present presence is undesirable; imagine worrying yourself sick each and every 
day, that cancer will raise its head as it did for many of your family members. And 
absence, in the form of death is, of course, the worst of all the scenarios. An absent 
presence – that is what previvors want.  
 
Being around  
 
As the preceding ethnographic excerpts indicate, women at-risk of hereditary cancer 
experience the parts of their bodies that threaten to develop cancer as increasingly 
looming presences in their lives, preventing them from operating in habitual terms. This 
presence of, say, the breast, or the ovary, has the effect of making women realise just 
how important those parts are to making and continuing in social relations. Remember 
the ovarian sociality that lets women share in the experience of menopause as a 
collective and the breasted sociality that links babies and lovers with mothers and wives. 
One of the primary ways in which my informants returned things to normal, made 
present breasts and ovaries habituality absent, was, in fact, to make them absent – by 
cutting them off. But often cutting them off or out was not sufficient to make them 
absent in the way Leder (Zggj) speaks of, not sufficient to make them habitual. Women 
in my study had to find ways of replicating what those parts had done and been involved 
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in. Had they not, then the absence of those parts would, ironically, have made them 
continually present. Recall the examples I’ve utilised so far, in this and previous 
chapters, in which breasts are replaced so that lovemaking can continue in its habitual 
way. Or remember the ways in which cuddles are rehearsed so that other elements of 
touch – hands to backs, cheeks to cheeks – can be made of sufficient substance to bear 
the affective role of the hug, sans breasts. It is only when the relations between bodies 
can safely ignore the absence of a part that absence, in the true sense in which Leder 
(Zggj) means it, can return to familial relations. What these women I interviewed and 
spent time with want the most is to be present – present without cancer and for the 
long haul – in their families, but they want that presence to be characterised by 
habituality and an absent body. It is the absent body, fully present and alive in the family 
unencumbered by cancer or cancerous potentiality, that the women in my study 
wanted.  
 
After undergoing her risk-reducing mastectomy, Laura felt that she was finally almost 
an absent presence. She explained how she was, for the moment, an absent presence, 
something she never thought she would experience after testing positive for a BRCA 
mutation: 
 
It used to consume me, the breast cancer risk. My nan died of bowel cancer, or it 
could have been ovarian. It was a while ago so they didn’t know. But it used to 
consume me, I always knew I was going to die of cancer, I have always known that. 
But ever since the surgeries I haven’t thought about it at all. I am so glad [about 
my decision], the relief I felt straight away, the first three days are killers but it was 
so worth it. I was the first grandchild for my grandmother and she died a month 
before I was born and the same with my daughter, she would have been my mum’s 
first grandchild but she died a year before she was born so I never expected to see 
my grandchildren or they never saw their daughters get married so I thought I 
would never get to see my children get married but now I am kinda excited for it. 
Because I think now I actually have a chance to see it, to see them grow up. I have 
broken this curse by doing this stuff. So it does get me a bit excited because I never 
thought I would see this day. I have that hope that I will make it there now instead 
of just expecting not to make it.  
 
The deceased, Scheper-Hughes ([jZZ, p. ZXf) writes, are uncanny; ‘they inhabit rooms, 
closets, attics and clothing.’ They also inhabit body parts in ways that challenge 
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understandings of bodies as ‘indivisible, inalienable, integral containers and signifiers 
of human existence’ (Scheper-Hughes, [jZZ, p. ZXf). As discussed in Chapter Two, 
women at-risk of hereditary cancer often experience their bodies collectively, inhabited 
by others across time irrespective of linearly arranged time regimes and the supposed 
boundaries of the flesh. As Laura felt most acutely, her body parts was haunted by her 
deceased mother’s and grandmother’s body parts – their cancerous breasts and ovaries. 
Their parts came to consume her. Her breasts, as reincarnations of theirs, became too 
present. It was only by removing and replacing them did Laura feel that they would 
recede into absence, breaking the curse that would allow her to become an absent 
presence – one that would be around to see her own children marry and have children.  
 
Ashley was on her way to being an absent presence for herself and her family. After 
being tormented by cancer lying in wait, many parts of her body had been almost 
unbearably present. But now they were becoming increasingly absent, as was her sense 
that she might remain alive and be present in her family for the long haul:  
 
I do [think about my risk] more now that I am contemplating the next surgery [a 
risk-reducing salpingo-oophorectomy], but I go through [periods] not thinking 
about it too much until something pops up or I have a decision to make, like at 
the moment. But generally I go through life not thinking about it and not thinking 
about breast cancer much anymore. I am trying to enjoy life and plan lots of 
holidays with the family and our time ahead… I guess when I first [found about 
the double mutation] I was a bit scared about looking forward to the future as I 
didn’t know what was going to happen but now there is a bit of space… there were 
times when it was really tough to think [positively] but in the end I was sick of 
worrying… I think we will travel and have holidays and I really love working, the 
last few weeks have been great. And my husband wants to get into the police force. 
He quit his business and sold the equipment. So it is all happening. We have 
allocated a holiday fund so we can do holidays. We definitely now have that 
mindset that family time is so important and that we need to have good memories 
and doing things with the kids. And that is another reason my husband sold the 
business as he didn’t get much time at all with the boys and now he is a house 
husband and he is loving being at home with Tylor and dropping Ben at school. 
So I think, through all the hard times, we now have a really good balance. We have 
family time, time with the kids instead of always working. And onwards from there 
every year [we will travel], it’s all about having good times together.  
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Now that her breasts and soon-to-be ovaries have receded into absence, Ashley finally 
feels that she can begin to once again plan her life and her family around shared times 
and activities. She makes plans around being together and enjoying the syncopated 
family life of going on holidays and taking the kids to school. Now that her body, and 
the body of her sick child, are slowing returning to absent presence, she feels able to 
appreciate the time they have together as once again unrestrained or limited: 
 
I thought going through [cancer] with my mum, I was already cherishing things 
more but now that I have gone through [surgeries] I cherish things even more. 
Time with my boys is special and enjoying life is important. Like at work, I am so 
happy and I would never have been like this before. I am so happy, just getting out 
I am so happy. I think having a tough time with Tyler over the last two years and 
the times I couldn’t get out because I was dealing with a chronically ill child, I 
think that was really tough. That was even a lot tougher than a lot of the cancer 
stuff. But now that he is well and I am getting out and working, I am like this is 
awesome, life is really good, I am not dealing with all of this anymore. I have to 
write that down so I can remember it, it is just so good having everything go well 
at the moment. It’s a long journey… But you never know how things are going to 
work out. So hopefully by not panicking, hopefully it will all work out.  
 
Bridget, ee, was also becoming an absent presence like Ashley after she underwent risk-
reducing surgery. After going through a period of recovery and adjusting to her 
reconstructed breasts and their role in intimate relations with her husband, she found 
she did not think about her risk or her breasts anymore. She explained how her BRCA[ 
mutation and cancer risk: 
 
consumed my thoughts for most of [jZe... I'm a stay-at-home mum to four young 
kids so the decision to have surgery and not be able to ‘work’ for periods of time 
was a big deal. [My husband] had to take a lot of time off work and do a lot at 
home while I was recovering.  We've had to deal with emotions and new ways to 
be intimate. [But] it doesn't impact my day-to-day life now. 
 
For Kat, having undergone her risk-reducing mastectomy and experiencing what she 
described as life playing the ‘sick role,’ she was likewise relieved to be able to resume an 
absent presence in her everyday life:  
 
For me, it’s over. Once I get my ovaries out it will be over. That gene will not affect 
me... We had the shittest year last year but now, in two months time we are 
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travelling for four months and we decided not to have nipple reconstruction and 
to use that money for our holiday as well. So there are all these things that are a 
positive thing, I think. 
 
But sometimes, the presence of potentially cancerous body parts did not go away as 
expected despite undergoing risk-reducing surgeries. Vanessa, hZ, could never again 
take up a position of comfortable absence, could never watch the calm receding of 
presence back behind the horizon of absence after beginning surveillance for cancer: 
 
I just think when’s it going to stop, when will it stop?... I think it’s something we 
are always going to deal with. I saw my doctor on Thursday and he still wants to 
keep my appointments to every six months because apparently the liver is part of 
BRCA[ which I didn’t know. So he wants to keep an eye on my liver and I am 
thinking ‘oh no, now it’s the liver! If only they could eliminate every body part 
then I would be set.’ That would be good. It would be great. But I can’t do that.   
 
Like Vanessa, Lucy felt exasperated by her situation. Suffering from multiple surgical 
complications following her risk reducing mastectomy, she felt that she would never 
achieve the absent presence she sorely craved:  
 
It’s like as many surgeries I have done, there is still more to do. Like after I have 
my ovaries out, my doctors are talking about bowel scans. How many more body 
parts do I have to worry about? How many more can be removed? 
 
For Vanessa and Lucy, bearing a mutated BRCA[ gene meant that they felt a constant 
presence of body parts. They experienced an ongoing cycle of presence, removal, 
absence only for another part to take up presence – the liver, the bowel. For other 
informants, it was less of a cycle of parts dys-appearing as present and receding as absent 
as their potential cancer risk was identified but rather that body parts attained a new 
type of presence as a result of risk-reducing surgeries. No longer present as a result of 
their cancerous potential, these parts dys-appeared as they took on new sensory 
qualities. Often reconstructed parts felt different, making their presence known, in a 
way that could not be ignored. Kathryn, hh, spoke of the ways she felt physically 
different after her risk-reducing mastectomy and reconstruction many years after the 
surgery:  
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My body does feel different, my muscles are on top of the implants but they still 
get really sore and numb even now. When I bash my implants [into things] I still 
can’t feel it. My ribs also often hurt. I look the same as I did before but it feels very 
different. It’s hard to explain to people, they ask ‘are you better now?’ and I have 
to explain, no it is ongoing. 
 
Billie also felt her reconstructed breasts to be very present, not for their cancerous 
potential, but in the way they did not feel, did not have sensation, as they previously 
did. Their physical absence, ironically, made them very present, somewhat akin to the 
phenomenon of ‘phantom limb’ described by Merleau-Ponty (Zg`[, p. X`). For Merleau-
Ponty, when someone experiences phantom limb, it is because their body remains open 
to the kinds of acts that involved the limb if it were still operative (Zg`[ in Toombs, 
[jjZ, p. [jZ). This is true of Billie, who continues to feel the sensations of her natural 
breasts such as itching although all of her feeling breast tissue has been removed and 
replaced by a non-feeling implant:  
 
It took me a little while to get used to how they felt. Some of it is just… it’s weird 
to know that something is there but not feel it. It would be weird, I would feel an 
itch but there is nothing there for me to be itching but I could feel it and just the 
way they move when I move in certain ways, you know, even still sometimes when 
I pick something up or I don’t know, I lean on one side, you know. And underneath 
the muscle, everything just kind of goes up and I’m still a bit self-conscious. I’m 
more aware of that than I probably need to be because I feel it. I feel like everyone 
else can see it. 
 
Remember back to Chapter One and to Anne’s efforts to remove the body parts that 
had become too-present as a result of her BRCA[ mutation but also their former role in 
creating and maintaining a relationship with her now-deceased, adulterous husband. 
Despite removing her breasts and choosing not to reconstruct them, they remained a 
present reminder of the relationship she had with her husband before his pornography 
habit and cheating was revealed. Her body, even without these body parts, still 
remembers what it was like to be sexual with her husband and to feed her children. 
They remain, for Anne, an uncomfortable presence despite her best attempts to render 
them absent: 
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While I don’t have my breasts I can still feel the sensation of them being there, I 
can still relate to being a sexualized being, of having erect nipples, especially after 
exercising when my muscles become tight. I get false breast feeling. Sometimes 
my remaining muscles react like they did when I was breastfeeding or having sex. 
If I massage the area I can help make it relax but that’s not something I can really 
do in public! 
 
For some informants, it was not the physical changes to the body part after surgery that 
prevented them from returning to habitual absence. Rather it was the ways in which 
these parts bespoke relationships to others, both desired and cherished relations and 
those that were unwanted, ready to be cast off. Despite their best efforts to return to a 
state of absent presence, women such as Billie and Anne still struggled to achieve the 
habitual disattendence with their bodies they sorely craved. The pain, frustration and 
sadness that accompanies the inability of a body to recede back into habitually as an 
absent presence was something that Anya Silver felt most acutely.  
 
Death and absence  
 
Anya Silver ([jZW), poet and literary scholar, wrote the poem The Hazel Tree for her son 
Noah: 
 
The mother died and grew into a tree. 
Through the loam, she webbed her roots, 
bones branching, leafing, ripe with sap. 
In time, her body fruited, rich and brown, 
each nut a word she’d grown to tell her son 
now that her speaking human voice was gone: 
that she’d chanted stories in his blood, 
sown language in his eyes so he could dream. 
He hears the cooing of the mourning dove, 
its black band pulsing as it sings. The day- 
light’s gold and glass and soft gray wings. 
 
Anya was diagnosed with inflammatory breast cancer, a rare and aggressive form of 
cancer, when she was eh years old and pregnant with her first child Noah. Despite 
undergoing chemotherapy while pregnant and continuing extensive treatment 
following the birth of her son, Silver’s cancer returned after five and half years of 
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remission. Silver now has terminal metastatic breast cancer. While her physicians 
suspect she may carry a genetic mutation linked to her diagnosis, she tested negative to 
both BRCAZ or BRCA[ mutations. In The Hazel Tree, Silver writes of the legacy that she 
wants to leave behind for and through her son. She speaks of the gift of stories, 
memories, language and creativity that she has, through creating and giving care, 
inscribed into his very being. These gifts, Silver envisages, will live on in her child long 
after she is gone. They too will manifest into the tree that she plans her ashes to be 
buried beneath. She will become part of the root ball that will be taken up by the tree, 
becoming the nutrients that will help the tree to fruit, leaf and nut, just as she hopes 
that the skills, the stories and the love she planted in her son will continue to sprout 
long after her death.  
 
When is it, Derrida (Zggh) asks, that we are most aware of our own mortality? It is when 
facing the likelihood of death, he concludes and, more importantly, of those social 
relations that are inextricably tied to our fleshy existence; both in the sense of its 
embodied and biological existence as Anya so poignantly expresses. Thanatophobia, 
that is the fear of death, of one’s own mortality, is often drawn upon as symptomatic of 
modernity, as more people look to medical technologies as a way of overcoming their 
own mortality (Beck, Zgg[). The fear of death was certainly spoken about in my 
informants’ explanations of their decision to undertake risk-reducing surgery or regimes 
of surveillance. If we look beyond the death of the person however we can consider what 
such a fleshy demise might mean for the social relations in which the body is inherently 
entwined and how this is directive towards particular forms of action. The significance 
of this particular approach is in the insights it yields for understanding how women 
make sense of the impending loss of the potentiality of shared flesh, this being 
instrumental in creating relations of the family. It is at this point that Derrida’s 
theorising of death is pertinent. Facing death and absence, Derrida (Zggh) writes, is a 
situation in which one’s entanglements with others is most deeply felt. The 
surrendering of one’s own life is not sufficient to ensure another’s immortality. 
However, Derrida suggests, one’s very being in the world, as a social body created and 
maintained through fleshy interactions with others, inculcates a certain type of 
relationality (see McQuillan, [jjh). In quoting Levinas, Derrida writes:  
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I am responsible for the death of the other to the extent of including myself in that 
death. That can be shown in a more acceptable proposition: ‘I am responsible for 
the other inasmuch as the other is mortal.’ It is the other’s death that is the 
foremost death (Levinas in Derrida, Zggh, p. W`) 
 
Here, we are not only talking about a physical death, but rather a death of the bodily 
relations of sociality that are crucial to creating and maintaining people in familial 
configurations. As the examples I have detailed above suggest, this recognition of the 
fleshy, partial collective of the family, produces a situation in which women at-risk of 
hereditary cancer remove certain, and significant, body parts to ensure continuance of 
the family and their absent presence within it. 
 
Drawing on Heidegger’s phenomenological insights into death and being-towards-
death, Peters ([jjW) submits that fear of death exposes the inherent sociality or 
collectivity of fear. The fear of death itself is surpassed by fear of the fear experienced 
by loved ones who will live on in your absence.  He writes ‘but what if the fear of fear 
was not a fear of one’s own fear in the face of death but the fear of the other’s fear?’ 
(Peters, [jjW, p. W). Fear, Jain ([jZh: Zf[,Zgg) asserts, is a ‘central, understudied aspect 
of cancer… that sticky, primal emotion, cements so many unspoken elements of the 
cancer conglomerate.’ Peters details the existence of a dire need felt by those dying to 
attend to other’s fears and one’s own fear of this fear, it being:   
 
a genuinely intersubjective solicitude concerned, primarily at least, not with the 
demise of the self, but, rather, the fear the other has in the face of that demise. It 
is the other’s loss, their suffering, their pain that opens such fear out… The thought 
of (let us say) my own death is fearful to me to the degree that I am able to 
empathize with the fear of my child whose fear is not for my fear (the necessary 
dissymmetry that both interrupts and enlivens all empathic ambitions) but for my 
absence. Not my absence as a body, as a father/mother figure, but my absence as 
a particular weave within my child’s internal time consciousness, my absence from 
the future and futurity of their identity – their own partial death. It is this fear that 
might compel me, when death is certain and definite, to intensify my engagement 
with the future in an effort to ‘keep alive’ for the other [my emphasis] (Peters, 
[jjW, p. W-h). 
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We see this intensification of engagement with the future and one’s future absence in 
Anya’s attempts to instil her presence in and through her son in the form of words, 
stories, embodied memories and bodily acts of care. For her, these seemingly mundane 
but crucial acts represent a means of writing herself into her child’s future identity, of 
‘being around’ for him despite her physical absence. Anya sought to prevent what Peter’s 
calls the ‘partial death’ of elements of her child that may accompany her own passing. 
She endeavours to live on in some tangible form, as a tree, a nut, a fruit that can 
communicate with her son and her partner when her ‘speaking human voice was gone.’  
 
As Peters ([jjW) ascertains, the family as a social unit is likely to continue onwards after 
the death of a family member such as the mother or father. However, it will be 
fundamentally different to what is was, and what it could have been, had the person 
lived on. He continues: 
 
the futurity of death is not conceived of instantaneously as absolute discontinuity, 
but, rather, as a fearful hollowing out of continuity as one among many futures 
comes to an end…Thus my child’s fear in the face of my death is not only the fear 
of my absence but of an absence that exceeds me, that opens out onto a plurality of 
past futures that I carry within me… These are ‘part of me’ as that which I never 
was or will be, a pluralisation of my absence… [my emphasis] (Peters, [jjW, p. Z[) 
 
In this pluralisation of absence, the death of a loved one issues forth a partial death in 
one’s familial others that is not only of the ‘now’ but extends into futures, curtailing 
certain possibilities and trajectories. As a loved one passes away so too do the physical, 
material and the embodied connections that created and maintained the family as a site 
of part-ial engagements, whatever form it takes. Loss is thus co-constituted and shared 
not unlike the body. The recognition of this death of key, partial relations may prompt 
the dying person to make efforts to protect these relations and the ways they will be 
remembered and memorialised:  
 
the dying man or woman [may] compress a ‘life’ into a discourse of memory that 
significantly heightens the sense of loss. To ‘die well’ in this sense… [is] providing 
the other with a life that is capable of being lost, it is to provide the other with the 
material necessary for their own suffering (Peters, [jjW, p.Zj). 
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The death of the person becomes the death of a certain configuration, experience and 
embodiment of the family. After death, this configuration transforms into embodied 
memory, a point that Peters makes when he suggests that ‘my absence’ is an ‘absence 
that exceeds me, that opens out…’ onto others. One’s physical death does not 
necessitate the destruction of all connections with the living, as Peters ([jjW), 
Desjarlias ([jZ`), and others remind us. Indeed, we need, as Bille et al ([jZj, p. h) argue 
to pay closer attention to the ‘ability of such absences,’ of a person or thing, ‘to imply 
and direct attention towards presence.’ Losses are able to have a ‘powerful presence in 
people’s lives precisely because of their absence.’ Losses change and alter the family in 
profound ways. Strathern (Zgg[b), in her work on kinship in England, observes these 
ways in which the presence of an absence fundamentally alters possibilities for ongoing 
relationality in the family. ‘At death’ Strathern (Zgg[b: Zjf) asserts: 
 
the deceased [is] colloquially ‘cut off’ from a stream of existence that was more 
than him or her, as he or she was cut off from an active part in social relationships. 
Death terminated the enjoyment of relations, such as marriage, that remained 
thereafter frozen in the record. 
 
Death forecloses particular temporal horizons and modes of relationality. Taking note 
of phenomenological understandings of temporality, Geertz in Zg`` put forth the notion 
of social time as an awareness of the passing of time that is marked by the disappearance 
of concrete persons. This notion of time as experienced by the passing of significant 
others has particular relevance for those belonging to a family affected by hereditary 
cancer, as they often come to face mortality at an early age. Witnessing this 
‘disappearance of concrete individuals,’ of grandmothers, mothers, aunts, sisters, 
fathers, in prolonged and painful ways, and living with the enduring emotional weight 
of such embodied absences has a profound effect on at-risk women (Geertz Zg``:eXW). 
To curtail the chaos and suffering, the enduring presence of multiple absences that may 
accompany generations of cancer diagnosis, at-risk women work to ensure that the 
endings foreshadowed by hereditary cancer syndromes do not eventuate.  As I detailed 
in this chapter, this endeavour often entails the decision to forego parts of one’s body, 
those that are so crucial to making the familial unit. Felt memories and bodily archives 
of the breasts’, ovaries’ and wombs’ (partial) role in the enfolding of familial others are 
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set to be removed, surgically, from the body, bringing to the fore feelings of loss, grief 
and uncertainty. However, attempts to secure an absent presence sees that the removal 
of such parts may in turn prevent a breast or an ovary, from becoming its opposite, a 
destroyer of the social body and familial relations by allowing its fatal cancerous 
potential to be realised. 
 
Let us return to Anya. She spoke directly to the notion of presence, as she worried that 
she might not be present for her son’s progression from childhood to adulthood. She 
told me: 
 
I definitely feel that with my son… I have to give him a foundation and certain 
value system now and I can’t wait to instil certain things in him because I have to 
put him on this path now in case I die, you know. There is this constant feeling 
like I am performing. The way I feel in life is that I’m always performing for other 
people’s memories and I feel that especially with my son. I want to do things and 
behave in certain ways so that he’ll remember me in a certain way when I die. So 
it’s like I’m outside of my life looking in on this performance of my life, this 
performance for other people… And that is the problem with death because you 
become intangible. And even if you’re a religious person, you’re still intangible and 
I think, like last night, he said to me ‘can you kiss my pillow so that I have a kiss 
on my pillow forever’… There is a sense in death that you want to hold onto 
something and give your child something to hold on to and that’s why I want be 
buried in a tree [chuckles]. I want there to be this tree he can go to and say ‘my 
mum is in this tree, this tree is my mum.’ I want there to be something living. 
 
Anya wanted desperately to be present in her son’s life. She wanted to ‘be around’ for 
him for as long as she could. But the treed presence she told to me, material and tangible 
as it was, could not be the absent presence that all my informants wanted to obtain. 
This absent presence is not only one we can describe as ‘habitual,’ and ‘behind present 
attention,’ but one characterised equally by the relations that absence enables. The 
absent breasts, cut off and yet still present as they had been replaced by implants that 
women such as Ashley and Laura, were now presently absent, for their lovers and their 
kids, entailed fully in a sociality of the family. A sense of belonging arises from joint 
experiences of real parts or, indeed, replacement parts that stand in for the relations 
that were once issued from and received by real breast flesh. Reconstructed breasts do 
not just replicate the swelling one needs to wear a sweater, so that the ravages of pre-
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cancer are conspicuously absent to the casual observer. They also collect up the 
enfleshed relations that breasts once did, sufficient enough for an absent body, 
sufficient enough to be a continuing presence.  
 
Conclusion 
  
In this chapter, I have argued that, rather than causing a Cartesian divide between mind 
and body, being at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer makes women aware of 
how integral their bodies are to the making and caring of the family. At-risk women feel 
bodily parts as dys-appearing, that is, becoming increasingly present, in a way that 
interferes with the habitual interactions of the family (Leder, Zggj). While the ‘present’ 
breast or ovary draws attention to their role in certain socialities, it impedes these 
operations in the everyday – it threatens one’s ability to ‘be around’ for their loved ones. 
One of the key ways that my informants sought to make these body parts absent, to 
achieve an ‘absent presence,’ was to remove them from their bodies. Removing the part, 
however, was alone sometimes not enough to make them absent. These parts were 
replaced and replicated, so that their absence would not infer a presence. What my 
informants really wanted was to be present in their families unencumbered by cancer 
or death. These women wanted to be an absent presence, to be part of the habituality 
of the family borne in and of the fleshy interactions of everyday life. To be fully present 
and alive in the family was what the at-risk women I met wanted most.  
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Conclusion 
 
But worse than any of this is the appearance of other mothers’ mothers. . . 
Other mothers’ mothers. I devour them more jealously than a wife devours 
the anatomy of a husband’s mistress. Their thickening waists. Their sensible 
footwear. Their silvered hair, cut expensively in stylish bobs or plainly 
chopped. I study their skin, which menopause has turned parchment thin or 
plump and glabrous. How would my own mother have been? I wonder… So 
I stand in the playground studying the other mothers’ mothers… Afterward, 
I have auditory hallucinations of their voices.  
 
- Sarah Gabriel ([jjg, pp. Zgh-ZgX), Eating Pomegranates: A Memoir of Mothers, 
Daughters and Genes.  
 
Sarah Gabriel has experienced firsthand what it is like to live without one’s mother. She 
covets, from afar, the mothers, now grandmothers, that take their place at the 
playground, watching their grandchildren dance, skip and scurry about. Gabriel can 
only wonder what her mother would look like, sound like, move like and dress like as a 
grandmother, having lost her decades prior to cancer. She is haunted by these other 
mother’s mothers. Their voices follow her, reminding her of what she does not have.   
 
In this conclusion, I want to reiterate the importance I have placed on informing 
socioemotional dimensions of hereditary illness in and through what genetic 
relatedness can tell us about bodies. I have taken this stance throughout the thesis, and 
in closing, I want to attend to pain, suffering and death to make it once again. The basic 
tenets of genetic inheritance inform us that the body is anything but bounded and 
discrete. The person is a product of the partial inputs of others (in the form of genes) 
that recombine to yield a hybrid being. In paradigmatic anthropological analyses of 
genetic and hereditary illness, the bounded and discrete ‘individual’ is the key figure 
that experiences the pain and suffering of pre-cancerous life. While it is, of course, the 
case that the at-risk woman feels pain in her own body as no one else can, and while it 
is she who may die when other bodies go on living, these experiences are relational. 
Taking my cue from Strathern’s (Zggh) reimagining of the body as hybrid, I have argued 
that to understand the illness experience of women at-risk of hereditary cancer we need 
to attend to body as something that is inherently partial, porous and always relational.  
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I want to return here to an important distinction I have argued across this thesis. The 
concepts of individual, person and self, as I outlined in my introduction, are often 
conflated or used interchangeably within anthropology (Harris, Zgfg; La Fontaine, 
Zgfh). In this thesis, I have sought to distinguish between what I identify as the key 
analytic unit used by anthropologists of hereditary cancer, that is the bounded and 
discrete ‘individual,’ and what I consider to be the broader but more appropriate term 
‘person.’ The person, I argue, is a more useful concept for approaching illness experience 
as it encompasses the partial, permeable and interconnected body that was described 
to me by my informants. In using the term person, rather than individual, I am not 
suggesting that the self, that is, the experience of one’s own existential ‘someoneness,’ 
as Harris (Zgfg, p. `jZ) describes, does not exist. Nor am I suggesting that attending 
solely to ‘the social’ can encompass the fact that one physical body will bear the brunt 
of pain, suffering and may die. Indeed, it would be foolish to do so given that my 
ethnography is comprised of the stories of people such as Beth, Lily and others who, just 
like Sarah Gabriel, experience the death of their loved ones as precisely the loss of a 
unique person. The pain of cancer treatment or pre-treatment – radiation, 
chemotherapy and surgery – and the death of the person from cancer are, necessarily, 
borne out in one body that will hurt, and will die.  
 
Pain and death, in this sense, are inarguably experienced by an identifiable person. It 
was Sarah’s mother who endured multiple rounds of chemotherapy and radiation and 
Sarah’s mother who died from her metastatic cancer. However, insisting on the singular 
bounded and discrete ‘individual’ that suffers and dies, does not encapsulate the 
entirety of the experience of living with hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. Even when 
an identifiable ‘individual’ suffers from pain and dies, these experiences do not stay 
bounded. The spectre of cancer, suffering and death are deeply embedded in the familial 
bodies which, through their partial deployments, create and constitute one another. 
Recall how Lily described her breasts as entailed in her relations to her children outside 
of their nutritional functions. She would be ‘furious,’ she told me, if her breasts, once 
removed and reconstructed, ‘got in the way’ of her playing with her children. By 
returning to the stories of Beth and Lily, I refer to the key analytic themes that I have 
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developed over and across this thesis.  In and through their reflections, I hope to lay 
bare my re-envisioning of the body as necessarily partial – not discrete, nor wholly 
‘individual.’ This approach allows for a recasting of the family as founded in the partial 
relations of the flesh. The family is produced from partial, bodily inputs of others just 
as the body itself is yielded by partial, genetic contributions of others (in the form of 
genes). Bodies, in this sense, are always and already enfolded into the bodies of others.  
 
Shared insights 
 
In critiquing biomedicine and genetic technologies, anthropologists of hereditary 
cancer have cultivated a relationship with genetic medicine that limits our 
understanding and appreciation of the complex illness experience. In adopting a 
combative stance to genetic medicine, anthropologists have maintained that they 
possess a fundamentally different understanding of the body that is required as a 
corrective to biomedical and genetic approaches. These critiques have an historical 
genesis in disciplinary concerns over the misuse of genetic knowledge as evidence of 
inherent racial differences and in service of eugenic programs and ideologies (see 
Fujimura, et al., [jjf). Anthropologists, Fujimura et al ([jjf, p. `WW) posit, have 
vehemently asserted the need to study racial differences ‘as political, social, cultural, 
and psychological processes,’ rather than genetic information. These concerns remain 
relevant. Recall Abram’s (Zgg`) comments upon which I drew in Chapter Three. These 
remarks attended to the differences between medical and experiential understandings 
of sick or malfunctioning body parts. As Abram (Zgg`, p. W) asserts the ‘breathing 
body … is very different from that complex machine whose broken parts or stuck 
systems are diagnosed by our medical doctors.’  This is indubitably the case. The issue I 
take in this thesis is with anthropologists of hereditary cancer who assert that medical 
knowledge can never inform how the discipline understands and analyses everyday life.   
 
As anthropologists we need to see what concepts are shared between anthropology and 
genetic medicine and how they can inform disciplinary enquiry. I have taken a genetic 
motif in this thesis, the idea that partial contributions (in the form of genes) make the 
person and shown its continuation into the realm of the social; that is, partial 
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deployments of the body parts of persons make the family.  Some parts, like breasts and 
ovaries, forge powerful socialities with parts of other bodies. These parts, diseased or 
potentially diseased for my informants, shift from unreflexively foundational to familial 
life to frighteningly present. One of the key wishes of my informants was to return 
present body parts to absent presences. If they do not, it means that the sick part will 
remain the subject of concern.  If they cannot, it means they may die – they will not be 
absently present but deathly absent.  
 
Adopting a social and partial concept of the person, and the family, allows for insights 
into previvorship that provoke a reconsideration of the antagonistic stance taken by 
anthropologists towards genetic medicine and rearranges the foundational concepts of 
existing anthropological approaches. By adopting partiality and collectivity as key 
motifs throughout this thesis, I have departed from established anthropological analysis 
of precancerous lives that pivot around the individual who acts either selfishly or 
selflessly in her relations to others. By attending to partiality, I have been able to draw 
attention to the importance of significant body parts in creating the sociality of the 
family, albeit often unreflexively. The need for these parts to operate habitually and in 
syncopation with familial others is crucial and is what makes removing these very same 
parts to secure an ongoing presence in the family so worrisome.  
 
Anthropologists involved in establishing the theoretical foundations for considering 
hereditary cancer such as Finkler ([jjZ, [jje), as well as influential others, such as 
Sachs ([jjW) and d’Agincourt-Canning ([jj`), have shown great trepidation towards 
genetic medicine and its propensity to ‘medicalize’ the individual and the family via 
genetic testing. For Finkler ([jje, p. Wjh), genetic medicine transforms the body into 
‘abnormal, disconcerting states, thereby separating the individual from the rest’. In 
worrying over the individual being isolated from her social and cultural context 
anthropologists have, somewhat ironically, fallen back on the individual as the key 
analytic figure through which to understand illness experience. This is ironic given the 
concern routinely voiced by anthropologists such as Finkler ([jjj, [jjZ) and Novas 
and Rose ([jjj) over the capacity of biomedicine to produce the ‘individual as isolate.’ 
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Indeed, Helman outlines such critique of individualism as a core research agenda of 
medical anthropology:  
 
A feature of much of the medical anthropology literature since the Zgfjs has been 
its criticism of modern Western medicine (often termed biomedicine), especially 
for its reductionism, mind-body dualism, focus on the individual rather than 
societal problems and its view of ‘diseases’ as universal, cultural-free entities 
([jjf, p. xiv).  
 
And yet, as genetic thinking reminds us, the ‘individual’ is anything but isolated in any 
bounded, discrete sense. Bodies are made of the ‘combination of materials’ from unique 
persons which ‘create new and unique persons’ (Edwards & Petrović-Šteger, [jZZ, p. ZZ). 
Genetic inheritance, as such, bespeaks relationality and the co-construction of the 
person. As Strathern submits: 
 
At the molecular level, genetic elements recombine; at the level of the organism, 
the joining of sperm and ovum creates offspring identical to neither biological 
parent but containing elements of both. Persons, in this worldview, are ‘natural 
hybrids’ (Strathern Zgg[b: ZZZ[my emphasis]).  
 
The very making of the person, Strathern (Zgg[b) reminds us, hinges on relationality as 
the partial input of other bodies recombine to create anew. In jettisoning genetic 
knowledge of the body as both inherently composite and unique, anthropologists have 
overlooked the usefulness of such perspectives for understanding how at-risk women 
make sense of risky bodies. Such oversight into the partiality of bodies has had a 
significant impact on the ways in which anthropologists have interpreted women’s 
decisions to undergo genetic testing or risk-reducing surveillance and surgery.  
 
Shared bodies 
 
One consequence of framing the at-risk women as a bounded, discrete individual who 
relates to other individuals in a network is that it lends itself to particular readings of 
her actions as either selfish or selfless. Existing analyses of women’s decision making 
inherently invoke the categories of selfish or selflessness to explain risk reduction as a 
consequence of her mutation status and her gendered duty to care for her affective and 
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genetic kin. In the existing literature, the at-risk woman is selfish if she does not disclose 
her risk to her relevant genetic kin nor participate in a regime of risk reduction. She is 
selfless if she gives up her reproductive desires to prevent the gene mutation 
transmitting to future generations or sacrifices her cherished body parts to prevent 
cancer from developing. This reading, as I described in detail in the introduction and 
first chapter of this thesis, is common in the anthropological literature. Such an 
approach, however, offers very little insight into the ways in which women experience 
their bodies, their families and their risk of hereditary cancer in the everyday, outside 
of the high-pressured clinical encounter. Indeed, much of the anthropological research 
completed to date has taken the clinical setting as the primary ethnographic site for 
data collection and analysis, a space the at-risk women often attend alone.  
 
By taking a perspective on the body as constructed from the partial input of others, as 
is the case in genetic medicine, I put forth an understanding of the partially constructed 
person. This approach allows me to give attention to the experiences of living with the 
risk of hereditary cancer outside of the clinical, biomedical setting and within the spaces 
of day-to-day life. In the first and second chapters, I drew upon the work of Lyon and 
Barbalet (ZggW) to craft an understanding of the family that is premised on the habitual 
deployment of body parts to receiving body parts, these movements driven by emotions 
such as that of care. We see this emotion of care as impelling bodily interaction in Lily’s 
description of caring for Beth during her treatment in the vignette below. The family 
emerges as an institution that is created and maintained in and through the fleshy 
relations existing between acting body parts – Lily’s hands reaching to Beth’s arms to 
stabilise her walk back to the car after chemotherapy, Lizzy’s chubby fingers writing 
cards for Beth eyes as she convalesces in bed. As I suggested, particular parts of the body 
are more important than others in crafting this intercorporeal sociality. Breasts and 
ovaries, the parts most at-risk of developing cancer for women carrying BRCA 
mutations, are highly significant in creating and maintaining the family. I developed the 
notion of breasted and ovarian sociality to describe the ways in which these body parts 
reached out to and encompassed others to create the fleshy relationality of the family. 
Breasts were met by the mouth of babies, ovaries produced the eggs that, when met 
with sperm, would create children. In the process of risk reduction, at-risk women often 
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removed these significant body parts. In the absence of breasts and ovaries, 
approximations of these body parts, in the forms of implants, altered techniques of the 
body or hormone replacement therapy, were deployed to ensure that the socialites 
hinged on them could continue unimpeded. This circulation of body parts reaching out 
to and being received by those of familial others illuminates the collaborative 
construction of not only the family, but the person herself.  
 
Recall the comments Lily made about her ovaries in regards to her young daughters in 
Chapter One. A few months after our initial discussion in which she voiced her concern 
about losing her fertility, Lily elaborated on her fears. She told me:  
 
Thinking about risk reduction surgery makes me second guess myself a lot. I am 
not a gambler but if I was, I would definitely err on the side of caution when it 
comes to cancer and potential risk reduction surgery. You'd never want to lose the 
bet when cancer is the result. But on the other hand, there's a Wj% chance I may 
be removing perfectly healthy body parts… While I am probably going to have a 
hysterectomy, it saddens me that if one of my children ever had trouble with 
fertility, I wouldn't be able to donate an egg to help them. I am going to look into 
freezing eggs but again, I'm told this is costly. 
 
Although Lily’s ovaries dwell inside her body, they expand across both time and space 
to be taken up by her daughters as she, too, worries that hers will develop into her own 
mother’s cancerous ones. As I discussed in Chapter One, we could read Lily’s comments 
as indicative of her acting out her gendered responsibility to both surveil her own body 
and fulfil her obligations to provide for her family, especially her daughters.  But to do 
so is to overlook the ovarian sociality that hinges upon her body parts or the potential 
lack thereof. For Lily, her ovaries and their functions are equally her daughters’ just as 
hers may easily become her mother’s. Body parts, in this reading, resist confinement to 
one bounded ‘individual’ despite their physical location in an identifiable body. As 
detailed in Chapter Three, Merleau-Ponty (Zg`f) draws our attention to how one’s body, 
comes to be created and completed by others, in a fleshy form of relationality. The 
actions of seeing and feeling complete the body by holding it in attendance. Instead of 
viewing Lily’s comments through the prism of selfish or selfless behaviour, we can move 
beyond this reasoning and its reliance on a fixed, bounded and discrete ‘individual’ to 
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appreciate the ways in which her body, and body parts are co-constituted in concert 
with the partial deployment of others across time.   
 
Shared time 
 
In offering forth this vision of the family and the at-risk woman as co-constituted and 
inherently partial, I examined how other aspects of the illness experience, such as time, 
are equally shared, fleshy and partial. In Chapter Two, I put forth Timmermans and 
Buchbinder’s ([jZj) concept of the ‘patient-in-waiting’ as symptomatic of 
anthropological approaches to women at-risk of hereditary disease. In this concept, the 
woman dwells in a liminal time, waiting for cancer to come. The issue with such an 
approach is that it insists upon a linear arrangement of time as it pertains to the discrete, 
individual body. As evident in a number of my informant’s experiences of part/ial 
relationships, time emerged as something that is fundamentally familial and shared, 
and as such, is not experienced in isolation. Time, similar to experiences of breasted and 
ovarian sociality, unites bodies and body parts in ways that do not respect discrete linear 
boundaries. In the stories of Valerie, Penelope and Masha Gessen and in the opinion 
piece of Angelina Jolie, we saw the ways in which bodies are co-present across time and 
space. Parts of bodies, a mother’s cancerous breast, for example, came to inhabit and 
occupy the bodies of their daughters as they considered their risk-reducing options, just 
as genes fuse together to create new bodies in and across time. Time, for at-risk women, 
was experienced in shifting, cyclical and non-linear regimes, in moments of collision of 
past, present and future that upset our commonplace understandings of the linear 
unfoldings of day-to-day life.  
 
Lily, for example, worried that her daughters would come to occupy the time regimes 
of sickness and disease that her mother experienced during her cancer treatment. What 
will happen, Lily wondered, if she too develops cancer like her mother and 
grandmother, and her daughters have to take up the role of caregiver as she is diagnosed 
with cancer and undergoes treatment. Will this cycle of hospitals and hospice, of pain 
and suffering, Lily worried, extend forth to them? Or what if her ovaries and then her 
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daughters’ ovaries come to be diseased like her mother’s? Lily explained how she 
concerned:  
 
that [the] day will come when a doctor says ‘there is nothing we can do' and that 
makes me sad. And while I hate stats and numbers, I often count the years since 
[Beth’s] diagnosis... I worry that if I don't have risk reduction surgery, I might get 
cancer and then that will [likewise] impact [my children]. It sucks that there are 
so many members of one family that can be impacted - because it's genetic, of 
course. I worry that my kids (who are too young to understand a cancer diagnosis) 
would think that hospitals, surgery and regular visits were normal in every family. 
 
Concerned that her mother, herself and her daughters will come to share the same 
diseased parts and same illness trajectory, Lily also stressed over how this cycle of 
cancerous becoming could impact on the day-to-day rhythms of their family. In Chapter 
Two, I considered how temporality is shared in and through bodies and thus produces 
the co-temporal body of the family and the habitual rhythms of familial life. I detailed 
the micro-rhythms through which the family is created and maintained.  These rhythms 
are established through the habitual and partial deployments of bodies and body parts, 
in syncopation with those of others. As evident in the stories of women such as Lucy, 
Leanne and Kat, these familial rhythms were important and worthy of protection. 
Threatened to be disrupted by cancer and illness, these syncopated and habitual family 
rhythms dys-appear for women at-risk (Leder, Zggj).  At-risk women, like Lily, come to 
worry that the rhythms of illness, of hospital visits, surgery and enduring treatments 
regimes, will not only interrupt but replace the established rhythms of the family. These 
shared rhythms emerge as vitally important to the functioning of the family. The ability 
of illness or death to ultimately disrupt the syncopation of the family was something 
that many of these women had experienced as their own mothers and sisters were 
diagnosed with cancer. Women at-risk of hereditary cancer worked hard to re-establish 
the corporeal beat of their families, be it through establishing routines around 
surveillance and surgery that fit in with the sleeping, eating, travelling and working of 
the family or in planning milestones such as weddings, birthdays and Christmases to 
ensure that the temporal experience of family members, of the familial flesh, remained 
syncopated.  
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Consider again the experiences of Beth and Lily – despite an initially good response to 
treatment, Beth’s cancer returned in [jZW and she underwent another course of 
chemotherapy. Beth’s inability to engage in the habitual and syncopated rhythms of her 
family life became a source of great frustration and sadness for her. I witnessed the 
importance of being entailed in familial rhythms when we travelled to New York 
together with Lily, Beth’s brother and her niece to attend the FORCE conference. 
Having recently finished a round of chemotherapy and preparing for further 
gastrointestinal surgery, Beth was placed on a restricted low-fibre, low-fat diet and was 
advised to avoid public transport and crowds to limit the risk of catching an infection. 
And yet what seemed to frustrate Beth most during our trip was not the side-effects of 
her treatment; the fatigue, pain and digestive discomfort, but her inability to do things, 
to partake in the micro-rhythms of eating and moving with her family. Be it sharing the 
same meal with her brother, tasting the ridiculously decadent Manhattan desserts with 
her daughter, traipsing the streets of New York for hours or riding the crowded and 
stifling Metro at peak hour – for Beth, not being able to participate in these rhythms 
and activities of family life with ease, or without eliciting concern about her wellbeing 
by those who loved her, was most frustrating.  
 
Indeed, Beth’s determination to continue to be a part of the habitual, partial and 
syncopated rhythms of family life in an unrestricted or uninhibited way was recognised 
by Lily. As we watched The Bachelor one night in late [jZh, I asked Lily how her mum 
was coping with the clinical trial in which she was enrolled:  
 
Mum still thinks she can do everything she used to do. Sometimes I get frustrated 
at her for not taking it easy but that is not likely to change... It was hard watching 
Mum get so frustrated when in hospital having surgery or recovering from it. As 
Mum is a 'doer,' it was hard to see her in a bed and not her usual energetic self.   
 
For Beth, however, giving her all – her energy, her efforts, in the face of exhaustion – 
into maintaining normal life, normal, habitual familial life, was utterly paramount. Beth 
remains determined to have a presence, to ‘be around’ with and for her family despite 
the uncertainty and challenges brought about by her ovarian cancer diagnosis and 
reoccurrence. This type of presence – what I termed an absent presence – in which one 
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is able to disattend from their body and its potential failings, was not afforded to Beth’s 
own mother. Beth did not want this to be her experience. In drawing attention to the 
shared and profoundly embodied notions of time as experienced by women at-risk of 
hereditary cancer, I challenged assumptions concerning the primacy of the discrete, 
bounded individual who experiences illness and, as such, illness time. Exploring my 
informant’s stories of bodily co-presence, in which significant relational parts of their 
mothers’, sisters’ and childrens’ bodies came to inhabit their own bodies, I drew 
attention to the shortcomings of strictly linear approaches to illness or pre-illness 
temporality such as those evident in Timmerman and Buchbinder’s ([jZj) notion of 
patients-in-waiting. Time, whether it be of the illness experience, the minutia of 
everyday life or the syncopated, habitual rhythms of the family, refuses to be neatly 
contained, very much like genes and bodies. Time, like genes and bodies, are a matter 
of the family and of continued familial participation.   
 
Shared care 
 
Care, like time, genes and bodies, is a familial matter. Caregiving in paradigmatic 
anthropological approaches to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer reflect the 
bounded, discrete individual that they take to be their centrepiece. Care, in such 
accounts, is something that is directed outwards from the at-risk women to her family, 
both genetic and affective. There is little attention given to the notion of flows of care, 
particularly in the space of the family. This lacuna, I think, derives from the strength of 
gendered analyses of the woman as the primary caregiver in the family and how she may 
feel burdened by this role when facing the risk of hereditary cancer. This gendered 
approach, evident in Hallowell’s (Zggg) UK study, demonstrates how some at-risk 
women may and do feel, at times, obligated to and burdened by the care they give to 
their families. However, to reduce all forms of caregiving in the family to this 
unidirectional giving without receiving is misleading and overlooks the messiness of 
care in day-to-day life.   
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Moreover, these paradigmatic anthropological approaches to care within the family 
affected by hereditary cancer prefigure a version of care that is bounded and discrete, 
like the individual. Care, in these readings, is a property held by an individual who 
directs it outwards to another. While some anthropologists such as Graeber ([jjZ) have 
explored the reciprocity of care as a form of gift exchange, drawing upon Mauss ([Zghj] 
[jZj), I have argued that we need to develop this line of thinking further to consider 
how care flows within the family. In the stories of at-risk women, we can discern an 
understanding of care as something that circulates throughout bodies. Care, in this 
sense, does not have a single, identifiable place of issuance but flows through the 
complex and knotty meshwork of the family, impelling bodies, and specific body parts, 
towards one another in modes that both create and maintain the family.  This flow of 
caregiving and care-receiving across generations – mother to daughter, daughter to 
mother, husbands to wives – was evident in Beth’s description of the care operating in 
her family as she underwent cancer treatment: 
 
My family have been very involved right from the start. Thomas has been a rock 
and very supportive. When we went for doctor’s visits he always came, so there 
were four ears listening and if I came out of the appointment with a negative, he 
usually could turn it around to be a positive on the way home in the car. He was 
also very helpful on my bad chemo days, getting his own meals, helping with the 
housework (which he has done most of, ever since he retired). He also never tried 
to tell me what to do and would accept if I just needed a quiet day at home or 
couldn’t manage to go to a function – though I often pushed myself to go. Lily and 
Dylan have always listened, been there, encouraged me and visited me heaps when 
I have landed in hospital, travelling to Sydney to be with me. Thomas has taken 
me to Sydney for my trial visits, which for the first six weeks, were weekly visits. 
He has never questioned the financial side of these visits. Lily has also driven me 
up to Sydney for these visits. My brother and sister have had lots of contact with 
me over the last four years.  
  
While it is Beth’s body that contains ovarian cancer, her body is not sealed off from 
those around her, those her body helped constitute. Beth does not experience the pain 
or suffering associated with her disease alone – neither did her mother Marie – it is most 
profoundly shared. Here we can take note from Livingston’s ([jZ[) reading of Asad 
([jje) regarding the sharedness of pain. Pain, Livingston ([jZ[, p. Z[Z) suggests, is not 
an object that can be overcome by an ‘agentive individual.’ While the full depth of 
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someone’s pain may not be fully accessible to others, those who suffer are, as Asad 
([jje, p. fh in Livingston [jZ[, p. Z[Z) suggests ‘also social persons (animals) and their 
suffering is partly constituted by the way they inhabit, or are constrained to inhabit, 
their relationship with others.’ Pain thus elicits, it demands, a response. While the 
physical pain and death caused by cancer are primarily experienced in one body, this 
containment do not encapsulate the whole experience of cancer. Even when the person 
experiences pain and dies, these things do not stay bounded – the spectre of death is 
embedded in others’ bodies as they weight up what to do with their risky parts. Pain 
spills out and has to be dealt with by others – it demands response. What is important 
to note however, is that care is not necessarily given and received in equal parts. As I 
suggested in Chapter Three, this may not be possible in a family facing hereditary 
cancer. Rather, as we see in Beth’s description above, care flows within the knotty 
meshwork of the family. Beth and her family’s bodies are co-constructed, as is the care 
they provide. Paradigmatic anthropological approaches to hereditary cancer have 
framed care as a discrete or ‘whole’ thing that is given to another in the hope of 
reciprocity (see Hallowell Zggg). The complexity of care in the family, as we see in Beth’s 
description, does not fit into such neat analytic categories. 
 
The flows of care within the family is evident in Lily’s description of caring for her 
mother during her multiple cancer diagnosis. Lily and her family helped to make Beth 
as comfortable as possible during her ongoing treatment:  
 
When Mum had her first chemo treatment she was very, very sick and in bed for 
days. I unfortunately had a cold so couldn't go near her and the only way I felt like 
I was helping was if I looked after her dog. So I would walk it so that she would 
feel better knowing that Ruby was being looked after (she loves that dog). I took 
Mum out a few times to do 'normal' non-cancer related things [like the] movies 
[and] shopping. My Dad did most of the physical helping and everyday tasks. I 
have often driven her to Sydney for appointments or sat through boring chemo or 
blood transfusions. It sucks to look around and look at all the other people, young 
and old, facing a shitty battle. I made cards for Mum's weekly chemo so that she 
had something nice to read and think about when she was having chemo. The girls 
would help me make cards or crossword puzzles or stories for her. I would also sit 
with her in hospital when she was recovering from her various surgeries… I have a 
new respect for my Dad as he is normally not a patient man but with Mum and 
her treatment he just waits and waits.  
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In this vignette, Beth does not emerge as the ‘individual-as-isolate’ as a result of her 
cancer diagnosis nor is she called upon to selflessly sacrifice her own needs for her 
family or else selfishly put her wellbeing first and foremost (Novas and Rose, [jjj). 
Nor does Beth and her body appear as bounded and discrete. Parts of her body call out 
to those of her family and are met by the everyday and embodied acts of caregiving that 
take up many different forms. Alongside the more obvious acts of feeding, transporting 
and physical assistance, caregiving was a family affair for the Brooks. It flowed and 
circulated as each and every member worked to care for Beth and each other – including 
the family dog. Care and suffering are, as Lily suggests, most profoundly shared. What 
is also profoundly shared, is the sense of loss and absence that is felt in the wake of 
death of a loved one to hereditary cancer and the fear that this cycle of suffering will go 
on endlessly.  
 
A life shared 
 
For families affected by hereditary cancer, absence is something that is known 
intimately. As Peter ([jjW) reminds us, the death of a loved one and the absence this 
creates, is also the partial death of oneself. For women at-risk of hereditary breast and 
ovarian cancer, this fact is experienced acutely as parts of the family, more often than 
not, disappear. It is this reality, this cycle of pain and destruction, of bodies becoming 
too present, that women at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer yearn to change. 
In the final chapter of this thesis, I considered the ways in which at-risk women made 
sense of the death and dying they face as a result of their hereditary cancer risk. I 
suggested that what at-risk women desperately wanted was to be present, to ‘be around’ 
for their families now and in the future. They wanted to be a part of their family in ways 
that were often not possible for their own mothers and relatives. Consider Beth’s 
comments about her own mother’s death from breast cancer and how her absence 
impacted on her life, long after her mother’s passing. For Beth, the impact of her 
mother’s absence, although felt acutely at the time of her death, had a cumulative effect. 
While she tried to push on with life as ‘usual’ in the first few years following Marie’s 
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death, taking on new roles and responsibilities in the family, it was when she herself 
became a mother that she yearned for her own mother the most. As major milestones 
in Beth’s life – marriage, having children, the birth of her grandchildren – came and 
went, the presence of her mother’s absence, her absence as a source of knowledge, as a 
part of the family, as a pair of hands that reach out to embrace, to nurse a child to sleep, 
was mourned by her daughter. She explained:  
 
It was sad when she died and we all missed her, however because I had uni, had 
met Thomas and was going out with him and busy with my social life, we just all 
picked up and continued on…[T]he impact didn’t seem to happen until I became 
older with my own children. Thomas and I got married two years after her death 
and it was not so good not having her at the wedding. Luckily I had a lovely 
mother-in-law who supported me a fair bit with cooking and parenting advice. I 
think I missed her more when I had Dylan and Lily, as I realised that she was 
missing out on the grandparenting thing and it would have been good to share 
their milestones with her. When I became a grandmother, I was once again sad 
that she had missed out on this part of life as well. It is interesting too, that I 
missed catching up with all her friends’ news and some of them would ring me to 
see how I was doing and I really appreciated that and would visit them, especially 
when Dylan and Lily were small. 
 
As Beth became a mother and then a grandmother, she came to feel an intense loss and 
sadness for what her own mother had missed and the relationships she was not able to 
enjoy with her daughter or grandchildren. This possible future, of such intercorporeal 
relationality with her daughter, as Peter’s ([jjW) suggests, was curtailed by Marie’s 
cancer and death, her passing becoming a plurality of absence as it opened out to her 
grandchildren who would never know the warmth of her embrace. Being identified as 
at-risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer, as I suggested in Chapter Four, made 
women aware of how important their bodies were in creating and maintaining this 
familial relationality. The risk of hereditary cancer made women’s bodies ‘dys-appear,’ 
that is, they came to occupy an increasing presence in their everyday life in a way that 
impeded the habitual, syncopation of the family (Leder, Zggj). Consider Beth’s 
comments on how her body dys-appeared as a result of her ovarian cancer diagnosis:  
 
The hardest bit… is the rollercoaster ride that comes with having cancer. I try not 
to worry about dying, however sometimes I do and I feel a bit anxious that I haven’t 
done everything I want to do, haven’t sorted out my belongings and I also don’t 
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like the idea of not seeing the grandchildren growing up and seeing how my own 
children mature. I also sometimes worry about what will happen to 
Thomas. Having said that I also then reflect that I have seen a lot more than what 
my mother and father did and have outlived them both… My present trial is 
working very well and this is probably the best I have felt for two years. It is good 
to feel almost normal, as when you are having chemo, sometimes you really wish 
to just feel normal again and be not so tired and sick for some of the time... The 
rollercoaster side of cancer can sometimes be a bit challenging as you are not 
always sure what it is going to throw at you…  
 
For Beth, her cancerous body had become a present presence. She yearned to feel 
normal again, for her body to recede into absent presence, so that she could enjoy the 
socialites that hinged upon her body. She wished to no longer fear what may happen if 
she would become an absence – if she were to die. For those at-risk who did not, yet, 
have a cancer diagnosis, the need to secure an absent presence, rather than a present 
presence or deathly absence was paramount. Women such as Tricia, Diana and Melissa 
removed risky parts of their body in hopes of achieving an absent presence. Often these 
important parts were replaced and replicated so that the sociality that depended upon 
them could continue. Body parts became replaceable so that the unreplaceable – the 
multiplicity of partial relations that form the person and the family – could continue 
unimpeded. The affective presence of the person and the family was secured when the 
parts that threatened its existence were removed and replicated. Risk management, in 
this sense, can be read less as the rational calculations made by an autonomous 
individual as an attempt to ensure a particular type of enduring presence, an absence 
presence, within the family. This absence presence allows for the habituality of the 
family fleshed out in the bodily interactions of everyday life to continue unencumbered 
by sickness and disease. It is this mode of ‘being around,’ as an absence presence, that 
was most sorely wanted by my informants – that is, a life free from the ongoing fear of 
cancer, that is sustained by the fleshy relations of others and that can participate fully 
in the family and the care that sustains it, across time. This form of presence, as a part 
of a fleshy intercorporeal collective known as the family, troubles the bounded, discrete 
individual that characterises paradigmatic anthropological accounts of hereditary 
breast and ovarian cancer.   
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A final note  
 
The collective construction of person, body and being in and through others has been 
demonstrated across this thesis, but I am not the first to identify and discuss it. As the 
functionalist anthropologists knew, kinship could not be reckoned via the discreteness 
of the individual, nor for that matter, could societies. The institutions – of family, 
politics, education and labour – they identified had their geneses in collectivity, as the 
key functionalist metaphor of the interconnected organs operating interdependently 
within the human body, attests. Each organ operates within an organised system to 
sustain the living organism. In this view, however, the individual body remains intact, 
the organs operate collectively within a bounded corporeality. Consequently, the whole 
body is interdependently organised with and against those of others. Such arrangement 
is borne out in current anthropological assessments of at-risk women’s sociality and 
their decision making (as either selfish or selfless). In this thesis, I have tried to disrupt 
the integrity of that consistently imagined, discrete body, taking my cue from the 
disrespectful way that genes permeate the boundaries of the only ostensibly bounded 
‘individual.’  
 
The body, Strathern (Zgg[b) has argued at length, is the yield of the genetic 
contributions of others.  ‘The child’s physical origins’ she informed us, ‘lie in the bodies 
of others, a link as indissoluble as its own genetic formation is normally deemed 
irreversible’ (Strathern, Zgg[b, p. Z`h). Acknowledging the partiality of persons, in lines 
with the basic tenets of genetics, does not, however, necessarily result in genetic 
determinism or reductionism. Genetic linkages remain contingent on how persons act 
upon them as Strathern (Zgg[b, p. Z`h) herself asserts. Indeed, as post-Schneiderian 
kinship studies have shown us, people enfold both genetic facts and affective relations 
into their lives as they form the family (see Strathern, Zgg[a, Zgg[b; Carsten, [jjW; 
Marks, [jZe and Franklin, [jZe). Existing anthropological approaches to hereditary 
cancer express a deep concern over the ability of genetic facts to surpass affective 
relations in forming the family. The ‘individual’ woman who tests positive for a BRCA 
mutation may lose her capacity to choose relations on the basis of affectivity as she 
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becomes responsible for the genetic burden she, and her genetic kin, now carry. By 
strictly asserting the need to protect this discrete individual who affectively arrays her 
own kin, anthropologists of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer have fundamentally 
overlooked insights that could be offered by the partial views of the person and body 
that genetic medicine has to offer. This idea of partiality – of body and family –  is crucial 
to understanding the lives of at-risk women who deal with the possibility of having 
significant parts of their body removed. As my ethnographic material attests, my 
informants often talked about themselves as practitioners of fleshy, partial relations as 
they discussed how particular body parts connected them to their familial others, how 
these same parts came to impede the habitual operations of their family and how they 
made the gut-wrenching decision to remove them to ensure they could be a living 
presence in the family.   
 
A key argument of this thesis has been that the person is made manifest in and through 
the partial contributions of others, who are themselves made manifest in just this way. 
It is hard to think of bodies as whole, bounded entities when they are considered at the 
level of the genes. But rather than continue the objections that anthropologists before 
me have made about the erasure of the discrete, bounded ‘individual,’ I have tried to 
demonstrate that, in fleshy life, the relations between people are always partial – we do 
not encounter others as discrete and complete wholes, nor even our own bodies as such. 
As Merleau-Ponty (Zg`f, p. ZWe) informs us, the lacuna ‘where our eyes, our back, lie, is 
filled’ by the vision of others and they complete us. As Foucault (ZgXX) reminds us, all 
institutions are the outcomes of the relations of partial bodily deployments – including, 
as Lyon and Barbalet (ZggW) argue, the family. Those partial relations, between hands 
and feverish foreheads, baby cheeks and breasts, are impelled by emotion – and we need 
not dispense with them in order to ‘rescue’ the person from cold, hard genetic facts.  
Indeed, as I hope I have shown in this thesis, such intercorporeal relationality may be 
at the heart of anthropological inspiration to reveal much more about a precancerous 
life than we know.  
 
To live a life affected by hereditary breast and ovarian cancer is to experience pain and 
suffering. To struggle with the risk of hereditary breast and ovarian cancer is to confront 
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the existential uncertainty, the devastation and the incomprehensible elements of 
human existence. And yet to live with the spectre of cancer is also to live with others, 
to live for others; to be a relational being; to care; to find meaning in what may otherwise 
seem to be an incomprehensible and irreconcilable experience of suffering. It is these 
collective modes of experience that are overlooked in existing anthropological 
approaches to hereditary breast and ovarian cancer. The risk of hereditary cancer 
exposes as vulnerable the ability to continue as a fundamentally familial being, to ‘be 
around’ with and for loved ones now and well into the future. While disease and the 
pain it engenders will be borne out in an identifiable body, this pain and suffering is 
taken up by the bodies of others. In recognising the family as a sociality created and 
maintained in the fractal, fleshy relations between parts of bodies, just as the body itself 
is created from the partial, genetic contributions of others, we can produce new insights 
into precancerous lives and cancer illness experiences. These insights go well beyond 
the current, paradigmatic assertions of discrete and individual at-risk women who 
organises socially significant others consistent with selfish or selfless motives.  
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Appendix A 
Table 2: Informants information presented in order of interview schedule 2013-2015 
Name Age  
at first 
interview 
BRCA 
mutation 
status 
Gender  Ethnicity/ 
Nationality  
Risk reduction regime  
Karen 43 BRCA1 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction 
Lily 34 BRCA2 Female Australian Screening  
Beth 67 BRCA2 Female Australian Screening, clinical trial and total 
abdominal hysterectomy with 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
Lewis 75 BRCA2 Male  Australian Bilateral mastectomy and tamoxifen  
Marcia 49 VUS Female Australian Bilateral mastectomy  
Anne 62 BRCA2 Female Australian Bilateral mastectomy and risk-
reducing total abdominal 
hysterectomy with bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomy 
Mia 31 BRCA1 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction  
Melissa 32 BRCA2 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
and total abdominal hysterectomy 
with bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
Fiona 47 BRCA2 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomy  
Ruby 30 BRCA2 Female Australian Screening   
Diana 32 BRCA1 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction  
Vanessa 51 BRCA1 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction and 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy  
Celia 33 BRCA1 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with tram diep reconstruction and 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy  
 [ZW 
Leah 37 BRCA2  Female American, 
Ashkenazi 
Jewish  
Bilateral mastectomy with implant 
reconstruction  
Valerie 35 BRCA1 Female Australian, 
Irish 
Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction  
Christina 36 VUS Female Australian Bilateral mastectomy  
Bridget 33 BRCA2 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction and total 
abdominal hysterectomy with 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
Marilyn 43 BRCA2 Female British Risk-reducing total abdominal 
hysterectomy with bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomy 
Jenny 38 BRCA1 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with diem flap reconstruction  
Kathryn 55 Not tested Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction and total 
abdominal hysterectomy with 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
Jodie 32 BRCA2 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction 
Kat 26 BRCA2 Female Australian, 
South 
African 
Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction 
Ashley 36 BRCA1/2 Female Australian Bilateral mastectomy with implant 
reconstruction  
Becky  32 BRCA1 Female  Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction 
Leanne 52 VUS Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with tram flap reconstruction  
Nadia 23 BRCA2 Female Polish 
Australian 
Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction  
Alicja 47 BRCA2 Female Polish Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
and bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy  
Tricia  34 BRCA1 Female Australian Screening 
Luke 31 BRCA1 Male Australian Screening 
 [Zh 
Joanie 43 BRCA2 Female Australian Screening and risk-reducing bilateral 
salpingo-oophorectomy 
Laura  28 BRCA1 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction 
Ellen 56 BRCA2 Female Australian Risk-reducing salpingo-
oophorectomy 
Janet 39 Inconclusive Female Australian Lateral mastectomy with implant 
reconstruction  
Khloe 30 BRCA1 Female American  Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction 
Brooke  34 BRCA1 Female American Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction  
Kay 55 BRCA2 Female American Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction and 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
Jessica 54 BRCA1 Female American Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
and bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
Debbie 58 BRCA2 Female American Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction and 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
John 64 BRCA1 Male American, 
Ashkenazi 
Jewish  
Screening 
Lenny  37 BRCA1 Male American Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
Kim 61 BRCA1 Female American, 
Ashkenazi 
Jewish 
Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with SGAP flap reconstruction and 
total abdominal hysterectomy with 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
Penelope  43 BRCA1 Female Filipino 
American  
Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction and 
salpingo-oophorectomy 
Billie 28 BRCA1  Female American Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction 
Patricia  52 BRCA2 Female American, 
Ashkenazi 
Jewish 
Bilateral mastectomy with 
reconstruction and risk-reducing 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy  
Justin  58 BRCA2 Male America Screening 
 [Z` 
Anita 29 Results 
pending 
Female Pakistani 
American 
Screening 
Lucy 42 BRCA1 Female British Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction 
Paige 36 BRCA1 Female Australian  Bilateral mastectomy  
Gwen 62 Inconclusive  Female Australian Screening and total abdominal 
hysterectomy with bilateral salpingo-
oophorectomy 
Eric 64 BRCA2 Male Australian Screening 
Chloe 33 BRCA2 Female Australian Screening 
Bree 50 BRCA1 Female Australian Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction and total 
abdominal hysterectomy with 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
Jo 49 Inconclusive Female Australian  Risk-reducing bilateral mastectomy 
with implant reconstruction and total 
abdominal hysterectomy with 
bilateral salpingo-oophorectomy 
Note: All names are pseudonyms 
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